Why?
The principle underlying the Craiglist lawsuit is centuries old. Craigslist is like a shop open to shoppers. The shopkeeper makes the premises open to the public, but the scope of that access is limited by the shopkeeper's purpose in granting that access. If a member of the public accesses the property for improper purpose, a civil action for trespass arises.
The fact that the premises is an Internet website changes nothing.
It absolutely should. There is no accurate physical analogy for an HTTP server that responds with "200 OK" and valid data for a given set of "GET whatever HTTP/1.1" requests. Rather than contort existing trespass law to match the Internet, we have to derive meaningful boundaries for the Internet from ethical first principles if we want the conclusions to be remotely sane.
(I have no idea how this plays into the Craigslist lawsuit. I'm just responding to that one fragment of logic from your comment.)
What I think happens a lot is that people use "the Internet is different" as a sort of short-hand for the idea that the Internet should be governed by different underlying principles. But I think it's disingenuous to say that the nature of the Internet dictates that it be governed by different principles. The existing property principles translate just fine.
If they did, we wouldn't be having this conversation. As others have pointed out, physical concepts of scarcity and mutual exclusion are nearly meaningless in the digital realm. Digital systems are capable of acting autonomously as agents; they are not just passive property. Measures to ensure technical exclusion bear no useful resemblance to physical security. Computers give the ability to lay out in machine-readable terms what is "public" and what is not.
Note that I'm not arguing against the right to decide who can access a computer system and for what purposes, only against the use of analogies to physical spaces and existing laws.
An example he gave was seeing a cop drive by your house. Ostensibly that'll put you at ease, the concept that a law enforcement agency is patrolling your neighborhood. Maybe the officer gives a wave, or even chats with you for a bit if you're out washing your car or mowing the lawn. You feel safe.
How would this possibly translate to "cyberspace"? What if the local PD did a regular port scan of your router, or attempted to crack wifis while on their patrol? We allow searches of our belongings when we get on planes, but when our packets go overseas, we very much dislike the idea that someone from the government might be taking a look.
The rules, he went on to say, are simply different, because expectations are different.
I understand that in the State of California it is unlawful to shoot a whale while riding a camel.
First of all, trespass is a red herring in this case. Defendent used Google's Cache -- NOT the Craigslist website -- to gather data. Craigslist's claim is that accessing a Google Cache of its website constitutes unauthorized use.
If we're going to resort to ill-fitting metaphores, it's closer to the owner of a piece of artwork posting public notice that their art can only be viewed in their studio, permitting a public gallery to show that art, and then suing you for trespassing because you looked at their art while it was in a public gallery.
Craigslist asserting copyright claims in this case is plausible if precarious (the very quietly changed their ToS just 4 days prior to filing suit -- that's bullshit if I've ever smelled it. Furthermore, as an aside, I wonder whether the rise of walled data gardens shouldn't give us ethical pause).
However, Craigslist's claim to CFAA violation in this case is absurd and dangerous. Period.
Changing the scenario slightly makes this seem far less absurd: you took a photo of the art piece while it was on display at a public gallery, then used your own photo commercially.
> the very quietly changed their ToS just 4 days prior to filing suit -- that's bullshit if I've ever smelled it
From the article, CL changed their ToS, and after a month sent a Cease and Desist Letter to 3Tap. After that, they required CL poster to agree to new copyright rules, and then 4 days later sued 3Tap. It's not clear if that later change was also a change in their T's and C's.
But that would be copyright infringement, not trespass. The CFAA charge is still unfounded.
Find me a single example of an artist successfully suing for trespassing in such a situation.
CL's only plausible claim is to copyright infringement. They should stick to that claim.
> CL changed their ToS, and after a month sent a Cease and Desist Letter to 3Tap.
1. After "less than a month".
2. 3Taps replied to the Cease and Desist Letter stating that it didn't make any sense because the C&D letter requested that 3Taps stop accessing CL, but 3Taps wasn't accessing CL directly.
3Taps assumed this was an adequate response (and asssumed their initial behavior was okay) because the explicit caveat to the explicit "use our data" invitation from CL executives was that such use shouldn't over-tax CL's bandwidth.
At that point, to quote the article (emph. mine), "craigslist concocted a scheme to allow it to assert ownership over copyrights to user postings so it could bring copyright infringement claims against 3taps and other innovators who accepted Mr. Newmark's invitation. Without notice to its users, craigslist inserted language into its posting process that it claims gave it an exclusive license to user posts. Four days later, craigslist sued 3taps."
