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Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by sofaofthedamned on Saturday March 30, 2019 @11:50AM (#19529996)
Agreed. OP is one angry human being.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by mindslight on Saturday March 30, 2019 @11:55AM (#19530030)
Are we really so far gone that expressing a strong opinion with a little hyperbole is interpreted as "anger" ?

The adjective I'd use to describe OP's writing is "resolute". And in these days when surveillance and other corporate monsters continually bathe us in soft nudging to acquiesce to their agendas, it is a stance that's quite necessary.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by jayd16 on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:17PM (#19530176)
But its totally misplaced emotion. The whole design goal of a chromebook is constantly push signed OTA updates. They give you a hardware switch to turn off the signature checks. His comment that a hardware key you'd certainly lose is better than a jumper is pretty weak.

If you don't like them, fine, but this just comes off as nerd rage in an attempt at saying "I am very smart."

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by craftinator on Saturday March 30, 2019 @06:46PM (#19532437)
Really? The whole design goal? The design goal that Google's massive marketing department made up, or the design goal that was actually used in creating Chromebooks? And really, with what is common knowledge about Google, why would you ever trust them at face value?
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by tylerl on Sunday March 31, 2019 @03:07AM (#19534304)
Google's marketing department doesn't give a flying f*k whether you install another os on your chromebook. Use it however you like, with their blessing and even their assistance to the degree that they can help.

Your "common knowledge" notwithstanding, I can tell you with 100% certainty that the os protection features in chromeos devices are about security. More specifically, it's about creating a device that Google can use themselves for extremely high-security use cases.

You can trust it, or not, doesn't matter. But for Google, the modern Chromebook is the only desktop environment where they can be absolute sure that all the software and all the hardware are clean. Turns out that other companies like this capability as well, so it's a general product feature.

But if all you want is some cheap hardware where you can flash the bios and run Windows Vista, then you just go ahead and be you. That's fine.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by mindslight on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:34PM (#19530288)
Unfortunately the Arbiter of Emotion was not there to correct his frustration during the unlocking.

The Chromebook's model is obviously consistent with Google's fleshed out security model. But this model is at odds with Free users, and there isn't one straightforward way to reconcile the two, but rather various ones that will each attract their own criticism.

Individuals don't have the luxury of massaging their opinions with a PR department, and conflict (with the corporate narrative) draws attention to rough points. People aren't going to express things perfectly - one can either work to be tolerant of varying personalities and colorful overstating, or retreat to the safe space of sanitized corporate press releases.

Ask yourself what is your motivation to shit on him with classical bullying ("nerd rage"). Some casual ranting about security models while tediously reflashing a BIOS is not an attempt to say "I am very smart".

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:15PM (#19531197)
Or they could have made their point without the rant and increased their chances of being taken seriously. As it stands, it’s not clear that the author understands why the things he’s annoyed about exist.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by mindslight on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:41PM (#19531340)
It's amazing how these tone policing responses are coupled with patronizing endorsements of Google's security model...

We get it. Google's (and Apple's, Intel's, etc) contemporary security model is to work to retain control over the device for themselves, taking end users under their wing to provide them security. For a non-technical person with no technical family, obtaining a device with this security model from Best Buy is likely the pinnacle of what can be done.

But this is not the only device security model. And the idea of a manufacturer working against the owner of a device is abhorrent to the perspective of Freedom. Weighing Google's specific design decisions within their model is not terribly important if one is repudiating the entire model. I personally think a better synthesis could be found between the two models, but that was obviously not the point of the original post!

I'm not personally a huge fan of blog posts / youtube / etc that just reiterate and editorialize information that is easily found elsewhere. But I do recognize that this is how many people learn - both the viewers and the authors. By picking on this post for not having the details fleshed out and stated in an impartial manner, all you're really doing is putting a veil of faux impartiality over shouting down the culture of Freeing computing devices.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by bubblethink on Saturday March 30, 2019 @06:02PM (#19532177)
>We get it. Google's (and Apple's, Intel's, etc) contemporary security model is to work to retain control over the device for themselves

This is exactly what you and likely the author of the post don't get. Google's security model is vastly different from Apple's or Intel's or anyone else's. In particular, the google security model is the only one of these which still ensures the ability for a user to take full control of the device (to the extent possible in current times). And they have gone through a lot of effort to do so. The easy way out is to do what every other manufacturer on the planet does.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by mindslight on Saturday March 30, 2019 @06:53PM (#19532481)
Their security model is the exact same one - trust us and we'll maintain your security. The difference is better described as Google deliberately adding an opt-out to the devices.

