It seems increasingly apparent that recruitment and radicalisation are done in the open. After all, political speech is free speech.
Then people either self-radicalise (go on a murder spree without coordinating action with a larger group; e.g. many mass shooters), or they meet up in person. Lots of radicalised people go to the Middle East where they can't be surveilled by western security forces.
There's remarkably little evidence that terrorists are making routine use of strong encryption.
Even if they were, we Americans have a fundamental right to strong encryption, protected under the Second, Ninth & Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. I'd go further still, and argue that everyone in the world (who's not a prisoner or otherwise unfree) has a right to strong encryption.
If true, more reason to let the rest of us bank safely with it. There are ISIS manuals, and advice to use the best of the apps available.
Even more importantly, it's a power grab of the powerful (which mostly translates into "the rich", and vice versa) aiming to further dominate and manipulate the remaining population ("the 99%") in order to secure and increase their dominant situation.
> The Hampton's aren't a defensible position.
Hell, in most cases they wouldn't be detectable!
With so much random data flying around today, you could encode short messages in just about anything. comments on reddit or hn or one of the alternatives, image metadata, etc...
If you are looking to hide data on the scale of kilobytes, your options are basically unlimited.
Edit: On a 5 Mbps video stream, that could give you 5-50 kbps bandwidth.
It's going to be no different for "crypto" solutions.
*Part of the FBI's job was to harrass anyone they considered a dissident or counter to their view of what US citizen should be or how they should behave. I doubt they changed at all. It's already documented and well known one of their favorite tactics was to break into people's homes while they're sleeping, or away, move things around... mess with their belongings or persons, etc... Expect it to be the same for crypto solutions "post quantum", if not already "pre quantum".
The likelihood for a criminal to use a one time pad is extremely low. The likelihood of them having an encrypted cell phone with useful information is much higher. It would be tough to argue that a law against cell phone encryption wouldn't be effective for this purpose.
More valid criticism is its disproportionate impact on lawful uses.
Maybe that's the case right now, but how can you be so confident that these actors won't switch to OTP if such a law is enacted?
Encryption wasn't mainstream at all back then and, more crucially, digital surveillance was still in its infancy. The most popular chat app in the world right now implements full E2E encryption. Go back 10 years and having a "chat" consisted of sending your friends SMS messages.
Sure, there might be exceptions for high-level criminal conspiracies. But most crime isn't of that kind. For terrorist, I imagine there is a large spectrum of covert abilities.
How are you so confident that this was what happened? Do you have some concrete data and/or stats to back this statement? What if most criminals are using something like Signal? Besides, I personally wouldn't trust WhatsApp if I were partaking in illicit activities.
I think you're gravely underestimating the intelligence range and tech knowledge of 'criminals'.
Citizens lose.
Hardly ironic at all, since as long as someone stands to gain either money or power from doing so, they will simply do so under guise of the former.
Not ironies, just tactics.
I think of OTPs as a form of time-shifting. Think of it this way: if you and your correspondent have viable OTPs, that implies that, at some point in the past, you securely communicated that OTP. Since it is (at least) the length of a future message, you could have just passed a secure message then. Instead, you passed something that enables passing a secure message now.
I don't see a situation being frequent where you'd know the message weeks or months in advance of when you send it. If we follow your scheme, there's no encryption; we just meet up when we need to communicate. What if we're on opposite sides of the earth? If we had exchanged keys months earlier, this wouldn't be a problem.
The fact that your key material is the same size as the message means all your security is in the key, thus in your key distribution method. Among other problems, this means no rekeying without replicating your original hand-off - you can communicate exactly as many bits as your previously securely exchanged, no more.
...erm, isn't that the point?
Yes, with OTP you need to exchange keys and this shifts all of the security to key exchange, and while this wouldn't be a problem in other ciphers, it's a problem in OTP because of its other properties and shortfalls.
So at most I feel as though it's a security/convenience tradeoff; a tradeoff that's substantial or even dangerous in certain situations.
Simplistic interpretations are the bane of security engineering, especially where human factors are involved.
You don't even have to program or use a computer to create these OTP solutions, for limited messages you could just flip a coin to create the OTP if necessary (although there are lots of more automated solutions available as well.)
Airgapped computers at both ends provide another way 'round restrictions for more sophisticated actors. Their backdoors won't be accessible (remotely.)
So taking away secure encryption from the rest of us is just security theatre; a destructive, narcissistic legislative exercise designed to make it look like the pompous powerful doing something when they're doing nothing of any real use while creating terrible risks.
This is why, I think, legislators have consistently ignoring logic and math from professionals such as the OP - they don't care. They know perfectly well they're pissing into the wind doing nothing useful; that it's all theatre; they just think the fallout is going to land on someone else's pants after they're out of office. But tech works (and fails) faster than that.
[Counterargument: if everything else is breakable, securely encrypted messages really stand out. One answer: But very short messages (in an unknown format) aren't generally breakable, anyway, and that's the likely case.]