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Re:The DROWN Attack by CiPHPerCoder on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @10:41AM (#11203297)
You have two choices then:

    - Use RSA until 25519/448 land in TLS
    - Switch to ECDSA in the interim
Personally, I would switch even though ECDSA isn't great.

The concerns over P-256 and P-384 are more academic than anything: They're hard to implement safely and without side-channels. Read: hard, not impossible.

You shouldn't be writing your own ECDSA implementation, however. That'd be foolhardy.

EDIT: I use secp384r1 for signing random_compat, so if anyone gets bit by this recommendation, I will too: https://github.com/paragonie/random_compat/blob/master/dist/...

Re:The DROWN Attack by _yy on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @11:12AM (#11203594)
The NIST curves also have constants which may or may not be manipulated.

Bruce Schneier recommends against using them.

Re:The DROWN Attack by tptacek on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @11:57AM (#11204039)
Even Bernstein doesn't argue that the NIST curve seeds are actually backdoors. Schneier isn't a curve researcher; in fact, he's more like an anti-curve pundit. I'm not sure his opinion is all that powerful.

Regardless, I'm not suggesting new cryptosystems should use the NIST P-curves. They shouldn't; those curves are just as tricky to use as RSA.

Re:The DROWN Attack by stock_toaster on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @03:23PM (#11205746)
What about the NSA "freaking out"[1] about ECC in general?

[1]: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/10/a-riddle-wra...

Re:The DROWN Attack by tptacek on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @03:38PM (#11205847)
Rodents of unusual size? I don't think they exist.
Re:The DROWN Attack by stock_toaster on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @04:49PM (#11206372)
Your vote of confidence is overwhelming. ;)
Re:The DROWN Attack by CiPHPerCoder on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @11:14AM (#11203609)
I would recommend against using them if your adversary is the NSA and your threat model comes wrapped in tin foil (and if I didn't, I'd get ignored anyway).

If so, use NaCl/libsodium at the application layer and don't rely on ECDSA alone.

If your threat model is "criminals", ECDSA is less insane than RSA (provided, once again, you're not implementing it yourself, you're relying on developed by a team of cryptographers and security engineers).

Re:The DROWN Attack by Dylan16807 on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @12:05PM (#11204115)
Threat model wrapped in tin foil? I don't understand what you mean, are you suggesting paranoia?

My threat model includes NSA dragnets but not being specifically targeted by the NSA.

Re:The DROWN Attack by CiPHPerCoder on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @12:19PM (#11204238)
In that case, active attacks against Weierstrass field arithmetic isn't part of your threat model and ECDSA/ECDH over the NIST curves is fine.
Re:The DROWN Attack by Dylan16807 on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @12:23PM (#11204294)
So this is something that can't be done en masse? Okay, thanks.
Re:The DROWN Attack by IncRnd on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @12:39PM (#11204427)
>> Threat model wrapped in tin foil? I don't understand what you mean, are you suggesting paranoia?

That term likely means one of two things: guarding against a particularly capable attacker or paranoia for others

Re:The DROWN Attack by mkj on Wednesday March 02, 2016 @12:55AM (#11208330)
NSA dragnets won't decrypt things using dodgy curves for signatures (ECDSA), only things using dodgy curves for key exchange (ECDH).