That's definitely appreciated and is nicer than not doing so. But it isn't a real model of hardware protections that would serve a Free device, nor does it allow for agility or nuance around that trust relationship with Google.

Which is why the experience of taking ownership of your device turns into a violent one - because you basically have to repudiate the OEM's built-in system in favor of a completely different Free road. Which is why it's much easier to do with a fresh device, rather than after you've grown accustomed to it.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by bubblethink on Saturday March 30, 2019 @07:07PM (#19532544)
>But it isn't a real model of hardware protections that would serve a Free device

What is your proposed mechanism to ensure a verified chain of boot that the vendor intends for the majority of its customers while simultaneously allowing a user to do whatever they please ? The current solution is about the only one you can do at a technical level. Note that the convenience (or lack thereof) is a separate minor thing that is not so relevant. You really need to understand the verified boot design in chromebooks to appreciate the nuance, as you put it.

>you basically have to repudiate the OEM's built-in system in favor of a completely different Free road

You are not repudiating anything. You are using a feature that the OEM explicitly added at significant cost to please someone like you. Buy any other machine, and tell me how much freedom you get.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by mindslight on Saturday March 30, 2019 @07:38PM (#19532677)
Even though a TPM has be tamper proof hardware, it does not have to be beholden to the single party of the manufacturer. I'd start by removing any burned in (loaded-once) asymmetric keys from the trust root. I'd pop an explicit serial header on the motherboard to communicate with the TPM in a user-friendly manner.

Any signing key could then be loaded into the TPM by holding the machine in a specific wiping mode for say a few days, essentially making the ultimate trust root "long term possession of the machine".

The actual signing key that is loaded needs to be percolated up through the UI so the user can verify whom they're actually trusting. But this doesn't actually need to be done every single boot, but really only when the machine is setup for a new user.

The banal criticism is that doing so would be work that doesn't directly benefit Google. Well you asked, and that's inherent in any constructive solution.

> You are using a feature that the OEM explicitly added at significant cost to please someone like you. Buy any other machine, and tell me how much freedom you get.

Erm okay you're taking this back to a hostile direction. Take any pre-DRM PC from 1985-2010, where the CPU simply trusts its memory. That's the longstanding basic model that Google simply added an escape hatch to revert to. I've said that it is appreciated, but don't act like it was somehow onerous.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by sangnoir on Sunday March 31, 2019 @03:50AM (#19534417)
> making the ultimate trust root "long term possession of the machine

You probably don't want someone who steals your laptop to get access to your secrets after a few days. Also, how would you know your "brand new" laptop wasn't interdicted by a hostile party while it was "having problems clearing at customs"?

It is clear to me that your threat-model and Google's (they dogfood ChromeOS hardware extensively) are divergent. Chromebooks are not for everyone, and that's OK.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by mindslight on Sunday March 31, 2019 @12:55PM (#19536619)
> You probably don't want someone who steals your laptop to get access to your secrets after a few days

Obviously. I was describing the signature chain management. The encryption key management would be as it is.

> how would you know your "brand new" laptop wasn't interdicted by a hostile party while it was "having problems clearing at customs"?

>> The actual signing key that is loaded needs to be percolated up through the UI so the user can verify whom they're actually trusting

> It is clear to me that your threat-model and Google's (they dogfood ChromeOS hardware extensively) are divergent. Chromebooks are not for everyone, and that's OK.

Here we go again with the condescending simplistic conclusions...

