https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/technology/grindr-sells-s...
Which is owned by a mainland Chinese firm [1].
[1] https://money.cnn.com/2016/01/12/technology/grindr-china-bei...
I'd imagine that in the game of compromising targets, it doesn't really matter what the general public thinks of the target's behaviors or actions. The only thing that matters is that the target have a psychological profile consistent with wanting to keep their behavior or actions secret. As long as the target has the requisite characteristics with respect to ego, that target can probably be compromised if you can find something on them.
You misunderstand. No one cares about Alice's personal life, karma, or happiness. All they care about is manipulating Alice and what a manipulated Alice might do. Alice's desire to hide her cheating from her spouse could lead Bob's trade secrets to getting stolen. Bob did nothing wrong here to have his "cycle of karma closing the loop."
If my spouse were to attempt to extract data from my work laptop she would run smack-dab into my password. If on the other hand Bob has extracted highly confidential data onto a freely available machine, then Bob is not only complicit, Bob is culpable. Don't be Bob.
If we take this further and Bob's employer made it that easy to extract highly confidential data then they are their own worst enemy.
For example, if a foolish Google employee attempts to stalk an ex-partners confidential data from within Google, they will be terminated and escorted out of the building within 60 minutes. Be like Google here.
Bob isn't "complicit" or "culpable" he's a victim.
I think you're overconfident in simple security measures and have a poor understanding of human security threats.
It's not that surprising though. One of their main focuses seems to be acquiring technology to catch up and eventually surpass Western liberal democracies. See their "Made in China 2025" effort: https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-does-everyone-hate-made-china-2....
In a traditional market, the organizers set rules for vendors and customers. The same rules apply to anyone should they decide to become a vendor or customer, but organizers usually avoid becoming a vendor because of obvious conflicts of interest.
If you are a vendor then your customers in China are basically some subsidiary of the very large organization that is China. If you are a customer then you are basically buying from a subsidiary. Since you are dealing with subsidiaries, you have to understand that all the subsidiaries are encouraged to share information with each other to build a stronger China.
Building deeper relationships with a subsidiary means building deeper relations with the whole organization and that means satisfying deeper requirements (taxes, knowledge sharing, local factory, IP sharing, equity sharing). All this is normal if you are say, just two companies doing business with each other. But you aren't. You are a company doing business with an organization who you may be misunderstanding for a market.
Finally, theres the case where two companies merge and share all resources to become a stronger, better organization. Unlike many other countries, the Chinese identity is very much an ethnic and a lingual one. This means that if you are not Chinese, you will never be Chinese. If you aren't already Chinese, then the chances that you will be able to move to China should China become a prosperous society are slim to none.
I would guess there are countries against whom the Chinese would do the opposite, where economic espionage isn't worthwhile but compromising the government is.
The US, on the other hand, probably has more to gain through political espionage against the Chinese than through economic espionage.
All depends on what you think you need?
Yep, in Africa, and probably along their "New Silk Road".
For me, personally, yeah, it's very dishonorable to my worldview. I would prefer alliances and collaboration and the betterment of all people rather than protectionism and distrust and zero-sum attitudes and behaviors.
Hypothetically, what if their talents were indeed to steal stuff and get ahead by appropriating the work of others? Would it then be sad if they didn't put those talents to good use?
I have no idea if all people do or don't feel good when they steal, but I would have guessed that some people do in fact feel good when they steal. Perhaps the badness that the people-who-do-the-stealing-for-their-society feel is outweighed by the overall goodness that the rest of society feels because of their advancement in (stolen) technology and the economic and societal benefits that come with that?
But, yes, in the end, I personally would rather not have some technology than to acquire it by means contrary to my values. I know an awful lot of people whom I believe, or even know, would either say the opposite or would be indifferent.
A lot of the espionage is probably also about gaining knowledge about firms for the purpose of understanding their weaknesses and the lay of the land vs. simply figuring out their secret sauce. I remember reading this was a common practice for Russian intelligence agents who didn't trust the official numbers and so wanted to gain proprietary knowledge from industry insiders.
Also, much of this theft involves breaking into other peoples computers. It’s wilfull violation of someone else in multiple ways. Breaking into a computer is as low as robbing a liquor store and I suspect thst everyone, even the perpetrators, feels that at a vicersl level.
Japan was practically given a lot of American Technology right after WWII under Robert Demings. In fact, Toyota is partially the way it is today, thanks to the Ford Assembly Line, but they still paved there own means of success.
Germany arguably the same as well, around the same time frame. Can't recall the exact history of what US gave to Germany though, but it was most likely part of the Marshall Plan.
US is copying a lot of methodologies and philosophies from Japan. Any deriative of the Toyota way is in many management philosophies, from scrum, agile development, etc. Germany, much technology is still being shared between both our countries today. Japan is copying a lot of software innovations from America, and vice versa.
Textile mills at the time were the modern day equivalent of semiconductor foundries. I dare you to try something like that today and see what happens to you.
And semiconductor technology is generally considered a national secret.
Of course, once you become a manufacturing leader, you want to pull the ladder up from under you, in the form of strong IP laws.
Unless you're OPM and you can't be bothered to follow NSA guidelines. Or you're the military and think having sensitive documents on a loosely secured SharePoint server is a great idea.
Maybe, but I think they have a much better source: I suspect OPM data taken has been sold and lent out so they do not need to trust linked in; they can go directly to the source ( https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ ). I wonder if it also contains "concerns" that can indicate weak points for recruiting for a true one-stop shopping?
It does. IIRC, it contained security clearance investigation files, so they could probably identify people who had issues but just squeaked by the process.
But that's not the only use. The OPM data could be used for counterintelligence, to identify US agents in the field.
Still, curious to see some sort of hierarchy around motivations/emphasis for:
- top secret private info (defense or otherwise)
- regular private sector info
- public sector info related to government contracts
- public sector info related to IP or tech
- public or private sector info on important people
> About 70 percent of China’s overall espionage is aimed at the U.S. private sector, rather than the government, said Joshua Skule, the head of the FBI’s intelligence division, which is charged with countering foreign espionage in the United States.
> “They are conducting economic espionage at a rate that is unparalleled in our history,” he said.