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Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by asveikau on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:07PM (#19530105)
It is on the other hand in some sense expressing hostility towards fellow humans for "don't be evil" Google to make this so hard to do. If they were more honest in that saying it would indeed be simpler, and that is probably why the author is disappointed.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by jayd16 on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:18PM (#19530188)
In this case it feels really disingenuous. The Chromebook design goals are different than his wants. Its really nothing to get upset about.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:26PM (#19530237)
Why should we not get upset about design goals we dislike?
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by jayd16 on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:29PM (#19530250)
Not every design is for you.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:40PM (#19530326)
And not every design is to the benefit of the consumer's it's targeted at - surely we should voice those concerns.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by vinkelhake on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:50PM (#19530392)
Chromebooks are arguably the most secure consumer devices out there. This security is very much by design, has been there from day one and is of tremendous benefit to its target users.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:06PM (#19530505)
Why is it so popular to conflate security with lack of user control? Making Chromebooks tamper-evident is perfectly sufficient for security.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:21PM (#19531238)
…which is pretty much what they do? You flash your alternative OS on it and the Chromebook tells you that it can’t verify what it’s booting.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:35PM (#19531308)
Unless you happen to press space or enter, in which case it wipes the device. That's a rather important detail.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @06:22PM (#19532311)
Space then enter, and only during a little time window during the boot sequence: it's not easy to hit accidentally. Oh, and it warns you that you are reenabling OS verification for each step.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by craftinator on Saturday March 30, 2019 @06:52PM (#19532475)
What an important clarification, I never hit those keys in that pattern, and neither does my cat! Glad I won't have to give my Chromebook a screwdriver enema again!
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @07:16PM (#19532589)
It is significantly easier to accidentally hit either of two keys than hit those two keys seconds apart in the right order. So I’d call that a pretty important clarification.

> Glad I won't have to give my Chromebook a screwdriver enema again!

If you’re willing to do that, you can disable this key sequence.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by craftinator on Monday April 01, 2019 @04:55PM (#19548121)
Those are the two largest keys on most keyboards. The space bar as also located along the edge closest to the user, making it the easiest key to hit. Having the two largest targets on a keyboard being the special combination for a factory reset is aweful. That's a coercion to foul your system. I hit space and enter quite often, but I don't wipe my OS often... Why convolute those operations? Because it's designed to push you back to Google's domain.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @08:53PM (#19532971)
It's not a little time window - the screen remains until you press Ctrl+D.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2019 @09:01PM (#19533008)
Not for me, it boots into Chrome OS after a little bit (it does make a pair of really loud, annoying beeps in the process).
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by asveikau on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:51PM (#19530404)
I actually find Google's position more disingenuous and more arrogant. If a customer purchased some hardware they will have uses its creators did not intend or forsee. To take active measures to impede them or make it more difficult is aggression, and confusion about what it means to sell a product.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by Latteland on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:35PM (#19530660)
The active measures are to block unwanted changes by a virus or whatever, protecting naive users from takeover. They explicitly tell you how to take this off if you want. Other companies don't do that. It's missing the whole point of chrome on to complain that it takes 5 minutes to overcome the cryptographically signed of that protects most users from harm.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by asveikau on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:46PM (#19530715)
I disagree. It is this same confusion, and I use that word intentionally, that makes people think user serviceability and safety from malware are mutually exclusive.

Edit: let me elaborate on what I think is the reason. They are selling the hardware at a loss or close to it. When you put Linux on there you eat their revenue. Instead of being honest about this, they dress it up in a bunch of phony security talk. They don't want people reselling them as useful Linux workstations.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by Latteland on Saturday March 30, 2019 @03:11PM (#19531169)
It's possible they are selling the hardware at a loss but my experience is the opposite case. If you compare specs of laptops generally a chromebook laptop seems to cost more than a windows laptop of similar capabilities. I think the reason chromebooks cost more not less is because they sell fewer of them. You can buy a cheaper low end windows laptop and install any old os, usually.
Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by derefr on Saturday March 30, 2019 @12:55PM (#19530436)
I don’t agree; Google shouldn’t have made it hard to do this—they should have made it impossible. (And making it merely hard just adds inconvenience while failing at their design goals.)