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by bubblethink on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:36PM (#19530300)
As the other comment said, the emotion is mostly misplaced. Quite a lot of effort has gone in to making chromebooks work the way they do. The documentation or the low level code may not be perfect from the standpoint of alternate OSes, but chromebooks are literally the most open laptops you can buy (barring a few niche products at the moment like purism's).
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by remyrd on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:56PM (#19530445)
Any laptop that allows dual boot is more open than a chromebook. And that's a Really big number
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by bubblethink on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:04PM (#19530494)
That's "missing forest for the trees". Most laptops ship with rubbish AMI bios and bootguard enabled making them objectively less open. Chromebooks let you do whatever you want, although google does not do a lot of heavylifting for you. There are apparently some plans in the works by google for making things like dual booting more convenient, but nothing official yet.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:20PM (#19531227)
Chromebooks can be dual booted. So are they open enough for you?
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by patient_zero on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:30PM (#19530633)
I'm in agreement with you, and its refreshing to see that view expressed on this site. The guy shouldn't have to go so far to do what he wants with hardware that he purchased. We have come so far away from the old concept of ownership and have for so long dealt with lackluster consumer protection that this simple concept is a radical one to some.

It seems to me that there's a bit of a blind spot here on ycombinator, specifically for tech companies and developers that is, in assuming they are working in good faith.

I guess it's that most people here work in tech or with said folks so I get why; it's just the way ycombinator swings.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by bubblethink on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:39PM (#19530676)
Chromebooks would go down as one of those tragedies that were too ahead of their time because people have just stopped reading or doing any of their own research.

>I guess it's that most people here work in tech or with said folks so I get why; it's just the way ycombinator swings.

There is HN bias, but in this case it's the reverse bias, specifically because most folks DO NOT work in this sort of tech.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by rc-1140 on Saturday March 30, 2019 @04:10PM (#19531517)
The language one uses when writing, while not perfectly accurate, is a good indicator of how one carries themselves in real conversation with strangers. Repeated usage of phrases like "Google Spy Device" isn't indicative of someone who's assertive or "resolute", it's indicative of someone who is being emotional. If you're a regular here and part of the author's target audience, you know how awful Google is with regards to the user privacy sphere. You don't want to hear someone whinge about it every some-odd lines of a tutorial.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by mindslight on Saturday March 30, 2019 @04:31PM (#19531660)
Or "Google Spy Device" is simply an amateur attempt at reframing a paradigm. Those fall flat most of the time, but trying them out is still necessary to separate one's own and hopefully everyone's perspective from default Google.

I personally appreciated "A Chromebook is an inexpensive data milking device and you are the cow". Rather than throwing everything at the wall and hoping something would stick, OP would have certainly benefited from some editing. But the bulk still shouldn't have been hard to read past.

There is editorializing in every communique. IMHO the protests here say more about being acclimated to a culture of milquetoast-positivity corporatespeak than anything else.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by rc-1140 on Monday April 01, 2019 @10:13AM (#19543400)
> Or "Google Spy Device" is simply an amateur attempt at reframing a paradigm.

That would require effort on the author's part. This is the equivalent of that guy who goes "gNu pLus LiNuX ;D" whenever someone simply says/mentions Linux as part of a larger conversation topic because they have nothing to contribute.

> But the bulk still shouldn't have been hard to read past.

It is difficult because the author has two simultaneous discussions going on: their actual work with the Chromebook and their banal google privacy comments which are intertwined with the actual interesting content.

> IMHO the protests here say more about being acclimated to a culture of milquetoast-positivity corporatespeak than anything else.

