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Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by tibbydudeza on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:07PM (#19598648)
Like the Toyota unintended acceleration issue we need third parties to look at the flight control software and engineering decisions taken for the MAX line and give a an independent report.

Certainly not the FAA who delegated their oversight to Boeing.

346 people died because of their ineptitude.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by MuffinFlavored on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:24PM (#19598796)
> 346 people died because of their ineptitude.

This might be too hot of a take for HackerNews, but... look at how many people the FAA has kept safe over the past 30 years. I'm pretty sure the number of people who travel without dying is very, very high. I don't disagree that their might have been some ineptitude (I'm sure you could find that anywhere for anything since it's opinion driven), but to say the FAA is all rotten because 346 died is kind of dramatic when millions have been kept safe.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by msbarnett on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:36PM (#19599337)
The FAA has not been an unchanaging entity operating under an unchanging set of rules for the past 30 years.

In reality, major changes have been made to the way that the FAA operates and delegates authority in a series of sweeping changes since 2005 that were largely meant to cover for the fact that Congress has been severely underfunding the FAA.

The MAX is one of the first models we’ve seen wholly designed and manufactured under this new process. (substantial amounts of the underlying safety analysis of the 787 happened under the old setup)

One major change that may be relevant in this case is that whereas Designated Engineering Representatives used to do safety analysis work at Airplane manufactures in a completely parallel, firewalled cross-cutting engineering group that effectively reported directly to the FAA in a quasi on-loan model, “in order to reduce costs” the FAA allowed this to be scrapped and replaced with “Airworthiness Representatives” embedded in, and crucially answering to, the regular engineering management at the company. Company management then acts as middle-man to the FAA. AR Management at say Boeing is nominally supposed to act as independent of Boeing and represent FAA opinions, but in practice routinely pushes back on FAA requests and acts to represent the interests of Boeing management: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/delegating-aircraft-sa...

So previously if day-to-day engineering was under pressure from a manager to ship a software subsystem or complete a component design, these deadlines were unrelated to the DERs, who operated in their own safety-focused management chain under the FAA.

Now, the AR is under the same manager and pressures as everyone else to hit the ship date. It is unsurprising that quality of analysis might take a back seat to job security in such a setup.

It does not make much sense to defend the FAA by pointing at successes produced by processes that were no longer in place by the time the 737 MAX engineering programme began.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by lisper on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:32PM (#19598871)
The problem is not that this is a big number of deaths in an absolute sense. The problem is that this is a big number of deaths to result from a chain of events that can ultimately be traced back to a strategic decision by Boeing to increase profits, and where an explicit component of that strategy was to cut corners on training. The whole point of MCAS was to avoid the overhead of having to obtain a new type certificate for the new engine design, and that lead to 346 deaths. That's the problem.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by diminoten on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:54PM (#19599057)
All deaths can be traced back to some kind of profit motive, but I don't see you protesting every hospital/doctor on the planet.

It's incredibly dangerous to propose changes to the FAA, given how much of an unqualified success they've had over the years at keeping flight safe. Don't let y our populist rage kill probably one of the best/most successful government institutions the US has ever created.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by lisper on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:26PM (#19599280)
> It's incredibly dangerous to propose changes to the FAA

That is an incredibly ironic thing to say, because these deaths are a result of changes to the FAA, specifically, the delegation of the FAA's regulatory authority to the company being regulated. That this would not end well was easily foreseeable because it's such a blatant conflict of interest.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by diminoten on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:42PM (#19599369)
Literally not true, but okay...
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by cdmckay on Sunday April 07, 2019 @05:21PM (#19599958)
Which part isn’t true?
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by diminoten on Sunday April 07, 2019 @05:21PM (#19599964)
The fact that my comment is ironic...
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by lisper on Sunday April 07, 2019 @05:35PM (#19600050)
Then you don't understand irony. Which is itself ironic.

I was using the word in this sense:

"Irony: a literary technique, originally used in Greek tragedy, by which the full significance of a character's words or actions are clear to the audience or reader although unknown to the character."

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by diminoten on Sunday April 07, 2019 @05:39PM (#19600076)
This isn't a story, and I am not a character. If that's what you were using it like, you are wrong. It'd make at least some sense if you incorrectly meant "irony" in the sense that fucking with the FAA, which I said was bad, is how the MAX was made so poorly.