The point of the Chromebook’s security approach (with the developer mode beep + notification, etc.) is to have a “Trusted Computing Base”, in the original, non-dystopian meaning of the phrase: you’re supposed to be able to tell, as a regular user, just by looking at/booting up a Chromebook, that it’s running Google-signed firmware/software.

A Trusted Computing Base is precisely for the case where you do trust some particular third-party to be your IT admin (because, for example, they’re your school or employer, or—more likely—a subcontractor of one of those that MDM is being delegated to.) In such cases, you want to know that your device is in exactly the state that that party wants it to be in, and that no other party has been able to modify it.

Google aren’t trying to make it impossible for you to use your Chromebook for whatever you want; that’s just a side-effect. Their goal is to make it impossible for someone who intercepts your Chromebook in shipment to install a rootkit on it, in a way where the device still appears to be (and act like) a Chromebook, with no sign that there’s anything wrong.

Yes, Google is the IT admin of the device. Someone’s gotta be; in a Trusted Computing Base scenario, you remove the possibility of handing the thing off to a repair shop (because what is a repair shop—from the TCB perspective—but another attacker?)

Essentially, a Chromebook has the same goal as a high-security lock: nobody should be able to pick it. Not even a locksmith. Not even the locksmith you hired because you lost your keys to the lock you own. Just like with encryption, you can’t leave a backdoor that only works for people with good intentions. You have to leave no backdoor at all—only a “front door.” In the case of a high-security lock, the “front door” is ordering new keys from the manufacturer, supplying your proof of purchase of the lock. In the case of a Chromebook, the “front door” is the signed update system, which allows one party (in this case the manufacturer, but in TCB Windows/macOS PCs this is your enterprise MDM admin) to manage everything. And also spy, if they want. But the two things are one and the same, really. The manufacturer of your high-security lock could break into your building, too. That’s why you pick a lock manufacturer you trust.

Sadly, as the author proves, it’s not impossible to install a rootkit (in this case, a Linux distribution, but it could just as well be a keylogger-injected version of ChromeOS) onto a Chromebook, in a way that’d be invisible to the end-user (unless the end-user X-rays their devices upon receipt and uses ML to compare them to a standard blueprint, ala the brouhaha around spy chips surface-mounted onto the bus of Supermicro servers.)

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:03PM (#19530486)
User control is not opposed to security - all your concerns are addressed by making the devices tamper-evident. Making them tamper-proof only benefits Google. As for

> you’re supposed to be able to tell, as a regular user, just by looking at/booting up a Chromebook, that it’s running Google-signed firmware/software.

Google did do that. But they went a step further - making it extremely easy to accidentally wipe your device and reset it to factory-defaults: https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/...

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by toast0 on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:37PM (#19530667)
Not really, you have to open a ChromeOS to replace the firmware, but it's easy to do, and then you can manipulate it however you like.

I personally find this useful, I've got two ChromeOS devices running other OSes, and I like the minimalist hardware. Frankly, I also get enjoyment out of using things in ways not totally intended.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by derefr on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:24PM (#19530598)
Yes, and that was the solution to an incentive design problem.

If you make it easy to persistently use a rooted device, then regular users would use rooted devices for regular tasks. (Because there are advantages of doing so, like side-loading native apps.)

If regular users use rooted devices, some people’s only experience of a device would be of a rooted device.

If some people’s only experience of a device is of a rooted device, then they’ll have no idea what an actually tampered device looks like, because every device they’ve seen is “tampered.”

This is exactly the state of Android, as it happens. Tons of people use Android in its developer mode; and so people don’t take a security mindset toward using a rooted phone.

The solution to this is to use technical mechanisms to achieve social effects (a.k.a. “incentive design” — the type of thing that tax credits are.) By making it irritating and risky to use developer mode in a persistent way, people won’t do it for anything other than tasks that truly require using developer mode for what it’s for (that’s “using the device as a debug build target”, by the way, not “writing code on the device.”)

Thus, nobody uses Chromebooks in developer mode.

Thus, the average person’s experience of seeing a Chromebook in use is, 99.9% of the time, of a non-rooted Chromebook.

Thus, the boot beep is surprising, and will scare the average user off of using the device.

Adding a switch in the OS that disables this, would be akin to having a switch in your OS (on a device MDM-managed by someone else, including the certificate store) that disables web browsers from doing any certificate checking. You could flip it; but so could viruses, and so could the NSA half-way through the laptop’s delivery process. Why would you want that switch to exist?

