While there are some attempts with evidence-based policy, these sciences just aren't really at the point where math is useful (yet).
Math mostly requires reducibility: the ability to split it into small parts and look at these individually. That approach worked incredibly well in physics, and with the Manhattan project at the latest, it proved that it was mightier than any human endeavour before it.
But while, theoretically, everything could be reduced to physics, that isn't always the level of abstraction that works best. If you're depressed, a physicist isn't going to help you. Medicine may – but a psychologist, even though the discipline is scientifically flawed - is still an important tool in the set available to us.
Sociology is psychology on a population-scale. In that regard, it may be almost impossible to reduce because of nonlinear effects, chaos etc. That severely limits applying results from prior experiment X,Y,Z to situation B – because what you usually do is split situation B into components (B1=X,B2=Y,B3=Z,...), each of which is quite generic and has been studied in detail. So you'd have to run your own experiment on B, and the questions of sociology would require you to run an A/B experiment, with both A and B being, for example, New York.
Is there a thing as free will, and if so, is it explainable in terms of physics? And with consciousness (if you believe there is such a thing)? Is morality and ethics reducible to physics as well? There's a lot of presuppositions to the statement that everything is reducible to some purely mechanical process.
I have no doubt that many serious people believe as you have stated, but it's not a self evidently true claim.
If so, that makes sociology completely useless for policy. A field which cannot predict what will happen next time can't actually inform a policy maker as to whether their policy is useful.
Math mostly requires reducibility: the ability to split it into small parts and look at these individually.
This is simply false. If this is your criticism of math in economics, it applies equally well to math in geophysics, oceanography, climate science, etc.
That charge could reasonably be made against economics. From 2008: 'During a briefing by academics at the London School of Economics on the turmoil on the international markets the Queen asked: "Why did nobody notice it?"' [0]
[0] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/338635...
There's plenty more to the economy, and to economics, and to the crisis than predicting stock prices. Reducing the question to stock prices is avoiding the question, IMO.
> That's like saying physics is invalid because the Newtonian model doesn't 100% accurately reflect reality
Not really. Newtonian physics is inaccurate in ways that are hard to measure at everyday human scale. The 2008 crisis was pretty noticeable, all over the world. I think an apt physics analogy would be something like getting a nuclear explosion out of starting a fire (technically, out of buying a house), something that's been done successfully for millennia without major incident.
You're absolutely correct. The point I was trying to make is that the economic model we use drastically under-predicts "rare" events like the 2008 crash. I wasn't trying to make a statement about the "cause" of the crash, so much as state that the model under-predicts such events.
> Not really. Newtonian physics is inaccurate in ways that are hard to measure at everyday human scale. The 2008 crisis was pretty noticeable, all over the world. I think an apt physics analogy would be something like getting a nuclear explosion out of starting a fire (technically, out of buying a house), something that's been done successfully for millennia without major incident.
All theoretical models are based on arbitrary axioms/assumptions. The degree to which they predict reality successfully is largely predicated by the degree to which the underlying axioms correctly reflect reality. I don't think this is a binary thing. I don't think that the field of economics is "invalidated" because it "failed" to predict the 2008 crash. I might argue that it's "less" correct or reflective of reality than Newtonian mechanics is, but again, I don't think the degree to which our predictive systems represent reality is binary. I don't think that they're either right or wrong, only more or less successful.
http://www.twill.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/SOME-ECONOM...
Dean Baker's paper from 2002:
2) If you put a Keynesian economist, a neoclassical economist, and an Austrian economist (just to pick three flavors) in a room together and ask them to sort out what they agree and disagree on, the assumptions they'll make are more about narrative than about rigor... which would suggest that narrative is more important than the rigor folks give it credit for.
This critique is similarly wrong. There's a field called "machine learning" - you might have heard of it - which often uses inhomogeneous data points.
So doing statistical studies on a question like "do charter schools work" that treats all these implementations as identical, is often not very useful for actually learning something about policy.
So instead build a model that understands the important factors which make charter schools work/fail. Then use it.
If you can't do this, don't pretend you have anything to say about whether I should implement charter schools.
