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Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by sangnoir on Sunday March 31, 2019 @03:50AM (#19534417)
> making the ultimate trust root "long term possession of the machine

You probably don't want someone who steals your laptop to get access to your secrets after a few days. Also, how would you know your "brand new" laptop wasn't interdicted by a hostile party while it was "having problems clearing at customs"?

It is clear to me that your threat-model and Google's (they dogfood ChromeOS hardware extensively) are divergent. Chromebooks are not for everyone, and that's OK.

Re:How to liberate a Chromebook by mindslight on Sunday March 31, 2019 @12:55PM (#19536619)
> You probably don't want someone who steals your laptop to get access to your secrets after a few days

Obviously. I was describing the signature chain management. The encryption key management would be as it is.

> how would you know your "brand new" laptop wasn't interdicted by a hostile party while it was "having problems clearing at customs"?

>> The actual signing key that is loaded needs to be percolated up through the UI so the user can verify whom they're actually trusting

> It is clear to me that your threat-model and Google's (they dogfood ChromeOS hardware extensively) are divergent. Chromebooks are not for everyone, and that's OK.

Here we go again with the condescending simplistic conclusions...