I clicked the link to read an article on getting ChromeOS off of a Chromebook. I didn't click the link to have to scrape aside the same wannabe revolutionary feel-good drivel that's been propagated on every common and tech-focused news site just to get at the content. If anything, the author writing the equivalent of "ha ha doodoo head google sheeple FITE DA POWA" and the volume of people defending it speaks volumes about what constitutes privacy advocacy in HackerNews comments.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by craftinator on Saturday March 30, 2019 @06:50PM (#19532456)
Unless the OP truly believes that Chromebooks are "Google Spy Devices". I don't understand what is emotional about that phrase.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by asveikau on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:07PM (#19530105)
It is on the other hand in some sense expressing hostility towards fellow humans for "don't be evil" Google to make this so hard to do. If they were more honest in that saying it would indeed be simpler, and that is probably why the author is disappointed.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by jayd16 on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:18PM (#19530188)
In this case it feels really disingenuous. The Chromebook design goals are different than his wants. Its really nothing to get upset about.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:26PM (#19530237)
Why should we not get upset about design goals we dislike?
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by jayd16 on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:29PM (#19530250)
Not every design is for you.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:40PM (#19530326)
And not every design is to the benefit of the consumer's it's targeted at - surely we should voice those concerns.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by vinkelhake on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:50PM (#19530392)
Chromebooks are arguably the most secure consumer devices out there. This security is very much by design, has been there from day one and is of tremendous benefit to its target users.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:06PM (#19530505)
Why is it so popular to conflate security with lack of user control? Making Chromebooks tamper-evident is perfectly sufficient for security.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:21PM (#19531238)
…which is pretty much what they do? You flash your alternative OS on it and the Chromebook tells you that it can’t verify what it’s booting.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:35PM (#19531308)
Unless you happen to press space or enter, in which case it wipes the device. That's a rather important detail.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @06:22PM (#19532311)
Space then enter, and only during a little time window during the boot sequence: it's not easy to hit accidentally. Oh, and it warns you that you are reenabling OS verification for each step.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by craftinator on Saturday March 30, 2019 @06:52PM (#19532475)
What an important clarification, I never hit those keys in that pattern, and neither does my cat! Glad I won't have to give my Chromebook a screwdriver enema again!
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @07:16PM (#19532589)
It is significantly easier to accidentally hit either of two keys than hit those two keys seconds apart in the right order. So I’d call that a pretty important clarification.

> Glad I won't have to give my Chromebook a screwdriver enema again!

If you’re willing to do that, you can disable this key sequence.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by craftinator on Monday April 01, 2019 @04:55PM (#19548121)
Those are the two largest keys on most keyboards. The space bar as also located along the edge closest to the user, making it the easiest key to hit. Having the two largest targets on a keyboard being the special combination for a factory reset is aweful. That's a coercion to foul your system. I hit space and enter quite often, but I don't wipe my OS often... Why convolute those operations? Because it's designed to push you back to Google's domain.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @08:53PM (#19532971)
It's not a little time window - the screen remains until you press Ctrl+D.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @09:01PM (#19533008)
Not for me, it boots into Chrome OS after a little bit (it does make a pair of really loud, annoying beeps in the process).
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by asveikau on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:51PM (#19530404)
I actually find Google's position more disingenuous and more arrogant. If a customer purchased some hardware they will have uses its creators did not intend or forsee. To take active measures to impede them or make it more difficult is aggression, and confusion about what it means to sell a product.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by Latteland on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:35PM (#19530660)
The active measures are to block unwanted changes by a virus or whatever, protecting naive users from takeover. They explicitly tell you how to take this off if you want. Other companies don't do that. It's missing the whole point of chrome on to complain that it takes 5 minutes to overcome the cryptographically signed of that protects most users from harm.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by asveikau on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:46PM (#19530715)
I disagree. It is this same confusion, and I use that word intentionally, that makes people think user serviceability and safety from malware are mutually exclusive.

Edit: let me elaborate on what I think is the reason. They are selling the hardware at a loss or close to it. When you put Linux on there you eat their revenue. Instead of being honest about this, they dress it up in a bunch of phony security talk. They don't want people reselling them as useful Linux workstations.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by Latteland on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:11PM (#19531169)
It's possible they are selling the hardware at a loss but my experience is the opposite case. If you compare specs of laptops generally a chromebook laptop seems to cost more than a windows laptop of similar capabilities. I think the reason chromebooks cost more not less is because they sell fewer of them. You can buy a cheaper low end windows laptop and install any old os, usually.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by derefr on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:55PM (#19530436)
I don’t agree; Google shouldn’t have made it hard to do this—they should have made it impossible. (And making it merely hard just adds inconvenience while failing at their design goals.)

The point of the Chromebook’s security approach (with the developer mode beep + notification, etc.) is to have a “Trusted Computing Base”, in the original, non-dystopian meaning of the phrase: you’re supposed to be able to tell, as a regular user, just by looking at/booting up a Chromebook, that it’s running Google-signed firmware/software.

