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Re:Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Ope... by libeclipse on Thursday May 04, 2017 @11:29AM (#14265536)
Imagine implementing your amazing solution in real life.

I don't see a situation being frequent where you'd know the message weeks or months in advance of when you send it. If we follow your scheme, there's no encryption; we just meet up when we need to communicate. What if we're on opposite sides of the earth? If we had exchanged keys months earlier, this wouldn't be a problem.

Re:Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Ope... by _jal on Thursday May 04, 2017 @11:39AM (#14265637)
I must have explained poorly. I was not proposing "just communicate securely in advance". I was highlighting the problem with OTPs.

The fact that your key material is the same size as the message means all your security is in the key, thus in your key distribution method. Among other problems, this means no rekeying without replicating your original hand-off - you can communicate exactly as many bits as your previously securely exchanged, no more.

Re:Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Ope... by Nomentatus on Friday May 05, 2017 @10:48PM (#14278410)
USBs carry a lot - and couriers are terrorists usual way of doing business. I don't see this as any barrier.
Re:Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Ope... by libeclipse on Thursday May 04, 2017 @11:42AM (#14265671)
> means all of your security is in the key

...erm, isn't that the point?

Re:Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Ope... by _jal on Thursday May 04, 2017 @11:55AM (#14265815)
Speaking of points, I can't tell if you're intentionally missing mine, but either way this is unproductive. If you're sincerely confused, please read up a bit. The Wikipedia page isn't a terrible place to start.
Re:Americans' Access to Strong Encryption Is at Risk, an Ope... by libeclipse on Thursday May 04, 2017 @12:33PM (#14266236)
No I mean I understand where OTP falls short, but you're either really bad at conveying your viewpoint, or you're simply plain wrong.

Yes, with OTP you need to exchange keys and this shifts all of the security to key exchange, and while this wouldn't be a problem in other ciphers, it's a problem in OTP because of its other properties and shortfalls.

So at most I feel as though it's a security/convenience tradeoff; a tradeoff that's substantial or even dangerous in certain situations.