And I'm not claiming that sociology cannot predict. I'm just saying that they cannot measure the small (CO_2) and extrapolate to the large to make predictions. Their predictions therefore need other methods.
Only in as much as one believes that descriptive results are "completely useless" for policy.
For me they are just as important, if not more, than predictive results. Predictive models only tells us what will happen -- not what is going on, if it is any good, ways of thinking about it, and whether we should ask for more or less of it.
I'm a policy maker. I put an end to slavery.
No prediction involved.
"X prevents women from getting into IT".
I'm a policy maker. I take steps to help women get into IT.
No prediction involved.
Conditions in prisons are bad because so and so.
I'm a policy maker. Let's change the conditions.
No prediction involved.
Sometimes the prediction is obvious and implied (removing X will allow more women to get into IT), other times it's not needed at all (when the change is about doing what's right, like with slavery, not about doing something that we predict will turn things in some specific way).
Your other two examples - as you note - are based on an explicit prediction. Now the question arises - are sociological predictions any good?
You can't simultaneously claim sociology is descriptive, and therefore can't be judged on it's predictions, and then turn around and use it's predictions to describe it as useful.
Sociology is inherently tied with "moral philosophy" and normative ideas about society, and has always been, and it's something sociologists, at least here in Europe, have been perfectly open about (e.g. Foucault Bourdieu, Pierre Bourdieu, Henri Lefebvre and tons of others) It's not, for example, just a positivistic gathering of statistics and a supposedly "neutral" construction of prediction models.
>Your other two examples - as you note - are based on an explicit prediction
No, they are based on observation of existing conditions. No explicit prediction involved, as noted. At best there's an implicit prediction that's an obvious conclusion from the observations (e.g. "if we reduce macho culture, more women will get into IT").
I'm surprised that you're speaking with such certainty without mentioning the rather powerful relationship between economics and finance in a classical "follow the money" trail of thought.
We are here back at the fundamental mathification problem. Economists have understood that as long as their formulas look scientific enough, they can influence with their results policy makers et al.. Sociology rarely present their research in terms of the broad and universal truth as the economists do. So while Economists' results look rigorous on paper, reality still proves it often wrong.
This is analogous to complaining that climate researchers aren't rigorous because some subset of politicians claim it isn't manmade and point to some articles which support their claims.
What specifically are you claiming?
J.K. Galbraith (an economist himself) has claimed largely the same himself, and he's hardly the only one (within the field).
(Update) Some examples: https://unlearningeconomics.wordpress.com/tag/economists/
A lot of sociology is unfalsifiable. However, this is a field in which many people still look up to Marx--a sociologist whose predictions were falsified in a rather spectacular way.
Foundational microeconomic theories, however, are easily verified in many everyday cases and frequently used to make money in practice. Furthermore note that we're pretty sure about when the foundations apply and when they don't. Being able to say "I know when this is true" is a very powerful thing. The non-economic side of sociology can't say anything like that.
2. There are quite a few economists around that would wholeheartedly disagree with your statement that his predictions were falsified.
3. Microeconomic theories are falsified every day in actual interactions. It just doesn't matter.
4. Those who say they know what's true are either ... whatever. They most likely aren't scientists at work.
Economics is a social science.
Economists, like Sociologists, have trouble predicting the future and the past.
The only thing, in my opinion, that separates Economics from Sociology is that for economic activity to take place there's also a hard substance that can be tracked, eg. money, but also other goods or services. Sociology is the social science that focuses on everything else in the field that isn't that. Sociology is Economics poor cousin, as it were.
The problem with pointing to qualitative techniques as more rigorous and less biassed, is that the bias - when it comes to data about people- often lies in the decision what to measure - especially when categorising - and how to interpret the numerical result when you have (rigorously) processed it. That is as susceptible to preconceptions of the researcher. It's just easier for an economist to hide behind the rigour applied to the quantitative part.
Compare, for example, at Colombia University, the Department of Sociology homepage http://sociology.columbia.edu/ and the Department of Economoics http://econ.columbia.edu/. The sociology page features a huge image of a protest of the recent immigration executive orders. The economics page, on the other hand, features upcoming talks like "Iceland's Road to Recovery" and "Modern Financial Markets: The Role of High-Frequency Trading". The sociology department is signaling that they're passionate about ideological issues, while the economics department is signaling that they're focused on understanding and analyzing.