A Trusted Computing Base is precisely for the case where you do trust some particular third-party to be your IT admin (because, for example, they’re your school or employer, or—more likely—a subcontractor of one of those that MDM is being delegated to.) In such cases, you want to know that your device is in exactly the state that that party wants it to be in, and that no other party has been able to modify it.

Google aren’t trying to make it impossible for you to use your Chromebook for whatever you want; that’s just a side-effect. Their goal is to make it impossible for someone who intercepts your Chromebook in shipment to install a rootkit on it, in a way where the device still appears to be (and act like) a Chromebook, with no sign that there’s anything wrong.

Yes, Google is the IT admin of the device. Someone’s gotta be; in a Trusted Computing Base scenario, you remove the possibility of handing the thing off to a repair shop (because what is a repair shop—from the TCB perspective—but another attacker?)

Essentially, a Chromebook has the same goal as a high-security lock: nobody should be able to pick it. Not even a locksmith. Not even the locksmith you hired because you lost your keys to the lock you own. Just like with encryption, you can’t leave a backdoor that only works for people with good intentions. You have to leave no backdoor at all—only a “front door.” In the case of a high-security lock, the “front door” is ordering new keys from the manufacturer, supplying your proof of purchase of the lock. In the case of a Chromebook, the “front door” is the signed update system, which allows one party (in this case the manufacturer, but in TCB Windows/macOS PCs this is your enterprise MDM admin) to manage everything. And also spy, if they want. But the two things are one and the same, really. The manufacturer of your high-security lock could break into your building, too. That’s why you pick a lock manufacturer you trust.

Sadly, as the author proves, it’s not impossible to install a rootkit (in this case, a Linux distribution, but it could just as well be a keylogger-injected version of ChromeOS) onto a Chromebook, in a way that’d be invisible to the end-user (unless the end-user X-rays their devices upon receipt and uses ML to compare them to a standard blueprint, ala the brouhaha around spy chips surface-mounted onto the bus of Supermicro servers.)

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:03PM (#19530486)
User control is not opposed to security - all your concerns are addressed by making the devices tamper-evident. Making them tamper-proof only benefits Google. As for

> you’re supposed to be able to tell, as a regular user, just by looking at/booting up a Chromebook, that it’s running Google-signed firmware/software.

Google did do that. But they went a step further - making it extremely easy to accidentally wipe your device and reset it to factory-defaults: https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/...

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by toast0 on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:37PM (#19530667)
Not really, you have to open a ChromeOS to replace the firmware, but it's easy to do, and then you can manipulate it however you like.

I personally find this useful, I've got two ChromeOS devices running other OSes, and I like the minimalist hardware. Frankly, I also get enjoyment out of using things in ways not totally intended.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by derefr on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:24PM (#19530598)
Yes, and that was the solution to an incentive design problem.

If you make it easy to persistently use a rooted device, then regular users would use rooted devices for regular tasks. (Because there are advantages of doing so, like side-loading native apps.)

If regular users use rooted devices, some people’s only experience of a device would be of a rooted device.

If some people’s only experience of a device is of a rooted device, then they’ll have no idea what an actually tampered device looks like, because every device they’ve seen is “tampered.”

This is exactly the state of Android, as it happens. Tons of people use Android in its developer mode; and so people don’t take a security mindset toward using a rooted phone.

The solution to this is to use technical mechanisms to achieve social effects (a.k.a. “incentive design” — the type of thing that tax credits are.) By making it irritating and risky to use developer mode in a persistent way, people won’t do it for anything other than tasks that truly require using developer mode for what it’s for (that’s “using the device as a debug build target”, by the way, not “writing code on the device.”)

Thus, nobody uses Chromebooks in developer mode.

Thus, the average person’s experience of seeing a Chromebook in use is, 99.9% of the time, of a non-rooted Chromebook.

Thus, the boot beep is surprising, and will scare the average user off of using the device.

Adding a switch in the OS that disables this, would be akin to having a switch in your OS (on a device MDM-managed by someone else, including the certificate store) that disables web browsers from doing any certificate checking. You could flip it; but so could viruses, and so could the NSA half-way through the laptop’s delivery process. Why would you want that switch to exist?