Obviously, I don't know whether they followed that policy. However, the important point is that it sounds like Craigslist's argument applies regardless of whether 3taps was scraping directly from CL.
Here's the source: https://3taps.com/papers/response%20to%20%20c_n_d%20letter%2...
padmapper was scraping, got C&D, so moved to 3taps
3taps got C&D (and was playing dumb games like switching ip addresses to avoid blocks), then moved to scraping CL posts out of google's cache, claiming they therefore weren't bound by terms and conditions of CL. After CL blocked google from caching posts, 3taps went back to scraping CL.
Even though we metaphorically call viewing a website 'a visit', I'm not occupying any of the website's property, or even particularly using it a consumptive/rivalrous way. I haven't traveled anywhere or opened anything. Even the kind of 'access' is very different from the 'physical access' of passing through a door or entering a shop/home – though the reuse of the same word can lead to semantic confusion.
Instead, I'm communicating. The website is sending me information, in response to simple requests. It can withhold whatever it wants.
If the website hasn't even so much as enforced a click-through assent-agreement – much less a password-login! – what 'property' is being 'accessed' conditional on some narrow 'defined purpose', when I'm simply viewing things that area also open to everyone else without preconditions?
If it's intellectual property, unlicensed reproduction or use of that is a very different cause-of-action than criminal 'unauthorized computer access'/trespass. (I believe that issue also came up in the case, and individual posters rather than Craigslist were found to be relevant rightsholders in individual listings.)
This difference definitely justifies amendments or entirely new legislation.
And consumptive/rivalrous use is a red herring. Property is about exclusive use of and control of access to something. Whether a competing use is rival or not is irrelevant. Cutting across a yard or walking into a store is still trespass, even though it's only consumptive/rivalrous in a de minimis way.
Consumptive/rivalrous use is relevant to the issue of what words, analogies, and legal regime should apply. You've been emphasizing terms and metaphors which make people think of situations where incremental use exacerbates scarcity. (Even your de minimis examples are activities that in the tangible world, can't be repeated endlessly without inconveniencing others.)
Much of the online world is different. Applying 'trespass' metaphors implies negative-sum wear-and-tear when in fact the activity can be marginally costless... or even socially net-beneficial, when spreading information improves decisions or competition.
A website operator that plugs their server into the net, and publicizes its address and services to the anonymous public, has consented to receiving a rather large set of messages from anyone. They retain full control over what that server – their 'property' – does in reaction, and what information it sends others, via software of their own choice and design.
Given that reality – which is very different from that of physical and real property – an interesting question is how much use-via-communication should be considered implicitly authorized, by custom and common sense, and what it takes to selectively revoke that blanket authorization... especially authorization that's still available to the anonymous public.
Permission-revocation via bright-line technical-access-controls would be a clear and fair system. People and even machines would be able to tell what's allowed, and litigation would be minimized.
Revocation by fuzzy 'terms-of-use' or other out-of-band communications seems ripe for confusion and abuse. That's especially true if any commercial dispute over reuse of true information can automatically be trumped up into a more serious 'hacking' ("access exceeding authorization") federal offense.
The animating principle of property law is that it gives a stronger right than just the right to exclude rival uses: it gives the right to exclude, period. That doesn't have to be the principle, but that's a question that's entirely orthogonal to meat space versus cyber space. There is nothing about cyberspace that obsoletes the idea that private property gives a blanket right to exclude.
As for revoking license, in this case 3taps had specific knowledge that it's implied license was revoked.
There's some begging-the-question in your argument:
"We should recognize this behavior as wrong, because it's analogous to traditional trespass."
Well, there are crucial ways where it's different.
"Because we've already decided trespass is the model we're applying, those aspects are irrelevant, and must be resolved to work the same as in traditional trespass."
No.
Online, there's no physical presence, movement, or consumption. All value requires probing communication. A "blanket right to exclude" has no clear meaning until reinterpreted for the new realities. The word 'cyberspace' itself is poetic, not literal, and using 'space'/'place' as drumbeat metaphors, without adjustments, will mislead us, and will not result in the fair, efficient results we want from law.
Sending a server a communicative message, especially a message the operator has invited and enabled via technical measures, is nothing like 'occupying his property' (at least not until it rises to some destructive/consumptive level).
