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Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by jandrese on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:01PM (#16266869)
Wait, so all of the hand wringing over the crappy UI was pointless because it was actually a case of miscommunication?
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by nkoren on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:13PM (#16266957)
Actually, it's even more crappy UI, just not in the visual domain. Including the phrase "this is not a drill" in something that actually is a drill could be considered a design flaw in the auditory user interface.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by ollerac on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:42PM (#16267189)
Pedants, all of you.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by dang on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @03:36PM (#16268783)
I know how annoying it can be to run across internet comments that seem insufferably pedantic. But would you please not post unsubstantive comments to Hacker News? As much of a problem as pedantry is, empty, name-calling comments are much worse.

https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by nkoren on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @07:26PM (#16270340)
Huh, interesting. Personally I read that as being a kind of wry, collegial, back-handed complement. Wasn't at all taken aback; it put a smile on my face. But perhaps I'm seeing British Humour where there is none. And you're right that it wasn't substantiative, and nobody wants HN to turn into Reddit.

So if earnestness is to rule the day, allow me to say that my point was more serious than mere pedantry. Because most of us here are software people living highly visual environments, and because our thinking is shaped by language that disproportionally based on visual metaphors, we tend to assume that "interfaces" are necessarily visual systems. They are not. They can be auditory and even tactile. If an audio message gives incorrect, contradictory, or badly-structured information, then that's no less an interface failure than a badly-designed web page. In this case, both the audio message and the alert interface shared a common point of failure: a deep, seemingly institutional inattention to how information is presented and interpreted. In both cases, doing a better job with the interfaces is hardly rocket science; that's not the interesting part of this fiasco. The interesting part is: why didn't the institutions care about this, how did the project managers fail to spot the problems, and how should this change procurement and management practices in the future?

Hopefully that's a bit less pedantic!

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by dang on Wednesday January 31, 2018 @02:07AM (#16272123)
I like your interpretation better than mine.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by nkoren on Wednesday January 31, 2018 @06:41AM (#16273130)
Yeah, but I'm privileged. When somebody is definitely being an ass-hat online, I have the luxury of breezily going about my merry and generally not giving a flip. Life is too short for flame wars. So lacking significant exposure to ass-hattery, I tend to optimistically assume that I'm not seeing it. Might be overly innocent, but keeps me happy.

Being a mod has got to be tough: you're not allowed to look away from the assholes; you're required to look directly at them. After dealing with the 10,000th jerkwad, an optimistic reading of what anyone says has got to be challenging. So divergent readings are totally understandable, and thanks for the reminder that when using flippancy or sarcasm online, it's a good idea to telegraph one's amiable intent.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by Cyberdog on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:43PM (#16267199)
Hello. Welcome to Hacker News. Enjoy your visit!
[deleted]
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by Cyberdog on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @04:41PM (#16269312)
Was that addressed to me? I certainly wasn't attempting to diss the community at large.

Yes, sometimes the pedantry and "um actually" nature of this place bugs me, but that's just what happens in gatherings of nerds.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by dang on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @05:07PM (#16269538)
OK, I overinterpreted you and will delete my comment. Sorry!

(It was still an unsubstantive post though... please don't post those, even when someone else is setting a bad example.)

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by rossdavidh on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:37PM (#16267154)
Or, there were a bunch of potential land-mines set in this process, and eventually the employee stepped on one. Which one he stepped on is maybe less interesting to me, than the fact of the organizational culture producing multiple ones to step on.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by turc1656 on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:50PM (#16267270)
Yup. I called bullshit on the story we were being fed at the time (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16161584) and said it seemed obvious when you think about it that they really believed they were under attack, and I'm glad to see the truth finally come out. The bad UI argument could still be valid, but it definitely was not the cause of this.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by MicroBerto on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @09:56PM (#16270966)
Same here, and I was called a reptilian flat eaether or something to that effect.

I'll never be shamed out of questioning clear nonsense.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by blueish on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:07PM (#16266916)
I wouldn't call it hand wringing, as I think all the points were valid, but yes, the employee sent out the message he intended to (the real alert over the test alert).
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by jeddawson on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:29PM (#16267092)
Sure sounds like it!

What is confusing is that the article still points to the UI as being a part of the problem though while they're now saying the employee intentionally sent the live message. Looks like the PR campaign is still trying to deflect blame or perhaps keep things just ambiguous enough that they'll be able to rush through some extra spending to "fix" the UI issue.

Hopefully more details will continue being shared and they deal with the organizational flaws instead of pouring blame on scape goats (software and individuals).

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by davesque on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:57PM (#16267330)
Well, we've seen the UI and it is crappy and it's not hard imagine someone making a mistake that way. But yeah you're kinda right. They should still fix the UI though :/.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by MicroBerto on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @09:54PM (#16270962)
No. They are getting tripped up in their numerous lies.

