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Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by kutkloon7 on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @06:28AM (#14855008)
The problem with a password manager is that you don't have easy access to one when you're on a different machine.

A better way is to use a scheme that hashes your username, service name, and master password to generate a password. A problem is that this doesn't always comply with the arbitrary demands on your password.

This is why these arbitrary demands need to die: they make the only way to securely and conveniently access accounts from different devices impossible.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by wutwutwutwut on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @06:34AM (#14855033)
Your suggestion is bad for a ton of reasons. For example, how do you change your password for a specific site after it had been compromised or due to normal password rotation?

Another downside is that changing master password means you need to change passwords for all sites or have multiple master passwords.

Another is that an attacker can use the knowledge of your password on site A to bruteforce your master password offline.

And so on...

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by l0b0 on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @06:54AM (#14855114)
Why on earth is this being downvoted? If you've used a hashing generator for any length of time you'll know how multiple master passwords inevitably creep in. Also, when your generator no longer works because the login FQDN changes (which happens alarmingly often) you'll have all the fun of resetting your password. For no good reason.

Re. portability, KeePass and its siblings are compatible with every major platform.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by Globz on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @12:13PM (#14857517)
I have access to my password manager at all time, thanks to https://minikeepass.github.io/ on iOS!

You can even sync your database to all of your devices by storing it inside an encrypted volume for extra security.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by kutkloon7 on Thursday July 27, 2017 @04:57AM (#14863648)
Does this also work when you use someone else's phone or computer?
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by Lagged2Death on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @11:04AM (#14856753)
...an attacker can use the knowledge of your password on site A to bruteforce your master password offline.

This might be a concern if you're the victim of a state-level targeted attack. That's not a threat most of us have to deal with. Hackers aren't likely to spend a lot of effort cracking John Doe's password list; they want to steal a few million password hashes and sift out a few thousand easy or re-used ones.

Your other points about the weaknesses of the scheme stand. Still, if we could get more users to use not-terrible, not-duplicated passwords, even with a flawed scheme like this, overall internet security would improve immeasurably.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by dublinben on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @11:36AM (#14857114)
You don't need to be the victim of a state-level targeted attack. You just need to be a public figure online[0] and attract the attention of a bored hacker.

[0] https://www.theverge.com/2012/8/6/3224597/mat-honan-hacked-a...

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by Lagged2Death on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @12:15PM (#14857537)
I'm not super familiar with the Honan story but I recall (and quick skimming seems to confirm) that it was more about lax security policies at Apple et al, the interconnectedness of social media accounts, and social engineering than it was about reversing a computed hash or human "hashing" scheme.

Did those attackers guess or compute even one password at all?

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by dublinben on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @02:06PM (#14858574)
Not in this specific instance, but they could have. And that level of scrutiny would have enabled a complete digital takeover like Honan suffered if his accounts were poorly protected by a system of passwords proposed above.
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by IncRnd on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @11:39AM (#14857150)
This is false.

There are many types of targeted attacks on passwords that don't come close to including state-level actors. Divorces. Corporate Espionage. Any one of the people on Judge Judy who posted information online about their co-workers.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by Lagged2Death on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @12:28PM (#14857660)
As far as I can tell, we're talking here about reversing a cryptographic hash and sifting the one true master password out from the much more numerous hash collisions. Do you really expect that level of effort to be common in a divorce?
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by IncRnd on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @05:17PM (#14860456)
I _know_ that level of effort has already been expended in divorces. Targeted attacks do not need to be common. The point is that there are many types of targeted attacks.
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by evfanknitram on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @03:15PM (#14859227)
That's assuming that the master password is really strong. Otherwise you could bruteforce it by testing millions of passwords ("password", "secret", short ones and so on). I assume most people will choose somewhat weak master passwords.

With this scheme ANY site where you register can attempt to brute-force your master password offline. I fail to see how it's a good scheme.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by kutkloon7 on Thursday July 27, 2017 @08:25AM (#14864586)
You're right. If you choose a weak password, nothing can save you. This holds in any case, so this is not specifically an argument to this use. Let's do some math to see if your argument about bruteforcing holds stake (spoiler: it doesn't).

Let's say you're master password only uses letters, numbers, and special characters. Just counting keys on my keyboard, there are 94 such characters. You should pick a random sequence as master password (very important).

