I don't believe this is accurate. It is true that there are complaints about the curves' design in parameter transparency and their difficulty to implement them securely. But I don't think people are actually suggesting the curves are not safe to use conceptually.
P-256 facilitated ECDSA should be good to use until the new curves are adopted (which will take a while) as long as you're not writing implementations yourself. It is true that the new curves will be a better alternative once they are available given that they are designed for transparency and ease of implementation.
- Use RSA until 25519/448 land in TLS
- Switch to ECDSA in the interim
Personally, I would switch even though ECDSA isn't great.The concerns over P-256 and P-384 are more academic than anything: They're hard to implement safely and without side-channels. Read: hard, not impossible.
You shouldn't be writing your own ECDSA implementation, however. That'd be foolhardy.
EDIT: I use secp384r1 for signing random_compat, so if anyone gets bit by this recommendation, I will too: https://github.com/paragonie/random_compat/blob/master/dist/...
Bruce Schneier recommends against using them.
Regardless, I'm not suggesting new cryptosystems should use the NIST P-curves. They shouldn't; those curves are just as tricky to use as RSA.
[1]: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/10/a-riddle-wra...
If so, use NaCl/libsodium at the application layer and don't rely on ECDSA alone.
If your threat model is "criminals", ECDSA is less insane than RSA (provided, once again, you're not implementing it yourself, you're relying on developed by a team of cryptographers and security engineers).
My threat model includes NSA dragnets but not being specifically targeted by the NSA.
That term likely means one of two things: guarding against a particularly capable attacker or paranoia for others
X25519 for key exchange in TLS is ready and is in openssl master (and in boringSSL). I don't know the status of NSS support, or plans for SChannel and CoreCrypto support.
X25519 key exchange and Ed25519 signatures have been deployed in nacl, libsodium, ssh, etc. for a while.
EDIT: NSS ticket for X25519 Key Exchange: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=957105
On the other hand, placing evergreen confidence in "TLS", believing that it is "good enough" or concluding "it's all we've got" are lines of thinking that not make sense to me. The vulnerabilities just keep coming, one after another.
High speed crypto not part of TLS that, as another commenter put it, is "considered safe". Does it exist?
Useful software that is written from the start with such care that it does not need to be continously patched ad inifitum. Nonexistant? (No need to answer. I know the truth.)
Getting something added to TLS seems difficult enough, but getting something removed seems impossible. Like all bad software, TLS has numerous "features" I do not need and will never use. OpenSSL is like a museum of cryptography, preserving the obsolete for posterity.
Long live TLS. May it forever waste my time and energy.
The problem is, the ONLY curves that are supported in practice are NIST P-256 (prime256v1) and P-384 (secp384r1), which aren't considered safe. So, I guess, many are reluctant to switch (because we're non-experts and don't know real implications, but we heard that there's something not right there - and shouldn't one be wary?).
Neither Curve25519 nor Curve448 - which are said to be safe - are usable with X.509 and TLS, yet. Still waiting for that RFC to get past the draft status.
So, what should we do?