Your fake choice of definition is even worse than what you actually meant.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by lisper on Sunday April 07, 2019 @08:06PM (#19600831)
Wow. Not only do you not understand irony, you apparently don't understand literature either.

    All the world’s indeed a stage
    And we are merely players
    Performers and portrayers
    Each another’s audience
    Outside the gilded cage
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by diminoten on Sunday April 07, 2019 @09:55PM (#19601322)
Sounds like I do understand irony, and you don't like being called out for not understanding it yourself.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by kazinator on Monday April 08, 2019 @12:55AM (#19602250)
It is possible to see irony in real world statements, actions and situations; "irony" is not strictly the name of several literary or dramatic devices.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by diminoten on Monday April 08, 2019 @12:52PM (#19606889)
Of course it's possible, it's just not present here. I never said irony was exclusive to narratives, I said the irony he's failing to accurately point out is.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by TheSpiceIsLife on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:58PM (#19599094)
Do you mean to argue that Boing and the FAA and / or any other regulatory bodies who approved the 737MAX should get a free pass due to their outstanding work over the past 30 years?

That doesn’t sound like an argument anyone would intentionally make.

They’ve done good work, great. But these two incidents represent a fall from grace, and both organisations should be pilloried for that incompetence especially because they have a history of high standards.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by acqq on Sunday April 07, 2019 @04:56PM (#19599814)
Exactly, it's not about the "blame" is some abstract sense, it's about the process that has to be permanent in order to keep the risk low. Different people already mentioned here a work of MIT Prof. Nancy Leveson

http://sunnyday.mit.edu/

An important quote from her book "Engineering a Safer World" section "Questioning the Foundations of Traditional Safety Engineering":

"Old Assumption

- Major accidents occur from the chance simultaneous occurrence of random events.

New Assumption

- Systems will tend to migrate toward states of higher risk. Such migration is predictable and can be prevented by appropriate system design or detected during operations using leading indicators of increasing risk."

So it's: either the organizations are themselves able to keep the risk from increasing (as quoted, that is even "predictable" and of course it "can be prevented") or there have to be the external influences in that direction.

In this case, the organizations themselves failed.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by sseth on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:41PM (#19598948)
I do not see anyone condemning the last 30 years of FAA, just the more recent work. Would it not be appropriate to criticize a significant fall from their earlier high standards?

And yes the numbers are not the only relevant issue. It is the manner in which the original certification was done, the failure to act swiftly after the first crash, and the inordinate delay in acting even after the second crash which together seem to paint the picture of an organization which puts the interest of the manufacturer above passenger safety.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by cryptonector on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:19PM (#19599231)
All it takes to destroy a great reputation is one massive moral screwup. That's what happened here. And all over a relatively minor technical and economic issue: whether to require additional training. (Also there is the issue that two sensors is not enough redundancy, and using only one of them is a result of that lack of redundancy.)
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by petilon on Sunday April 07, 2019 @04:58PM (#19599829)
There is more: the airframe of the 737 MAX is not in and of itself stable. Because of the forward positioning of the large engines, the MAX's airframe has a tendency to pitch up when accelerating. Boeing decided to fix this hardware problem with software. This is flawed design. In a multi-layer system, each layer should be intrinsically safe. The job of the higher layers should be to add functionality, not fix flaws in lower layers.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by tropo on Sunday April 07, 2019 @08:19PM (#19600897)
All aircraft with podded engines under low-mounted wings have that tendency to pitch up when accelerating. This is nothing new.

The 737 MAX additionally has a tendency to pitch up when pitching up. The more you pitch the aircraft up, the more it wants to pitch up. As you pitch up more and more, you'd like the required force on the controls to increase, but in the 737 MAX it would naturally decrease.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by mobilefriendly on Sunday April 07, 2019 @08:13PM (#19600866)
This is a fundamental point, the entire stack is broken. Fixing the software is just a patch. It is quite possible that in the end, the 737 MAX will be abandoned.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by weaksauce on Sunday April 07, 2019 @06:09PM (#19600253)
I think it was not the FAA's fault but rather the fault of the shrinking budgets and deregulation in parts that offload the safety checks to the manufacturer. blame congress over the past 20 years or so. the greed of boeing to shoehorn the MCAS into the aging airframe is the issue. they didn't want to have to get a new type rating and wanted to prevent needing to retrain pilots.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by patrickg_zill on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:10PM (#19599184)
I believe the saying is "FAA regulations are written in blood" in that new regulation is written after people die from a design defect or other discovered problem in the wake of a crash.