Let's say you use the Antminer S9 (which can compute 1 gigahash per joule). For ease of analysis, let's say you can recognize the master password instantly. Also, say we're paying $0.2 per kwh. Then we can define the average cost c of finding the master password as a function of the master password length l: c(l) = 94^l/(1.8*10^10)

c(5) is about 40 cents, c(6) about 40 dollars c(8) is more than 300k, c(12) = 26e12

In comparison, the estimated amount of money in the world (in 2009) is 52e9 dollars. By the way, this is if you use a single SHA256 hash. You can make the hash arbitrarily expensive by iterating (computing h(h(h(master_pass)))).

The one and only argument against using a master password that is used to derive passwords is the single point of failure. If someone catches you typing your master password on video, you're pretty much fucked. But I guess this is the same for password managers.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by kutkloon7 on Thursday July 27, 2017 @04:56AM (#14863646)
You can add something (e.g. a number) to the end to make a different password. The idea is that you have a _very_ secure master password (so bruteforcing it is not practical - to make this even more true you could hash a huge number of times instead of just once) and never change it.

There is still some truth in your arguments. I'm curious what you consider a good alternative?

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by kijin on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @07:18AM (#14855218)
How often do you need to type passwords into a machine that you either cannot or are unwilling to sync with a decent password manager? How do you trust this machine not to record and exfiltrate everything you ever typed into it? IMO it's a Good Thing (tm) that I have to jump through hoops to access my passwords on unfamiliar machines.

How does one even calculate H(username|service name|master password) on an unfamiliar machine that might not have a decent scripting language installed on it? If you asked me to do it on my father's laptop, for example, I'm gonna have to download Python first.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by Sniperfish on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @07:52AM (#14855375)
Re. the number of machines, it's something I've encountered as an obstacle from a fair proportion of people I've spoken about password managers to. I think its more a perceived issue than a real one.

Just spitballing which systems I would realistically want access to passwords on, at a minimum, includes: personal desktop, personal laptop, tablet(s), cellphone(s), family (parent, sibling, in-laws, etc) computers, office desktop, office laptop.

In my case (many cases?), the latter two prevent software installation, so I would need to manually type from a manager synced on my cell. Which really is no different to what is required for 2FA - just a longer character string. Overall, a some setup and synch related inconveniences but not to a damaging degree, which is why I think this is more a matter of perception - once you think through where you're typing passwords it appears less of an obstacle.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by lostcolony on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @09:43AM (#14856099)
Chrome syncing browser plugins with a password manager makes personal desktop/laptop, and office desktop/laptop pretty trivial (barring, yes, overzealous IT).

Cellphone and tablet I install the relevant app once and am done.

Either way, web access to the credentials isn't uncommon, though you'll need a device for 2-factor confirmation it's you.

For family devices...I wouldn't want to log into them. I don't trust their security sense and don't want to risk compromising my stuff because of their mistake. Why would I anyway; I have my cellphone on me, at minimum; I can access the account there.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by darylfritz on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @09:38AM (#14856067)
> the [office computers] prevent software installation, so I would need to manually type from a manager synced on my cell.

I don't know about other Password Managers, but LastPass lets you access your vault using any web browser. So long as your network doesn't block the LP site, you can access your password manager from anywhere.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by NMDaniel on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @02:14PM (#14858672)
On a similar note, Keepass can be used without admin rights with the portable version, so you can keep the portable executable along with the encrypted db file in some secure and accessible email account/web service that your network doesn't block.
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by graedus on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @07:23PM (#14861285)
Indeed, or a USB drive.
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by pishpash on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @09:58AM (#14856203)
Not often, but the times you do need to use those machines are probably the direst of times, i.e. emergencies.
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by kijin on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @12:52PM (#14857901)
I make sure that I always remember at least two passwords in addition to the master password for my password manager: my bank and my email.

If I need immediate access to any other site and I don't have access to my password manager, I'll just trigger a password reset and check my email.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by blowski on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @07:42AM (#14855325)
Most of my passwords never need to be typed onto strange machines, so I can use 1Password with long random complex strings.

If it is a password I need to type, I use diceware "Correct Battery Horse Staple" style passwords. If I don't remember the password, I always have my phone, where I can retrieve the password from 1Password. There is no relationship between my different passwords. As long as my password vault is secure, so are all my passwords.