Last time this happened, the story simply disappeared from the media altogether. Expect that to happen here too.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by emodendroket on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @01:02PM (#16267380)
You can't blame people for making inferences based on the news that was reported.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by make3 on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @01:21PM (#16267539)
I mean, I fully suspect that both suck
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by krapp on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:10PM (#16266938)
No, according to the end of the posted article, poor UI and a lack of necessary safeguards were part of the problem, just not the entire problem.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by rhino369 on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:11PM (#16266946)
I don't really understand how it is part of the problem. If the worker really believed an attack was incoming, confirmation screens wouldn't help at all.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by bearcobra on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:29PM (#16267087)
I guess it would depend on how that confirmation screen worked. If the design asked for a confirmation from a second user, then a single user's confusion wouldn't have resulted in the error.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by jeddawson on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:36PM (#16267142)
Not only that, but once they realized the message was sent in error they didn't have a simple way to correct course so there was a big delay between the realization and informing the terrified public.

Your suggestion of having multiple user confirmations coupled with a simple way to "cancel and correct" the notice would have likely meant this never became news worthy.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by paulddraper on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:56PM (#16267325)
Sure, but that's a lot different from "move these buttons around and have the user double click to be sure."
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by jsjohnst on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @06:58PM (#16270225)
The extra confirmation shouldn’t have been on the same user. The “two man rule” exists for emergency protocols for a reason.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by krapp on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:53PM (#16267293)
Confirmation screens might have given the operator a moment's pause to consider whether or not they were certain.

A UI that makes it easy to make a mistake, even when the mistake is intended, and makes it almost impossible to correct that mistake, is a badly designed UI.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by dragonwriter on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @01:01PM (#16267372)
> Confirmation screens might have given the operator a moment's pause to consider whether or not they were certain.

There was a confirmation screen.

I have seen no suggestion how a different confirmation than actually existed would have helped, and I don't think we want to introduce more delay in the critical path of a live alert without clear and massive benefit.

> A UI that makes it easy to make a mistake, even when the mistake is intended, and makes it almost impossible to correct that mistake, is a badly designed UI.

The problem with correcting the mistake is not a UI problem, but a deeper planning and procedure problem.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by krapp on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @01:37PM (#16267716)
> and I don't think we want to introduce more delay in the critical path of a live alert without clear and massive benefit.

If that delay reduces false alarms, when false alarms erode public trust in and concern about the alert system, then the massive benefit is clear. With such a system, drills and tests are going to be massively more common than actual events. Designing the UI so that the one-in-a-million option is as easy to invoke as the once-every-week option is a UI problem.

Notwithstanding it not being a primary issue in this particular case, I believe it's still an issue worth discussing.

Also, bear in mind that correcting the "deeper planning and procedural problems" would introduce delays as well. Anything but a purely automated system, or a big red button would introduce some delay.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by dragonwriter on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @01:46PM (#16267793)
> Also, bear in mind that correcting the "deeper planning and procedural problems" would introduce delays as well

No, it wouldn't, because those are problems that impact after an alert is issued, and whose existence caused delays in sending an all-clear. Resolving them won't effect the path prior to an alert, and would eliminate rather than introduce delays.

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by lsaferite on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:11PM (#16266948)
How would a UI change have made the outcome different if the employee actually wanted to send a real alert?
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by hinkley on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @12:57PM (#16267331)
When you're doing a post-mortem you're supposed to think about how to prevent the next one, not how to prevent the one that already happened (someone needs to tell the State Dept this).

So you look at all of the contributing factors and you come up with a plan for all the ones you can reasonably address.

It's been identified that a reasonable person could accidentally send a real alert even when they intended to send a fake one. So you fix that too because why the hell would you leave it once you've found it?

Or to put it another way, they're already in the middle of a PR disaster. You get a second one if the press gets wind of the idea that you're cutting stupid simple corners on the remediation. And make no mistake: Fixing a UI issue with the benefit of hindsight is a stupid simple fix (avoiding it to begin with is much harder).

Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by Johnny555 on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @01:18PM (#16267502)
This is a solved problem -- the UI could require confirmation from a second employee.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by askvictor on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @03:38PM (#16268800)
You have minutes before the missiles hit. Waiting around for Steve to get back from the toilet could cost a lot of lives.
Re:Hawaii’s false missile alert sent by worker believing att... by Johnny555 on Tuesday January 30, 2018 @04:04PM (#16269005)
Like I said, the 2-man rule is a solved problem.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-man_rule

What does Bob do when he goes to the toilet? He asks Steve to cover him.

So if you need 2 people to send an alert, when Bob is at the console, and Steve is secondary, when Steve has to go to the toilet, he asks Jill to cover him. Alternatively a backup authorization method could be used.

It does mean having 3 people available at all times, but since there are life-safety implications of real alerts as well as false alerts, it seems like a reasonable safeguard to have.