People trust scientists because people believe they are willing and able to divorce their emotions and vested interests from an objective pursuit of the truth. Sociology seems to fail that test time after time.
How can you conjure up this example, and conclude that only sociology is ideological?
Would it be better if he had said that the Economics department seems to aspire to centrist technocracy and the Sociology department varies from left wing to far left?
That would be the understatement of the century. Economics theory decide how to organize society resources, so, it's a very loaded subject with a lot of interests trying to decide what is "reality". Economics use complicated maths to justify ideologically determined policy.
I propose you a simple exercise. Go to any mainstream economic textbook and read about the fractional reserve system creation of money, that it's supposedly how the system works.
Then go and read what the people that are really in charge say about how money is created (pdf from the Bank of England):
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarte...
If the textbooks in economics are wrong about a basic thing like that, maybe we should start to think carefully about the subject.
Indeed. If it weren't for nutritionists, economists would win the prize for having the discipline most disconnected from reality.
I'd look at economic definitions of cost, value, and price, of ignoring the reality of thermodynamics, and of much of the theology (Thorstein Veblen uses the term "mythology") surrounding supposedly rationally-acting "homo economicus", market failures, and the role of information, amongst many others.
Money is first and principally a mechanism for exchange, and gumming up that role leads to problems. Fractional-reserve and central banking greatly assists in this, and is by and large hugely useful.
This is the exact problem, yet it is hard to get someone in the social sciences to admit it in my experience. For instance, I am a computer science student, and I'm currently taking a political science class as part of my university requirements. A recent exam question was worded in multiple choice format, to the effect that the professor was seeking an exact specific answer to a completely subjective question, such as "What is the most important issue facing China as it's population continues to grow?". It's completely absurd, and you end up with an exam full of questions with one "correct" answer, and a bunch of nonsensical gibberish for the other options.
This lack of imprecision drives me absolutely mad. I understand that social sciences are inherently dealing with subject matter that is harder to quantify than, say, computer science. But the issue is when one asserts that scientific conclusions can be made about these subjects when no formal system of reasoning exists. To quote from a recent article I read,
"Until we have a deep understanding of the brain, we can't shape falsifiable, general theories about it, and mind studies cannot provide a reliable understanding of the brain. In short, no theory, no falsifiability, no science."
http://arachnoid.com/psychology_and_alchemy/
In short, if social scientists simply accepted that their fields do not fit the traditional rigors of science, it would do much to alleviate the issue. Studying these things can still provide valuable, actionable insight. But to treat it on par with the natural sciences is fraudulent.
... because economics is a natural science?
This is exactly it. They can't prove what they know, or make good predictions. When you insert yourself into the story, you can't shake confirmation bias.
Economics is still shaky science, but the economists at least try to get on stronger fundamental footing.
Nonsense. Back to the original question, the reason why economics has influence is because it involves money. The people who hold the purse strings talk in that language, and those people always pay themselves first.
Sociology could have perfect rigor, beyond that of any other disciple, but it would never have the influence of economics.
Become obsequious towards those in power? Find out rationalizations for our current state of affairs? Come up with reasons why we live in the best of all possible worlds?
Joan Robinson once put it pretty concisely, "The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists."
Quantitative work are best at telling us what answers people gave or a numerical summary of what people did. It can't tell us why people gave that answer or why they did what they did.
For instance, this article ( https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.theatlantic.com/amp/article... ).
This joke probably sums up what many people think of economists: Q: Why did God create economists?
A: In order to make weather forecasters look good.
There are numerous economics papers studying exactly what is the shape of the Laffer curve both from historical analysis as well as trying to find natural experiments. (IIRC tax revenue peaks at 50-65% tax rates, at least in the short run.) None of the politicians actually know or care about the results of these studies - as long as the sound bite is convenient as a rhetoric device to support their ideology (cutting taxes or raising taxes or whatever, it gets trotted out by politicians.
