Consumers also lose out, because of decreased market competition.
It's nice to imagine that maybe it would breed "super companies" that are tougher, smarter, and more efficient because they thought they had to be to compete. But, there aren't any order-of-magnitude wins to be had in automobile technology. There are no lone geniuses who figure out how to eke out 10% more efficiency with this one weird (but patentable) trick. It takes research over a long period time to make even modest gains, and a cheater in the market bleeds the honest companies of resources.
And, to go further: Because Volkswagen made these claims about diesel tech, other honest companies may have been wasting resources trying to match the dishonest VW claims...when there are actual better techs they could have been pursuing. This may have led to even less gains over the time VW were faking data.
I think, all around, it is lose-lose.
If the business is otherwise competitive but the owners sued out of existence, it's nonsensical for new owners to dismantle it.
Do you think shareholders of a company like VW, which includes pretty much everyone with a retirement plan, shoulder _all_ the responsibility? Because that's pretty much what a "corporate death penalty" means.
No. That's why I said "a degree of culpability".
The question isn't whether companies (and thus their shareholders) should be penalized for wrongdoing. It's whether shareholders should be zeroed out by a "corporate death penalty". I think it's an interesting question, why we don't have one of those.
You can't just blame automobile makers for the existence of automobiles.
Whereas if the corporation were liquidated, the assets would be bought up by different corporations and run by different management.
Banks, most of all, are just bags of assets that can be run by other managers who run the same types of assets (otherwise these assets would be illiquid and not need active management) at other banks.
The same goes for airlines: If an airline is a brand + planes (probably leased) and routes, why EVER bail out an airline? Especially a legacy airline when it's assets could be bought by an economically viable new airline?
We don't have corporate death penalties because to a first approximation there are no laws that enable us to do that. To put companies to death, we'd need to pass enabling laws. But those aren't the only new sanctions we can enable in new laws.
It seems to me that we can break down those impacted by sanctions against corporations as follows:
* Officers and directors of the company
* Employees of the company
* Shareholders in the company
* Customers of the company
When we think about how to structure sanctions against a company, we should think about where (a) deterrence will have the most effect and (b) where retribution is most warranted.
How does a "corporate death penalty" apply those effects? It seems to me:
* Officers and directors of the company have a demonstrated track record of harming their employers for personal short-term gain; see, for instance, every stock buyback scandal. Moreover, officers and directors tend to be wealthy and thus more likely to have a professionally or at least competently managed portfolio: they're diversified out of a lot of impact.
* Employees of the company have extremely limited ability to alter strategic decisions made by management, and so aren't useful for deterrence. They also tend not to profit from strategic high-level malfeasance, and so aren't deserving of much retribution. Meanwhile: mergers, spinoffs, and acquisitions are almost invariable dreadful for employees, huge numbers of whom are made redundant, pension obligations scrapped, benefits reduced, and so on.
* Shareholders have virtually no insight into the operation of their holdings. Moreover, vast numbers of shareholders don't even know they hold companies, because they do so through pension plans and mutual funds.
* Customers who, for instance, bought VW cars during this scandal did so in an effort to minimize their impact on the environment; the scandal is that VW lied to them. Not only are they demonstrably incapable of being deterred from future scandals, but it's hard to argue that they've in any way earned warranty confusion, loss of service stations and personnel, and slashed resale values.
Compare that to a new law making this kind of malfeasance a strict-liability felony for officers of the company. Doesn't that make much more sense than a death penalty?
So I'm acknowledging that you could pass laws that make an effective death penalty (through fines or through literally forcing liquidation) a reality, but then asking: why would you want to do that? Aren't there better laws we could pass instead?
Since we have neither a corporate death penalty nor adequate criminal statutes for malfeasance, how is the "corporate death penalty" superior than laws that make it more straightforward to hold managers and directors accountable criminally? People who are willing to commit crimes to enrich themselves using companies are unlikely to be especially motivated by the well-being of the company, its employees, or shareholders.