Thus there is a discrepancy between your perspective / opinion and the typical way that the NTSB and FAA operate: this is precisely the time to address any issues.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by tus87 on Sunday April 07, 2019 @04:39PM (#19599693)
Who said all of FAA is rotten again? Or do you really think straw-men win arguments?
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by wtvanhest on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:35PM (#19598890)
Was this aircraft even under FAA jurisdiction? I thought the FAA only had jurisdiction over airline flights to and from the US.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Svip on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:53PM (#19599420)
Certifying aircraft is a long and expensive process. So generally speaking, aviation authorities 'share the burden' by relying on each other. By the same token, the FAA will take an EASA certification of an Airbus aircraft as valid without much additional checking.

FAA's reputation alone was good enough for other aviation authorities to accept its certification of Boeing's MAX 8, which is why the FAA matter despite happening way outside its jurisdiction.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by mcv on Monday April 08, 2019 @07:27AM (#19604159)
And both Boeing and the FAA have some credibility to win back here. If they don't, other aviation authorities might not trust the FAA's judgement on Boeing airplanes in the future.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by wtvanhest on Sunday April 07, 2019 @08:30PM (#19600945)
Thanks. That makes sense
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by rootusrootus on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:58PM (#19599093)
FAA absolutely has regulatory authority over plane manufacturers in the United States, regardless of where their aircraft are flying.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by XMPPwocky on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:27PM (#19599285)
Is this written into law, or is it "well, you at least need a ferry certificate for anything built in the US, because what're you going to do, push it onto a barge?"
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by pintxo on Sunday April 07, 2019 @04:18PM (#19599572)
Does it matter? We are talking about type approvals here. And this type is also sold in the US.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by XMPPwocky on Sunday April 07, 2019 @08:22PM (#19600909)
My question is "is it illegal to manufacture an airliner in the US without FAA approval, providing it's never actually flown in the US?"

It's somewhat abstract, but it's an interesting question to me, which is why I asked. Does the FAA's authority to regulate aircraft construction come from Congress specifically delegating authority over aircraft construction to them- or does the FAA only effectively have the ability to control construction because they can prevent the aircraft from flying in US airspace?

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by pintxo on Tuesday April 09, 2019 @01:49PM (#19617245)
I have no knowledge about the actual process, but can only assume that everyone is allowed to build a plane. But flying it is ~probably~ hopefully the thing that‘s regulated.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by amelius on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:32PM (#19598873)
Well, the main argument (which still stands imho) was that the FAA would not be independent in this case.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by BurningFrog on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:22PM (#19599246)
The Monday Morning Quarterback is always the MVP.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by agumonkey on Sunday April 07, 2019 @04:51PM (#19599776)
perspective is good but it seems they did a superb mistake here, not an average 'subtle systemic error'..
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by thechao on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:15PM (#19598718)
Toyota never had an “unintended acceleration issue”—that was purely human error. A Toyota engine can’t overpower its brakes, unless there was gross negligence in the care of the brakes, i.e., they were totally inoperative. Just to make sure we’re clear on the braking thing: if you were to accelerate a Toyota sedan (any of them) to 70mph, then stomp on the brakes while holding the accelerator to the floor, the car will absolutely come to a complete halt in about the same distance as if you didn’t have your foot on the accelerator. Here’s another thing to back up my claim: how do you think burn outs work?
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by ohazi on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:09PM (#19599174)
While you're right that the engine will not overpower mechanical braking, I think the bigger problem is that modern hybrid and electric cars have been moving to brake-by-wire so that they can balance mechanical braking with energy recovery.

The result of Toyota's firmware audits were terrifying [1], and I think it's still reasonable to be concerned about potential issues here. If the brake-by-wire system were to have firmware issues, your point would be moot.