Sadly, ex-economists who definitely do know better are instrumental in this as well. People like Krugman, Mankiw or indeed Laffer got a large audience based on genuine rigorous contributions from 10 or 20 years ago - and then promptly ignore all that rigor, uncertainty and intellectual honesty when they get the offer of a $10million/year payday and a chance to mold the world according to their ideology from politicians and media.
It is the same thing with international trade, it is the same thing with state-vs-private ownership and natural monopolies, it is the same thing with costs/benefits of demographic change and migration.
It reminds me of the often-cited Stanford Prison Experiment. The lack of any rigor during the experiment is usually ignored when the findings are discussed.
The "experiment" had no control group, or even a separation between the observers and the ones involved in the experiment (Zimbardo was both the prison chief and the lead researcher). From an experimental setup point of view, it was just an amateurish mess.
The uselessness is then demonstrated by proclamations that the doubling of the unemployment rate in the recent financial crisis is caused by 10s of millions of workers suddenly developing a preference for leisure over work.
A. Has never read an economics research paper
B. Only know economics as monetary policy (or macro more broadly), and as a libertarian is inherently skeptical.
Currently, most of the interesting research being done in econ is outside of theoretical macro, so the knee jerk libertarian "economics is broken" meme doesn't hold much water as the topics and methods are pretty dissimilar. A developmental microeconomics field study in rural India is a different beast entirely from a macro theory paper. For a sample of the diversity of economics research, see here: http://www.nber.org/papersbyprog/
Returning to your comment, the issue of storytelling, in a nutshell, was what drove me crazy when working closely with qualitative sociologists. Trying to discuss falsifiability in their study design was maddening. Sociology doesn't need to adopt the same research model as applied economics but they do need a serious look at their research methods, and I have more respect for those who try to take a quantitative approach. Many of the sociologists I worked with would turn up their noses at the phrase "computational social science" and were loathe to discuss issues like biased sampling, but the best ones (IMO) used qualitative observations to drive later large-scale quantitative study, which I think should be the de-facto standard for social science research.
Their reliance on ethnographic studies can be useful for verifying the existence of some phenomenon you have a hunch exists in some form, but such research is woefully biased and wholly inadequate as a means of measuring the prevalence or magnitude of a phenomenon, which is why economics studies (or quantitative methods more broadly) tend to have more credence when presenting evidence on the same subjects.
I'm not sure why that save economics from the discussion, when it's the theoretical macro what have a huge influence in the life of billions of persons and the title of the article we are discussing is "If Sociologists Had as Much Influence as Economists".
The libertarian comment is uncalled for, as most of the comments here don't express a political view, only criticism of the discipline.
It needs to generate 'useful' political recommendations (useful to the 'right' people).
"The answer would be rigor."
No it absolutely would not. The economics profession has been actively resisting rigor. For instance, Neoclassical (still the default in policy circles) still considers private debt to have no significant macroeconomic effect and presumes, religiously, that markets trend towards equilibrium (particularly in employment).
"This is why economics is so much more trusted."
It shouldn't be.
"it at least uses objective data"
Would you have any faith in a model rooted in Newtonian mechanics that assumed away friction just because "it at least uses objective data"?
The answer would be rigor. A huge problem with sociology is the dependence on the story. Unfortunately, since the sociologist is often a human with their own biases, they are going to see what they want to see.
For example, I purchased the Kindle version of the book the author recommends ("Coming Up Short"). I turned to the appendix, where the author describes her research methodology. And sure enough, the research involves open-ended questions ("Walk me through a typical day at work." "Is there a time you lost a job? Could you describe it?") that could lead the interviewee to respond in any way they want.
There are many problems with this, such as : 1) the interviewee may inadvertently invent convenient narratives that provide comfort but aren't accurate, 2) the interviewer may mis-interpret the answers, etc.
How are we supposed to develop policy off of this? Sure, it's a great starting point for starting research, but the narrative- or story-based approach should never be the conclusion.
This is why economics is so much more trusted. Although economics has flaws, and the study of econometrics can sometimes lead to incorrect conclusions, it at least uses objective data and metrics, which are less susceptible to error, providing a much more grounded approach to policy decisions.