That charge could reasonably be made against economics. From 2008: 'During a briefing by academics at the London School of Economics on the turmoil on the international markets the Queen asked: "Why did nobody notice it?"' [0]
[0] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/338635...
There's plenty more to the economy, and to economics, and to the crisis than predicting stock prices. Reducing the question to stock prices is avoiding the question, IMO.
> That's like saying physics is invalid because the Newtonian model doesn't 100% accurately reflect reality
Not really. Newtonian physics is inaccurate in ways that are hard to measure at everyday human scale. The 2008 crisis was pretty noticeable, all over the world. I think an apt physics analogy would be something like getting a nuclear explosion out of starting a fire (technically, out of buying a house), something that's been done successfully for millennia without major incident.
You're absolutely correct. The point I was trying to make is that the economic model we use drastically under-predicts "rare" events like the 2008 crash. I wasn't trying to make a statement about the "cause" of the crash, so much as state that the model under-predicts such events.
> Not really. Newtonian physics is inaccurate in ways that are hard to measure at everyday human scale. The 2008 crisis was pretty noticeable, all over the world. I think an apt physics analogy would be something like getting a nuclear explosion out of starting a fire (technically, out of buying a house), something that's been done successfully for millennia without major incident.
All theoretical models are based on arbitrary axioms/assumptions. The degree to which they predict reality successfully is largely predicated by the degree to which the underlying axioms correctly reflect reality. I don't think this is a binary thing. I don't think that the field of economics is "invalidated" because it "failed" to predict the 2008 crash. I might argue that it's "less" correct or reflective of reality than Newtonian mechanics is, but again, I don't think the degree to which our predictive systems represent reality is binary. I don't think that they're either right or wrong, only more or less successful.
http://www.twill.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/SOME-ECONOM...
Dean Baker's paper from 2002:
2) If you put a Keynesian economist, a neoclassical economist, and an Austrian economist (just to pick three flavors) in a room together and ask them to sort out what they agree and disagree on, the assumptions they'll make are more about narrative than about rigor... which would suggest that narrative is more important than the rigor folks give it credit for.
This critique is similarly wrong. There's a field called "machine learning" - you might have heard of it - which often uses inhomogeneous data points.
So doing statistical studies on a question like "do charter schools work" that treats all these implementations as identical, is often not very useful for actually learning something about policy.
So instead build a model that understands the important factors which make charter schools work/fail. Then use it.
If you can't do this, don't pretend you have anything to say about whether I should implement charter schools.
And I'm not claiming that sociology cannot predict. I'm just saying that they cannot measure the small (CO_2) and extrapolate to the large to make predictions. Their predictions therefore need other methods.
Only in as much as one believes that descriptive results are "completely useless" for policy.
For me they are just as important, if not more, than predictive results. Predictive models only tells us what will happen -- not what is going on, if it is any good, ways of thinking about it, and whether we should ask for more or less of it.
I'm a policy maker. I put an end to slavery.
No prediction involved.
"X prevents women from getting into IT".
I'm a policy maker. I take steps to help women get into IT.
No prediction involved.
Conditions in prisons are bad because so and so.
I'm a policy maker. Let's change the conditions.
No prediction involved.
Sometimes the prediction is obvious and implied (removing X will allow more women to get into IT), other times it's not needed at all (when the change is about doing what's right, like with slavery, not about doing something that we predict will turn things in some specific way).
Your other two examples - as you note - are based on an explicit prediction. Now the question arises - are sociological predictions any good?
You can't simultaneously claim sociology is descriptive, and therefore can't be judged on it's predictions, and then turn around and use it's predictions to describe it as useful.
Sociology is inherently tied with "moral philosophy" and normative ideas about society, and has always been, and it's something sociologists, at least here in Europe, have been perfectly open about (e.g. Foucault Bourdieu, Pierre Bourdieu, Henri Lefebvre and tons of others) It's not, for example, just a positivistic gathering of statistics and a supposedly "neutral" construction of prediction models.
>Your other two examples - as you note - are based on an explicit prediction
No, they are based on observation of existing conditions. No explicit prediction involved, as noted. At best there's an implicit prediction that's an obvious conclusion from the observations (e.g. "if we reduce macho culture, more women will get into IT").
If so, that makes sociology completely useless for policy. A field which cannot predict what will happen next time can't actually inform a policy maker as to whether their policy is useful.
Math mostly requires reducibility: the ability to split it into small parts and look at these individually.
This is simply false. If this is your criticism of math in economics, it applies equally well to math in geophysics, oceanography, climate science, etc.