The NIST curves also have constants which may or may not be manipulated.
Bruce Schneier recommends against using them.
Even Bernstein doesn't argue that the NIST curve seeds are actually backdoors. Schneier isn't a curve researcher; in fact, he's more like an anti-curve pundit. I'm not sure his opinion is all that powerful.
Regardless, I'm not suggesting new cryptosystems should use the NIST P-curves. They shouldn't; those curves are just as tricky to use as RSA.
Re:The DROWN Attack
by stock_toaster on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @03:23PM
(#11205746)
What about the NSA "freaking out"[1] about ECC in general?
[1]: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/10/a-riddle-wra...
Rodents of unusual size? I don't think they exist.
Re:The DROWN Attack
by stock_toaster on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @04:49PM
(#11206372)
Your vote of confidence is overwhelming. ;)
Re:The DROWN Attack
by CiPHPerCoder on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @11:14AM
(#11203609)
I would recommend against using them if your adversary is the NSA and your threat model comes wrapped in tin foil (and if I didn't, I'd get ignored anyway).
If so, use NaCl/libsodium at the application layer and don't rely on ECDSA alone.
If your threat model is "criminals", ECDSA is less insane than RSA (provided, once again, you're not implementing it yourself, you're relying on developed by a team of cryptographers and security engineers).
Re:The DROWN Attack
by Dylan16807 on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @12:05PM
(#11204115)
Threat model wrapped in tin foil? I don't understand what you mean, are you suggesting paranoia?
My threat model includes NSA dragnets but not being specifically targeted by the NSA.
Re:The DROWN Attack
by CiPHPerCoder on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @12:19PM
(#11204238)
In that case, active attacks against Weierstrass field arithmetic isn't part of your threat model and ECDSA/ECDH over the NIST curves is fine.
Re:The DROWN Attack
by Dylan16807 on Tuesday March 01, 2016 @12:23PM
(#11204294)
So this is something that can't be done en masse? Okay, thanks.
>> Threat model wrapped in tin foil? I don't understand what you mean, are you suggesting paranoia?
That term likely means one of two things: guarding against a particularly capable attacker or paranoia for others
The concerns over P-256 and P-384 are more academic than anything: They're hard to implement safely and without side-channels. Read: hard, not impossible.
You shouldn't be writing your own ECDSA implementation, however. That'd be foolhardy.
EDIT: I use secp384r1 for signing random_compat, so if anyone gets bit by this recommendation, I will too: https://github.com/paragonie/random_compat/blob/master/dist/...