——

What people with complaints like yours really want, I think, is not to disable the TCB. You want to be able to be in control of the TCB. You want something that’s like a Chromebook, but where the MDM controller is an enterprise (e.g. you individually, if you’re clever enough) rather than Google.

Well, I mean, first: that’s what a regular PC with Secure Boot is.

But if the particulars of Chromebooks appeal to you (and I suppose they could appeal to somebody): the cheap hardware, the keyboard layout, the sandboxing, etc. Then what you might want is a variant Chromebook.

Such a device would have to look different than a regular Chromebook, somehow, to show regular users that it’s not for them. Sort of like how developer units of game console hardware are clearly not the same as production units. But if that were done, I think it’d be okay for those units to have a user-controllable TCB.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by deogeo on Saturday March 30, 2019 @01:41PM (#19530691)
> If some people’s only experience of a device is of a rooted device, then they’ll have no idea what an actually tampered device looks like, because every device they’ve seen is “tampered.”

This is false. All but the most technically inept user will understand "WARNING! YOUR COMPUTER IS NOT RUNNING GOOGLE CHROME OS/HAS BEEN ALTERED FROM FACTORY DEFAULTS!" shown at boot time. Which is what Chromebooks do. All that's needed to make it into a usable device is to get rid of "Press space to wipe your device."

> Tons of people use Android in its developer mode; and so people don’t take a security mindset toward using a rooted phone.

Android security is catastrophic on factory settings already, so how you managed to blame the tiny proportion of users that root their phones to get rid of vendor bloatware for it is beyond me.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by derefr on Saturday March 30, 2019 @05:01PM (#19531814)
> All but the most technically inept user will understand "WARNING! YOUR COMPUTER IS NOT RUNNING GOOGLE CHROME OS/HAS BEEN ALTERED FROM FACTORY DEFAULTS!" shown at boot time.

No. Not if half† the Chromebooks people own emit that message.

Users do not read. I know, it's hard to believe, but a large portion of average (not "most technically inept", average) users have never read a warning message on a screen in their lives. They see a warning message—and then they ask an authority figure what it means. They then classify whatever technobabble response they get into two executive-summary categories: either the warning means they should stop and wait for assistance; or the warning means nothing, and they should confirm whatever it's asking them to confirm and go on as per usual. After that, every time they see a prompt that looks like the one they asked about, they'll remember which of the two categories they surmised it to fall into, and that's what they'll do. Even if it's a prompt with different text. It looks the same—it gets the same treatment.

The next time you see a non-IT person using Windows and they get a UAC prompt, observe what they do. Ask them why it came up, and why they reacted the way they did. They won't know. All they'll know is that someone once told them it's fine to ignore those and click Accept.

If the ChromeOS boot screen is as common as Windows UAC, then it fails at its mission. That is why it makes it easy to un-root the device: because, if you have a boot screen that can "trick" average users into un-rooting a Chromebook, then you can't trust the average user around your rooted Chromebook to not accidentally wipe it, so you can't ever give the average user a rooted Chromebook as some kind of cheap kiosk (i.e. exactly what the author of the article was trying to do.)

And so rooted Chromebooks "in the wild" are rare—rare enough that if any user ever sees that boot screen, it'll be a new error that no authority figure ever told them "the trick" to bypassing and getting on with their day. New enough that they'll either "fall for" the prompt and un-root the device; or they'll call someone over to ask what the prompt "means."

----

† Sure, far less than half of Android devices are rooted. But consider the demographic difference. Every human being has a potential reason to own an Android device. Right now, very few average human beings have a reason to own their own Chromebook. (Be assigned a Chromebook by an enterprise MDM system, sure. But own their own? Quite rare.)

Ignoring the enterprise users, and taking the small slice of people who own their own Chromebook as the base population, any random niche use that requires rooting the Chromebook, if it got popular enough, could blow that population out of the water. If rooted Chromebooks turned out to be, say, good for running TAILS, or game emulators, or any other stupid thing you can think of, suddenly half the Chromebooks "in the wild" that a non-enterprise user ever sees would be doing that, and so would be rooted. They'd all beep and show the warning. And, like UAC, it'd be just another one of those things you ignore.