In actual reality you will never have any certainty about the outcomes of interactions like these. All you have control over is whether or not you hurt the person in front of you.
Because it reveals how you implicitly value human life and whether values can be traded or weighed against each other. There are moral theories that take various different positions on each permutation to the possible answers on these questions.
Thought experiments are about illuminating implicit values and thought processes.
I tend towards believing that people who bring up the "WHAT IF NOOK BOMB" type scenarios are really just looking for justification that their existing belief in torture is A-OK.
It's a fallacy because it's like a DOS attack on the argument - burning up most of the time on a absurdly small probability. Participants and viewers tricked by thinking "what's discussed most is what's most important".
[1] https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFalla...
To see how debate can backfire, consider a currently-near-universal ethical proposition: it is unacceptable to torture innocent children. The contrived scenario for debate: there's a ticking nuclear time bomb hidden in an American city. The man who has the critical information can hold out against physical torture for the next few hours until it detonates. But he can be compelled to confess in time if you force him to witness the torture of his 5 year old niece. Imagine that the scenario has both options debated, repeatedly, in lecture halls, on op-ed pages. It's even depicted in fiction like 24 to persuade by storytelling rather than logic.
It doesn't matter that the world's actual torturers have never encountered a ticking nuclear time bomb, much less the improbable other circumstances that led to this dilemma. Just witnessing sober, respectable persons arguing the "in favor" position for innocent-child-torture -- no matter how dryly or laden with caveats -- is going to tend to weaken norms against innocent-child-torture. So will seeing the tactic succeed in fiction. (It doesn't really matter if excellent arguments against innocent-child-torture are also aired in the same venues. Practically everyone started out against it, even if their reasons were visceral rather than logical.) Some percentage of people, hopefully small, is going to come to "see the light" in favor of this contrived scenario's utilitarian calculus.
The really pernicious part: as with the vanilla ticking time bomb scenario, many of the persuaded will misapply the contrived scenario to justify real world torture. "The torturers know that an attack is imminent, and torturing this man will save a million lives" will get watered down by homeopathic magnitudes to "the torturers suspect that an attack is going to happen at some indefinite time, and torturing a child related to this man might save 20 lives if the torturers' guesses are correct." The effect on the body public of debating contrived scenarios that could justify atrocities is not to improve the public's reasoning or shore up their pre-existing intuitions. It's to erode their actual ethical judgment, to make them more open-minded regarding atrocities against children.
There is obvious value in these "contrived scenarios," as has been proven innumerable times in human history. You do realize that simplifying assumptions like "assume a spherical cow" have worked to produce an accurate model of the physical world, right?
Errr I think you're "proving too much" so to speak. Having someone in front of you who you know has details about a terrorist plot that could stop it, and you think finding those details is something you can't reason morally about? By your definition of certainty, you basically can't do anything with any degree of certainty unless its actions are immediate.
Call up an assassin and tell them to murder someone? Well who knows if she'll even go through with it, so that's morally fine.
And if you're in the same city as the bomb, whatever you can possibly do to them has a finite timespan and is therefore much more tolerable and resistable.
(I'd also be grateful if you want to tell me what I'm getting wrong.)
There's a shooter actively killing people.
Is it OK to shoot the shooter?
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What's the benefit of doing physics problems "in a vacuum", etc? It lets you get to the essence of the question.
Similarly, a philosophical thought experiment lets you analyze your beliefs - rather than just a knee jerk ("No, I would never harm someone and anyone who harmed someone is not a morally decent human being"), you can come up with a more complete ethical framework for your decisions and judgments.
By identifying extremes, you can identify your priorities and understand the tradeoffs you will actually be faced with - what degree of harm are you willing to cause, and at what distance from "in front of me", to what benefit?
If your only means for investigating the nature of human relationships is via intellectual contrivances then you will always produce results which reaffirm your preexisting beliefs.
The first point to understand is that violence is a dicey business and never produces as tidy of outcomes as the intellectual justification for it expects. The second point to understand is that the pursuit of morality via intellectualization is counter-productive at best.
Do you have a better framework for pursuing morality? It seems like telling stories, asking questions, and thinking about them are the basis of all moral and ethical teaching, from religion to law school.
Now we're trying to establish the boundaries of that.