The thought that Boeing probably needs a similar audit to shine light on some dark corners and encourage them to clean up their act also seems quite reasonable.

[1] https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~koopman/pubs/koopman14_toyota_ua_...

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by mikeash on Sunday April 07, 2019 @05:18PM (#19599943)
I thought the problem with braking to overcome a runaway engine was that people don’t commit to it. If you brake hard to a stop then it will work, just like you say. But if you brake some and try to figure out what’s wrong and brake some more and let up and fiddle with the accelerator and brake a bit more and on and off like that, you’ll overheat them to the point that they won’t be able to overcome the engine anymore.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by noselasd on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:22PM (#19598785)
an "unintended acceleration issue" is quite orthogonal to whether the brakes work perfectly and could overcome the engine.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by ak217 on Sunday April 07, 2019 @04:28PM (#19599625)
No, that was never proven, and as another poster pointed out, the independent audit of Toyota's practices suggests that random and uncharacterized faults in Toyota's ECUs cannot be ruled out as causes for the unintended acceleration episodes.

As another sign of this, Toyota both stonewalled the investigation and later fired the director of the division in charge of ECU engineering, and rebuilt the division.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by gruez on Sunday April 07, 2019 @05:07PM (#19599874)
>the independent audit of Toyota's practices suggests that random and uncharacterized faults in Toyota's ECUs cannot be ruled out as causes for the unintended acceleration episodes.

>cannot be ruled out

That seems like a very weak statement. If you asked a software auditing firm to inspect your massive codebase they're not going to "rule out" any bugs either.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by ak217 on Sunday April 07, 2019 @10:56PM (#19601573)
Have you read the independent report? The point of the report was that their engineering practices (both software and hardware) were so extraordinarily dangerous, the ECU was impossible to test with any authority. Its behavior was effectively non-deterministic in many of their cars from that era.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by gruez on Sunday April 07, 2019 @11:11PM (#19601644)
That's sort of the point. I'm not defending their code. I'm pointing out that even if the code were immaculate, it would be hard for an code auditing firm to say "this has no sudden acceleration bugs". It's a very CYA statement.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by amartya916 on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:47PM (#19598994)
I do not know why you are getting the downvotes, but you are correct. The DoT and independent inspectors backed up this scenario.

https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a15125313/its-all-your...

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by iforgotpassword on Sunday April 07, 2019 @04:42PM (#19599714)
This doesn't mention the horrible spaghetti code NASA found when reviewing the code. 250k lines of C with thousands of global variables. It leaves a pretty bad taste.

Then again, I still wouldn't be surprised if most people were just too perplexed if their car suddenly accelerated like crazy and not stay calm and hit the brakes as hard as possible right away. It might take you a second or two to get what's going on, and by then you might already have lost control.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by jaclaz on Monday April 08, 2019 @09:33AM (#19604997)
>Then again, I still wouldn't be surprised if most people were just too perplexed if their car suddenly accelerated like crazy and not stay calm and hit the brakes as hard as possible right away. It might take you a second or two to get what's going on, and by then you might already have lost control.

Without electronics or software involved, many years ago (1980's or so) there was a FIAT diesel engine, that was widely used on mid-sized cars, typically the Ritmo (Strada in the US) that had a servo-brake working by depression coming from the engine that had a defective membrane.

Basically, it could happen that the membrane broke/got a hole in it and the oil from the engine would enter the combustion chamber, to the effect that the engine would go up at full revs.

And you couldn't switch it off, the only way was to depress the clutch pedal, put in fourth or fifth gear and brake hard while releasing quickly the clutch.

It was a terrifying experience for someone not very familiar with cars/engines, though most people using a manual gearbox know that by depressing the clutch and braking would stop the car (so no or few accidents caused by this issue), knowing how to forcibly turn off the engine wasn't (and still is not) common knowledge, the motor would continue going on for a few minutes until something else would break or the oil in the engine would have been mostly burned (leaving the engine with no lubrication at full revs) until the engine would seize up.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Zak on Sunday April 07, 2019 @07:09PM (#19600555)
I can't speak to what most people would do, but I've experienced unintended acceleration before. The throttle stuck all the way open while I was driving a friend's car because he routed the throttle cable improperly after installing a larger carburetor for more power. I had intended to give it full throttle, but only briefly.

