Re. portability, KeePass and its siblings are compatible with every major platform.
You can even sync your database to all of your devices by storing it inside an encrypted volume for extra security.
This might be a concern if you're the victim of a state-level targeted attack. That's not a threat most of us have to deal with. Hackers aren't likely to spend a lot of effort cracking John Doe's password list; they want to steal a few million password hashes and sift out a few thousand easy or re-used ones.
Your other points about the weaknesses of the scheme stand. Still, if we could get more users to use not-terrible, not-duplicated passwords, even with a flawed scheme like this, overall internet security would improve immeasurably.
[0] https://www.theverge.com/2012/8/6/3224597/mat-honan-hacked-a...
Did those attackers guess or compute even one password at all?
There are many types of targeted attacks on passwords that don't come close to including state-level actors. Divorces. Corporate Espionage. Any one of the people on Judge Judy who posted information online about their co-workers.
With this scheme ANY site where you register can attempt to brute-force your master password offline. I fail to see how it's a good scheme.
Let's say you're master password only uses letters, numbers, and special characters. Just counting keys on my keyboard, there are 94 such characters. You should pick a random sequence as master password (very important).
Let's say you use the Antminer S9 (which can compute 1 gigahash per joule). For ease of analysis, let's say you can recognize the master password instantly. Also, say we're paying $0.2 per kwh. Then we can define the average cost c of finding the master password as a function of the master password length l: c(l) = 94^l/(1.8*10^10)
c(5) is about 40 cents, c(6) about 40 dollars c(8) is more than 300k, c(12) = 26e12
In comparison, the estimated amount of money in the world (in 2009) is 52e9 dollars. By the way, this is if you use a single SHA256 hash. You can make the hash arbitrarily expensive by iterating (computing h(h(h(master_pass)))).
The one and only argument against using a master password that is used to derive passwords is the single point of failure. If someone catches you typing your master password on video, you're pretty much fucked. But I guess this is the same for password managers.
There is still some truth in your arguments. I'm curious what you consider a good alternative?
Another downside is that changing master password means you need to change passwords for all sites or have multiple master passwords.
Another is that an attacker can use the knowledge of your password on site A to bruteforce your master password offline.
And so on...