Intel has made a bet that it would take just as much time for ARM to reach x86 level of performance as it would take Intel to bring x86 power consumption down to SOC levels. Now Intel can play on both sides with their low power x86 parts, Xeon-D with upto 16 cores and Core-M in 2c/4t configuration.
There's only one little problem: the market has settled on ARM and doesn't care anymore.
So how are they gonna play those "both sides" again?
The Intel Houdini software used to make Android on X86 possible is a marvel of engineering but it is not perfect. I worked for a company that made an Android tablet around an Intel chip instead of ARM. We were hit with a great number of user reports of certain apps crashing, overheating, or simply refusing to run in the first place. We verified in QA that these apps would work just fine on ARM tablets with the same Android version and similar specs.
To be fair to Intel, they were very good to work with and really did (and do) want to make it work. I have no doubt they will. Eventually.
Currently iOS is the only one that also supports having C and C++ as bytecode (LLVM one).
Android and WP, only support it for Java, RenderScript and .NET languages.
[0] https://cloudplatform.googleblog.com/2016/04/Google-and-Rack...
Second, they cost WAYYYY more than a mobile chip. They cost more than an iPhone's ENTIRE BOM, or about 10x more than what Apple pays for its chips.
Throttling has been a problem on high-end Androids for years now.
> Second, they cost WAYYYY more than a mobile chip.
That's the real issue – the margins in the mobile market are ridiculously slim, and there is no x86 monopoly Intel can abuse to lock in vendors and customers. So cheap ARMs it is.
Atom has barely increased its single-threaded performance from like 300 pts in Passmark to about 540 right now (in Pentiums, in PCs, which cost $160 a pop).
Intel is not competitive on price. That's why Atom didn't pan out in mobile. They tried to do it by heavily subsidizing its high-end mobile chips, which typically cost close to $50, to compete against a $15 mid-range Qualcomm chip. That's why some people were "impressed" by what an Asus Zenfone could do for instance, for its mid-range price overall.
And if Intel can't compete with Atom on price, then there's NO CHANCE it will ever compete with Core M in mobile. The only reason it even exists in so called "tablets" that go for $1000 right now, is because Microsoft failed to make a good case for ARM-based Windows machines with its poor app support. But that will always remain a niche.
And outside the Surface those aren't selling well either.
(IMO rightfully so, the Venue 11 Pro is the worst device I've seen in years – hypothetical hardware dickwaving aside, even a $50 OEM Android tablet has better UX and usability than Windows 10 without mouse/keyboard.)
It's the complete opposite of how iOS/Android tablets operate.
1) they wouldn't have replaced its Core-based Celerons and Pentiums with Atoms to increase profits - and they sell those for $110-$160
2) they wouldn't have licensed Atom IP to Rockchip and other low-end chip makers, essentially pursuing an ARM-like IP-revenue model (for which they would've made peanuts and didn't pan out anyway).
Intel licenses allot of things they still have ARM licenses and probably even Power PC ones.
The gist of the Digital Semiconductor acquisition was that DEC had kicked Intel's ass in circuit design but turned out to have insufficient volume to be profitable, so Intel and DEC agreed to move DEC onto the upcoming Itanium and DEC could get rid of their bleeding edge but money losing semi business. Alphas and XScales were both remarkable feats - on high performance and low power end, respectively. DEC agreed to kill Alpha and move to Intel's Itanium - but Intel had no existing ARM style product at the time.
I don't think Intel really wanted ARM and so made half-hearted attempts at selling it.
Otellini said Intel passed on the opportunity to supply
Apple because the economics did not make sense at the
time given the forecast product cost and expected
volume. He told The Atlantic, "The thing you have
to remember is that this was before the iPhone was
introduced and no one knew what the iPhone would do...
At the end of the day, there was a chip that they were
interested in that they wanted to pay a certain price
for and not a nickel more and that price was below our
forecasted cost. I couldn't see it.
"It wasn't one of these things you can make up on
volume. And in hindsight, the forecasted cost was wrong
and the volume was 100x what anyone thought."Representing quoted text in italics does not suffer that downside.
(1) was doubtless true. But (2) didn't pan out.
One can find slides from IDFs etc. at the time with Intel trying to buttress its x86-everywhere arguments by showing that Flash ran more consistently on small devices when they were x86-based.
In retrospect, Atom was mostly wish fulfillment. I can't say whether this was an execution issue or whether the strategy was intrinsically doomed to fail.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_i960
Some variants are still in production mostly for legacy purposes but not the one (MC) I wanted. Too bad.
Now I will have to research about BiiN and Intel iAPX 432. :)
Performance Effects of Architectural Complexity in the Intel 432
https://www.princeton.edu/~rblee/ELE572Papers/Fall04Readings...
The i960/BiiN system improved on that by greatly reducing complexity of the hardware. It was a fast RISC system, had all kinds of error detection, supported HA configuration, and had 432's object-descriptor protections. Object- and page-oriented system. I expect our computer security and reliability situation on Wintel might have turned out differently given what highly-secure systems did with x86's shitty segment/paging/ring combo and HA with lock-step.
Note: A Slashdot article on legacy systems once knocked the F-35 for using old i960 CPU's. Thought that was stupid idea. I think designer was probably thinking too many steps ahead with the market ruining it for him/her.
[1] http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/levy/capabook/index.html
[2] http://craigchamberlain.com/library/blackhat-2007/Moyer/Extr...
Passive avoidance: Customer doesn't even think to consider what products Intel is offering. Active avoidance: Tries not to spec Intel products when possible.
The internal politics part comes from this scenario. Say someone makes a good proposal, spend $20 million. In return a get product line worth 100 million yr gross and $40 million net. Manager thinks, $100 million a year isn't going to get me a VP position at a $50 billion dollar company.
You could also be describing execs at Apple.
They didn't have any choice. Itaniums were big, and their defect rate on newer processes was too high to get any yield on chips that size.
Microsoft dropped support for IA64 only a few years ago with Windows Server 2008 R2 being the last OS that supported it due to the limited market share. This was quite long after Intel has killed IA64 internally on it's own.
To sell off a division that sold low-power chips for tiny margins in an industry that never, ever, ever explodes (until it did) was just plain normal. He would have gotten pressure and funny looks from the industry and shareholders if he didn't sell it off.
7 years ago they sold their Imageon GPU to Qualcomm, which is now going gangbusters inside every Snapdragon-based phone.
1 http://appleinsider.com/articles/15/01/07/after-intel-spent-...
2 http://www.cnet.com/news/intel-doubles-down-on-mobile-with-1...
3 http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/intel-to-chinese-elec...
Latest Atoms are almost usable, and you can get passable quad core 4GB ram/64GB flash tablet for $160 (Chuwi Hi10).
More complicated is that Intel came into the mid-90s with several "next generation" architectures, some that weren't solely developed at Intel. XScale came from Digital and had IP from ARM. i960 was a joint venture with Siemens. And they still had the i860 which by this point it was clear was never going to meet expectations in the market. So when the x86 folks said "Intel should put all it's wood behind our arrow", politically they were fighting groups that were weakened by NIH or who'd already for all practical purposes failed. Probably didn't hurt that Pentium was doing quite good and P6 was looking good on the horizon.
A more direct source, from Intel's own CEO (at the time): http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2268985/outgoing-in...
But the thing I don't understand is why Intel gave up on XScale, their ARM-compatible effort (they held one of the few expensive ARM licenses that allowed them to expand the core architecture). How's Atom doing nowadays? Last I heard, Intel had partnered with Dell to make the Atom-powered Venue android tablets. Can't say they're grabbing headlines with them...