I stood on the brakes and didn't let up. He reached over and shut off the key, which locked the steering and put us in the ditch, but at relatively low speed due to the continuous braking.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by matt-attack on Monday April 08, 2019 @12:24AM (#19602069)
Doesn't the steering column only lock when you remove the key?
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Zak on Monday April 08, 2019 @12:45AM (#19602201)
No, and I haven't driven a car with that behavior. Most US market cars have a sequence of lock, off, accessory power, on, start as the key is turned farther clockwise. Some cars require manipulation of a lever near the key to reach the lock position.

Very new cars with an entirely radio-based "key" might behave something like that.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by matt-attack on Monday April 08, 2019 @12:21AM (#19602053)
I agree with your first statement that it's clearly human error but I disagree with the argument about burn outs. Static friction is an entirely different mechanism than kinetic friction. The force needed to stop the car in your first scenario is kinetic friction. Burn outs work by static friction. In general, static friction is the higher of the two.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by TheSpiceIsLife on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:05PM (#19599144)
if you were to accelerate a Toyota sedan (any of them) to 70mph, then stomp on the brakes while holding the accelerator to the floor, the car will absolutely come to a complete halt in about the same distance as if you didn’t have your foot on the accelerator.

Are you saying the additional, let’s say, what?, 60kW of power being applied to the wheels will require no additional effort at the brake pedal to overcome.

Colour me unconvinced.

I’ve never tried to imitate a burnout at 70mph / I’m not convinced the circumstances are the same.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Baeocystin on Sunday April 07, 2019 @04:11PM (#19599522)
Assuming a properly-maintained braking system, it makes very little difference.

>And despite dramatic horsepower increases since C/D’s 1987 unintended-acceleration test of an Audi 5000, brakes by and large can still overpower and rein in an engine roaring under full throttle. With the Camry’s throttle pinned while going 70 mph, the brakes easily overcame all 268 horsepower straining against them and stopped the car in 190 feet—that’s a foot shorter than the performance of a Ford Taurus without any gas-pedal problems and just 16 feet longer than with the Camry’s throttle closed.

From https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a16576573/how-to-deal-...

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by TheSpiceIsLife on Sunday April 07, 2019 @06:27PM (#19600350)
Hmmm, interesting. Colour me convinced.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by seandougall on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:25PM (#19598806)
That sounds like a fun experiment to try on, say, a winding mountain road...
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by shhehebehdh on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:53PM (#19599051)
I wonder if people making this comparison will appreciate the irony if someday it proves that the same situation applies here (I.e. user error).
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by rasz on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:20PM (#19598767)
I agree, we need someone like Michael Barr to comb thru supposedly clean safety certified Ada codebase (in reality most likely full of C++ garbage).
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by mrpippy on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:51PM (#19599034)
The problem here is not a software bug—-the software performed as designed, the design was just bad.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Gibbon1 on Sunday April 07, 2019 @06:38PM (#19600403)
Yeah there was exactly one single point probably mechanical failure, the AOA sensor.

I'm coming down on the side of the cause of these accidents was due to the failure to properly type certify the aircraft. Because they were trying to avoid that they failed to do the system analysis and testing including simulator testing that would have easily found this.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by 4thaccount on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:45PM (#19598977)
Is there a percentage pie chart for what was used on the MAX? Like 80% Ada, 15% C++, and 5% C? I wonder if we'll see a move to things like Spark where proof verification becomes more standard? I don't know much about avionics software, so any educated comments are welcome.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by fmihaila on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:57PM (#19599435)
> Is there a percentage pie chart for what was used on the MAX? Like 80% Ada, 15% C++, and 5% C? I wonder if we'll see a move to things like Spark where proof verification becomes more standard? I don't know much about avionics software, so any educated comments are welcome.

It's not about software verification. In this case, the verifier would have given it a pass (with respect to this particular accident).

It's about bad management/bad requirements:

- "minimization of pilot training is the overarching requirement"

- "it's okay to feed only a single sensor into MCAS, even though there are two of them on the plane"

- "it's okay to sell critical safety equipment as options costing extra"

- "it's okay to not tell any pilot about any of this, since we practically didn't change anything".