(Personally I think torture is always wrong, I just want to make sure the legal issue is clear.)
In that comment, I said torture was unacceptable and more so when it was done in my name.
I have since wavered on this as I've considered some proposed hypotheticals. I've decided, at least for now, that it may not always be wrong but that it is always abhorrent.
Hypothetically, such a situation could exist where it is the right choice but it is still reprehensible. The whole WMD thing and saving a city? Yeah, I guess it's the right choice but it's still abhorrent. If I had every reason to believe the information could be extracted, I'd do the torturing myself.
In the end, I'd hope that I'd be more unhappy that I was forced to do so than I was unhappy that I did so. I imagine it would bother me for the rest of my life, but I'd accept that burden.
Two other points.
1. Our moral behaviour should be much better than the Geneva convention.
2. You are not bound by the Geneva convention if your opponent is not.
In the case of torture, the question is whether pain may be inflicted on a person to extract information, and in recent public discussion, esp. where known terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) are concerned.
In the Trolley problem, you are put in a situation out of your control and in which you may influence the nature and degree of casualties by flipping a switch. The concerns here are about whether one choice (flip, don't flip) is morally preferable to another, whether one is morally obligated to make one choice over another, etc.
In your nuclear bomb thought experiment, the question is somewhat artificial and vague where potentially relevant distinctions could be made. Are we inflicting pain because we wish to extract information that will enable us to prevent the bomb from going off? Is there some device inside the guilty party that measures pain and disarms the bomb at appropriately high level?
Utilitarians, and broadly consequentialists, like to frame everything in terms of a moral calculus of maximizing good while reducing evils, but it leads to clearly perverse conclusions like the justification of committing morally evil acts so that some other good may come. Whether torture as a method of extracting information from people like KSM is immoral is not a question of whether we can justify torture because the good of the information we may gain exceeds the evil of torture, but whether torture is intrinsically evil, and if not, whether it is ever justifiable as a method of extracting information, esp. from guilty parties.
> whether torture is intrinsically evil, and if not, whether it is ever justifiable
That is exactly the question.
We often make absolute statements ("Killing people is instrinsically evil", "Torture is intrinsically evil") but may find cases where it is justifiable:
- shoot the active shooter (most people agree killing is justified)
- bone marrow donation (causes excruciating pain, willingly accepted by the individual, to save the life/health of another. Most people find this justified, even though it violates "first, do no harm")
- voluntary euthanasia (to involve both torture and killing) - Constant excruciating pain, no hope of a cure. Do you kill the person? Or force them to continue to endure? (People are divided on this one)
In the trolley example, you aren't choosing to actively cause harm to someone for the sake of the benefit of others. The trolley is going to kill someone. You may, at best, act to reduce the harm done by a process out of your control.
Where the torture example is concerned, one choice involves the active, intentional infliction of pain on someone for the purpose of extracting information that can be used to save lives.
In general, a fairly important principle in ethics is the principle of double effect. I.e.,
1. the action must be in itself good or neutral
2. the action's good effect must be intended, not its evil effect
3. the action's good effect must not be produced by means of the evil effect
4. the action's evil effect must not exceed the good effect in degree
The Trolley is at one end of an extreme. The point of such a hypothetical is that you can adjust any parameter to find peoples' limits.
It could be the case that you don't actually disagree with one another much at all! But if you never address the Trolley problem or similar you will never know.
Kill the villain by pushing him onto the track in front of the train to save the innocents, or not.
It is explicitly asking if you would harm the villain (evil action, evil effect produces good effect).
Now you, by "saving" a city, have condemned the entire human race to extinction.
It's an interesting thought experiment in ethics, analogous to the Trolley Problem (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem).
Assume a nuclear bomb will be detonated in the city, killing and horribly injuring millions of innocent people. The individual who is responsible is known, with no doubt, and there exists some level of pain you can inflict upon him which will, without doubt, prevent the explosion.
What degree of pain is acceptable to inflict on that person?
Make him sit in the comfy chair?
Give him terrible squinty looks?
Give him a paper cut?
Paper cut with lemon juice?
...
If you choose not to take that action, are you responsible for or complicit in the deaths and injury to those people?
What if you were one of the co-conspirators, and having second thoughts, could compel the other individual to stop it?