——

What people with complaints like yours really want, I think, is not to disable the TCB. You want to be able to be in control of the TCB. You want something that’s like a Chromebook, but where the MDM controller is an enterprise (e.g. you individually, if you’re clever enough) rather than Google.

Well, I mean, first: that’s what a regular PC with Secure Boot is.

But if the particulars of Chromebooks appeal to you (and I suppose they could appeal to somebody): the cheap hardware, the keyboard layout, the sandboxing, etc. Then what you might want is a variant Chromebook.

Such a device would have to look different than a regular Chromebook, somehow, to show regular users that it’s not for them. Sort of like how developer units of game console hardware are clearly not the same as production units. But if that were done, I think it’d be okay for those units to have a user-controllable TCB.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:41PM (#19530691)
> If some people’s only experience of a device is of a rooted device, then they’ll have no idea what an actually tampered device looks like, because every device they’ve seen is “tampered.”

This is false. All but the most technically inept user will understand "WARNING! YOUR COMPUTER IS NOT RUNNING GOOGLE CHROME OS/HAS BEEN ALTERED FROM FACTORY DEFAULTS!" shown at boot time. Which is what Chromebooks do. All that's needed to make it into a usable device is to get rid of "Press space to wipe your device."

> Tons of people use Android in its developer mode; and so people don’t take a security mindset toward using a rooted phone.

Android security is catastrophic on factory settings already, so how you managed to blame the tiny proportion of users that root their phones to get rid of vendor bloatware for it is beyond me.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by derefr on Saturday March 30, 2019 @05:01PM (#19531814)
> All but the most technically inept user will understand "WARNING! YOUR COMPUTER IS NOT RUNNING GOOGLE CHROME OS/HAS BEEN ALTERED FROM FACTORY DEFAULTS!" shown at boot time.

No. Not if half† the Chromebooks people own emit that message.

Users do not read. I know, it's hard to believe, but a large portion of average (not "most technically inept", average) users have never read a warning message on a screen in their lives. They see a warning message—and then they ask an authority figure what it means. They then classify whatever technobabble response they get into two executive-summary categories: either the warning means they should stop and wait for assistance; or the warning means nothing, and they should confirm whatever it's asking them to confirm and go on as per usual. After that, every time they see a prompt that looks like the one they asked about, they'll remember which of the two categories they surmised it to fall into, and that's what they'll do. Even if it's a prompt with different text. It looks the same—it gets the same treatment.

The next time you see a non-IT person using Windows and they get a UAC prompt, observe what they do. Ask them why it came up, and why they reacted the way they did. They won't know. All they'll know is that someone once told them it's fine to ignore those and click Accept.

If the ChromeOS boot screen is as common as Windows UAC, then it fails at its mission. That is why it makes it easy to un-root the device: because, if you have a boot screen that can "trick" average users into un-rooting a Chromebook, then you can't trust the average user around your rooted Chromebook to not accidentally wipe it, so you can't ever give the average user a rooted Chromebook as some kind of cheap kiosk (i.e. exactly what the author of the article was trying to do.)

And so rooted Chromebooks "in the wild" are rare—rare enough that if any user ever sees that boot screen, it'll be a new error that no authority figure ever told them "the trick" to bypassing and getting on with their day. New enough that they'll either "fall for" the prompt and un-root the device; or they'll call someone over to ask what the prompt "means."

----

† Sure, far less than half of Android devices are rooted. But consider the demographic difference. Every human being has a potential reason to own an Android device. Right now, very few average human beings have a reason to own their own Chromebook. (Be assigned a Chromebook by an enterprise MDM system, sure. But own their own? Quite rare.)

Ignoring the enterprise users, and taking the small slice of people who own their own Chromebook as the base population, any random niche use that requires rooting the Chromebook, if it got popular enough, could blow that population out of the water. If rooted Chromebooks turned out to be, say, good for running TAILS, or game emulators, or any other stupid thing you can think of, suddenly half the Chromebooks "in the wild" that a non-enterprise user ever sees would be doing that, and so would be rooted. They'd all beep and show the warning. And, like UAC, it'd be just another one of those things you ignore.