This particular one is not about C++.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by 4thaccount on Sunday April 07, 2019 @05:04PM (#19599859)
Agreed that static analysis/proof verification only gets you so far. I was just thinking that the visibility of the incident might lead to some companies asking how they can go even further to make things safer. Of course the first and most important steps consist of what you're saying above, followed by doing whatever they can on the software front if they aren't doing it already.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Retric on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:12PM (#19598697)
At best, stricter regulations may have resulted in a different design to comply with US regulations. The FAA is not a global organization, they don’t have oversight over any of the crashed aircraft. So, it’s tricky to place blame on US regulators for foreign crashes.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by trimbo on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:01PM (#19599115)
> The FAA is not a global organization, they don’t have oversight over any of the crashed aircraft.

The FAA has bilateral agreements with other countries and the EU for certification[1]. I read recently but can't quickly find in this that the FAA trusts EASA's certs for Airbus flying in the US.

The Ethiopian agency also trusts the FAA and EASA for this information[2]

So, it's not really tricky here, we can blame the FAA for the crash of a US manufactured plane in a foreign land (if the problem was the FAA's certification process).

[1] - https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/international/bilatera...

[2] - https://web.archive.org/web/20180215175924/http://www.ecaa.g...

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Retric on Sunday April 07, 2019 @03:51PM (#19599409)
Edit: The entire point around these regulations is managing trust. Aircraft manufacturers are trying to build safe aircraft, the question is how much oversight is nessisary. EASA largely trusted the FAA and the FAA largely trusted Boing which they need to do. EASA can’t verify every bolt, they need to trust the manufacturer’s process to some degree.

So, EASA can’t really abandon blame as easily as they abandon responsibility. If they allow a flawed process to continue then that’s on them.

However, in this case these agreements still give EASA veto authority about what aircraft are allowed. Which is why EASA was able to ground these airplanes before the FAA did.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by throwawaycert on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:48PM (#19599006)
While in a de jure sense this is true, de facto the FAA effectively does have oversight over many (maybe most) commercial aircraft all over the world. Small countries in particular do not have the resources necessary to exercise meaningful oversight over every type of aircraft on the planet, and defer to FAA decisions in virtually every respect for Boeing and other American-made aircraft, and the US FAA and NTSB are involved in the investigation of virtually every incident involving a Boeing aircraft anywhere in the world.

Even larger, well-resourced geopolitical entities like the EU rely heavily on the FAA to do its job for Boeing aircraft, much as the FAA relies on the EASA to do its job for Airbus aircraft. It's not pure rubber stamping, but it's close enough that things like this can pretty easily happen if a manufacturer's home agency falls asleep at the switch.

An example of the FAA's influence: Airworthiness regulations are so closely coordinated that special numbering is used by Canada, Europe, and Japan to match the numbering of FAA airworthiness regulations for easy cross-referencing. The FAA is also delegated air traffic control responsibility for much of the world's international airspace by the ICAO.

It is basically impossible to fly a commercial aircraft on Earth without being under the – possibly very heavy – influence of US civil aviation authorities, and it would take a great many resources and serious, concerted political will by many countries to change that.

Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by jeltz on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:14PM (#19598716)
That just means FAA wasn't the only inept organization.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Retric on Sunday April 07, 2019 @02:19PM (#19598759)
Blaming EASA/FAA/Boing etc feels good, but calling them inept becase they are not perfect is overstating things. Looking back it seems like an obviously bad call, but that’s hindsight bias.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by jeltz on Sunday April 07, 2019 @05:34PM (#19600043)
I did not blame FAA, I was just pointing out why your logic was flawed. Just because the plane crashes did not happen in the US does not mean that the FAA may not be at fault. The FAA had approved the plane and it was operated the same way in Africa as in the US so it is just chance that none of the crashes happened in the US.
Re:Boeing MAX production cut signals long grounding by Retric on Monday April 08, 2019 @08:57AM (#19604737)
FAA has many regulations that most of Africa does not.

So, no they where not operated in the same fashion. It’s still been grounded in the US for good reasons, but you can’t take individual regulations in isolation.