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Re:Patronizing Passwords by astazangasta on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @11:43AM (#10582231)
I have the perfect solution to this, but software systems aren't with me yet. The answer is: a keychain. Not a digital keychain, an actual one. On this I put my "infinity key" - it's a little USB flash drive with a LUKS-encrypted file system on it that holds a private key. Lots of tech people have something like this. It's great for SSH - I can add my infinity key to any host and be assured that I will always be able to login securely from any machine I want. We're all used to the physical metaphor of keys as security, and needing a physical key to get into things. This is not a huge change for us.

This could easily become the norm, and should. It requires only one key for all of us, it is perfectly secure, doesn't require storing secrets on the remote end, never needs to be changed, can't be forgotten because it doesn't need to be memorized (there is one password for the LUKS encryption). There is no penalty for using the same key in thousands of places.

The problem is, no website or browser supports this kind of authentication, and most people are not savvy enough to build this sort of thing for themselves. These are both problems that should be solved; we desperately need to move the Internet away from passwords, password resets, and so on.

Re:Patronizing Passwords by munin on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @12:16PM (#10582519)
> This could easily become the norm, and should.

a stronger version of this IS the norm in many countries in Europe and large security conscious enterprises in the united states: an ID card issued that is also a high security module. it's better than your scheme because the ID card is also a computer that can respond to signing requests by a host computer and the private key doesn't leave the ID card, ever. governments issue and service tens to hundreds of millions of these cards a year.

Re:Patronizing Passwords by astazangasta on Wednesday November 18, 2015 @12:09PM (#10589043)
A government-issued private key doesn't solve a main problem I'm concerned about. This needs to be something people can roll themselves. If you can't generate your own key, you're not secure.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by jclulow on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @12:10PM (#10582454)
You can't really "add" your key to a computer you don't trust, though. At best, it could destroy your USB device; at worst it could copy the contents out once you decrypt them.

This may be better than using one password for everything, but it's certainly not a panacea.

Re:Patronizing Passwords by anon4 on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @02:19PM (#10583335)
Maybe the only answer is to air-gap the two devices and have the user input a secret code shown on the dongle. So you press the button, type the code on the website and log in that way.

Edit: Or maybe have two devices: one dumb flash storage and a device that actually computes your key. You press the "compute my key" button while the storage is connected to the keychain, then disconnect it from the keychain and connect it to the pc. Next time you connect it to the keychain, it's wiped before use and never ever read.

Re:Patronizing Passwords by privacy101 on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @02:47PM (#10583493)
The device could instead have a display that displays a password, QR code, one-time-key, etc... and then you would scan it using a webcam or your phone (or type it manually).
Re:Patronizing Passwords by anon4 on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @02:55PM (#10583536)
Yeah, but that way it's displayed out in the open and you can make a mistake copying it. I think just exchanging usb flash storage sticks is preferable unless you sufficiently distrust the system you're on.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by Skunkleton on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @02:57PM (#10583552)
Maybe like a phone running a TOTP application?
Re:Patronizing Passwords by privacy101 on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @03:41PM (#10583803)
I would have more trust in a separate device that has no networking capabilities.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by dazmax on Wednesday November 18, 2015 @12:10AM (#10586042)
What if it's in a "secure element" whose hardware and firmware make it provably incapable of divulging the private key?
Re:Patronizing Passwords by privacy101 on Wednesday November 18, 2015 @04:44PM (#10590980)
I don't think that's possible... it reminds me of Apple saying that they can't decrypt your phone, but it is decrypted when you use it and many apps have permissions to transfer basically everything over the network (and Apple has root too).
Re:Patronizing Passwords by astazangasta on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @02:01PM (#10583214)
I think the panacea is dedicated hardware that can produce secure tokens (a signed message) without having to expose my key to the machine I plug into. But existing systems still require that level of trust; I'm doing no worse than someone with a password typing it into a possibly insecure machine.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by zz1 on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @01:37PM (#10583054)
You could also catch BadUSB...
Re:Patronizing Passwords by sigmar on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @12:11PM (#10582463)
>The problem is, no website or browser supports this kind of authentication

Aren't you describing Yubikeys? Which aren't widely supported, but IIRC are still supported by some websites and apps.

Re:Patronizing Passwords by teraflop on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @01:39PM (#10583071)
A Yubikey-like device is actually more secure than what the parent comment describes, because it prevents the private key from being viewed or copied by the host computer. You can think of it as a dedicated piece of hardware that runs something like ssh-agent, except over USB instead of a socket.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by angelbob on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @12:09PM (#10582442)
Though he says a lot of this is to avoid bulk cracking of your passwords. As with, say, OneLogin, your keychain provides a really easy way to bulk crack all your passwords - steal the key.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by finnn on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @12:39PM (#10582668)
Wouldn't it be better to have your "infinity key" not reveal the secret data, using a smartcard or similar technology? That way if the computer that it's connected to is untrusted, no further damage could be done after removing the card. That + TLS client certificates stored on this card seem like it might not be the worst user experience, while still remaining reasonably secure. From my brief Googling it looks like the US military uses something like this.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by astazangasta on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @02:05PM (#10583243)
Yes, RSA provides systems like this also I think. My solution is worse, but only uses commodity hardware and free software. When I can program my own smart card I will prefer that.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by finnn on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @02:16PM (#10583316)
Firefox, which I think would be considered free software despite some of the shit they've been bundling, does client certificates, and I'd imagine one could program their own smartcard, although I don't know much about it.
Re:Patronizing Passwords by icebraining on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @06:17PM (#10584731)
The Basic Card is programmable: http://www.basiccard.com/

It's what the FSF Europe uses for their OpenPGP cards, that you get if you join their Fellowship.

EDIT: apparently, the programmable version doesn't come with RSA support :|

Re:Patronizing Passwords by scotty79 on Wednesday November 18, 2015 @03:45AM (#10586663)
> We're all used to the physical metaphor of keys as security, and needing a physical key to get into things.

I was hoping this will go away in my lifetime.

Re:Patronizing Passwords by amelius on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @12:23PM (#10582576)
> it's a little USB flash drive

Uhm, yes, but why not use something a little more convenient, like a smartwatch with NFC/wifi?

Re:Patronizing Passwords by pavel_lishin on Tuesday November 17, 2015 @01:15PM (#10582908)
A flash drive that lives on my keychain would be much more convenient for me than a watch, which I dislike wearing.