With your system, if I learn your master password and hashing mechanism, I basically have all your passwords.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by notzorbo3 on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @09:19AM (#14855954)
FYI, diceware has been shown to be insecure with three words. Four is better, but also crackable by an attacker with a few thousand dollars to throw at it. Five and up is safe for the next few years.
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by kutkloon7 on Thursday July 27, 2017 @05:16AM (#14863703)
True! So you have to choose a good master password and use an expensive hash.

On the other hand, if you take any other approach, you place either confidence in the security of a service (1password), or you store passwords somewhere. In both cases, you have a problem when you can not retrieve the passwords anymore.

If 1password is hacked or simply offline, or your phone gets stolen, you basically lost access to all services.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by notzorbo3 on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @09:16AM (#14855936)
> hashes your username, service name, and master password

Security through obscurity. You're essentially just using the same password on every site now.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by dspillett on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @11:20AM (#14856924)
Ish.

If you use a sufficiently good hash function with a salt to stop rainbow table based attacks and key strengthening for good measure, then an attacker who has one compromised password of yours isn't going to be able to reverse the hash to find what your source password is so that they can generate new per-site passwords using it. That is assuming they even try: how would you know that an arbitrary string of characters was generated that way rather than just being randomly picked by a password manager?

Of course all your accounts are compromised if someone knows your master password, but that is little different to an attacker getting your pass-word/-phrase for an online password manager that doesn't use some form of 2FA.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by IncRnd on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @11:41AM (#14857165)
No.

This is not a cryptographic attack on the hash but on the text that is being hashed.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by dspillett on Thursday July 27, 2017 @06:34AM (#14864042)
But how would the text being hashed be attacked without either attacking the hash by brute force or knowing the master password (which is likely a human factors hack, to which online password managers are similarly susceptible?
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by IncRnd on Thursday July 27, 2017 @01:34PM (#14867551)
Using hash functions in an attack is not the same as performing a cryptographic attack against the hash function.

These are two different classes of attacks, both being real-world attacks. The attack being discussed is against a suggested formula to generate passwords.

From the top of the thread, "a scheme that hashes your username, service name, and master password to generate a password." Discovering the password by determining the inputs to the hash function is all that is needed. This is the case even if a different type of function is used instead of a hash.

Apologies, if I gave a different impression.

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by dspillett on Friday July 28, 2017 @11:33AM (#14874970)
Ah yes, I was thinking about the other end. Yes, this would be trivially susceptible to a simple dictionary attack if the user chose a bad master password, just as a plain password would.

Introducing a good salt would stop that but then the salt would need to be stored and managed somewhere (securely synced everywhere you might need to regenerate a password - it can't be a public value or you are back to square one with the dictionary attack). You could also introduce a CPU and memory intensive key derivation function to frustrate the brute force attack a little but that is a race you won't win if you need the function to work on a low resource device and the attacker has a large cluster of processors and/or plenty of time to work with.

It would protect against password reuse attacks even without the salt: if site1 stores plain passwords and leaks them then getting into my account on site2 becomes no easier than it already was if I had different passwords for each site (we are still looking at a brute force dictionary attack against the master password) so the scheme could work if the user has a sufficiently complex master key (and never needs to change that key). Making the master key complex enough but memorable is the challenge there, back to one of the core password related problems but at least with only one (or a few) to remember not one per account. Changing the master key once you believe it has been compromised would be quite some hassle in a similar way to if your master password for a service like 1password were compromised (worse: with a service like 1password you at least have a list of accounts to work down but with this scheme you need to remember them).

An interesting though exercise, but I'm probably overthinking an unrecoverably weak idea...

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by IncRnd on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @11:36AM (#14857115)
> A better way is to use a scheme that hashes your username, service name, and master password to generate a password. A problem is that this doesn't always comply with the arbitrary demands on your password.

This is a very bad mechanism to create passwords that will create severe security vulnerabilities. You are adding complexity and false-security without benefit.

Passwords are a secrecy mechanism, not a formula mechanism. In your method, all one needs is the formula, then all passwords will be disclosed.

The suggestion might then be to interject a secret with enough entropy into the text being hashed. But, that is no different from a secret password itself!

Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by 0xffff2 on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @01:50PM (#14858424)
While I don't particularly like this approach, there's at least one product that does just this: https://lesspass.com/#/
Re:Passwords Evolved: Authentication Guidance for the Modern... by davchana on Wednesday July 26, 2017 @01:30PM (#14858245)
I have to mine all the time, on my phone, KeepassToAndroid app. Its synced one way (PC to Phone) via dropbox, so that I can edit database only on PC.