The operator's technical ability to 'exclude' – but really, ignore – is nearly absolute, far beyond an owner's powers in the physical world. So the standards of notice/care/implied-license, before alleging a criminal communication and involving the courts and state in an enforcement action, should be much higher.
And maybe, when an operator is broadcasting informational goods to all anonymous correspondents ("the public"), the respective rights should be understood differently, totally outside a 'property' frame.
Maybe correspondents should always retain the right to elect to "be anonymous" and thus enjoy whatever conversation is freely given to the anonymous.
Maybe arbitrary conditions on communication, expressed by an 'owner' and asserting limits not just on communication with his server, but other people and servers at other times as well, should not be legally-enforceable by alleging 'criminal trespass' against individual correspondents. (Maybe the owner should have to offer consideration, and earn contractual assent, before asserting such control over others' communications.)
> the scope of which may even be implied
Scraping the web and analyzing a website's content is the basis for the primary feature of arguably the world's most successful website. Why should Google expect to be able to use this content in one way, but other users not expect to be able to use it in a different way?
Where is the implied bright line?
Ultimately, a post-Craigslist-victory world introduces a situation where anyone can sue anyone else they feel is both threatening and also vulnerable. That would have serious and negative consequences for the internet as a whole.
> That ethical principle applies just as much to websites as coffee shops.
It does not.
We already distinguish between physical and cyber trespassing, even in a lot of ways that benefit website operators.
The CFAA exists specifically because trespassing law doesn't immediately extend in an obvious fashion to websites.
If the legal extension has to be explicit, it's worth asking whether an implicit ethical extension makes sense. And physical and intellectual property are different enough that this conversation is non-trivial.
> Just because Craigslist makes its website available to the public for a defined purpose does not mean it's not trespass for a company to access that data for a different purpose.
There are substantive differences worth considering.
Most importantly, websites can and do regularly and maliciously change their terms without public notice, as in this case. This practice isn't common, and probably wouldn't be accepted, in the case of physical private property (that's open to the public).
Suppose the coffee shop introduced a "no other coffee shop owners allowed" policy, posted along with 20 pages of other policies outside their store, and then filed suit a few days after posting the amended 20 pages on its front door (with no notice of change).
The other coffee shop owner might have been technically trespassing, and hell, a judge might even concede that point. But regardless, judges aren't (supposed to be) banal computer programs applying law without context or human judgement. You can bet that a typical local judge would be pretty eye-rolly when this hypothetical coffee shop case finally made it across his/her desk...
Interesting side-note: this example really demonstrates that Craigslist doesn't want us to think about unauthorized use and trespassing in the same way; I assume they don't want to evoke eye rolls with this case.
https://3taps.com/images/pics/430_Amicus%20Brief.pdf
Their analysis may allow for something like what you propose – a purely contractual cause-of-action for damages. But the EFF et al are objecting to criminal liability based on CFAA/CPC §502 (computer fraud statutes).
I don't believe your shopkeeper analogy quite applies, though. Let's say the shopkeeper opens their shop, but puts a sign over the door to the effect "by entering, you promise to keep my prices secret". If someone enters, leaves, then later spills the pricing beans, it's not clear to me that traditional, non-computer law would allow the shopkeeper to retroactively characterize the visit as 'trespass'.
That's a major problem the EFF brief identifies with the Craigslist interpretation: it lets vague or arbitrary private conditions be creatively recast as criminal violations with more significant penalties. As a matter of fair law and the public's interest in clarity and the free-flow of true information, they argue that such application of the CFAA (and its California equivalent CPC §502) to be dangerously incorrect.
The EFF's argument allows that in such a (alternative) case, real 'unauthorized access' could have occurred. They write:
Of course, Craigslist has the right to restrict access to its data through, for example, requiring a username and login, which would password protect access ot its other users' advertisements. If defendants bypassed that security measure by trying to break through this barrier by systematically attempting passwords or "hacking" their way in through some other method, then their access to Craigslist would necessarily have been "unauthorized". ...
But once Craigslist chose not to password protect its data – a decision that would undercut Craigslist's successful business model – it necessarily authorized the public to view the information on the public website.
Craigslist sent them notice and IP blocked them.
That's a better standard than the originally-argued "violates terms of use". But it's still problematic given how draconian CFAA penalties can be, and given that the 'unauthorized access' in question penalizes access to information that's freely available to any other anonymous member of the public.
Maybe the EFF will be able to use the $1MM that fell their way to further circumscribe such CFAA application.
This is why it's so upsetting to see these people use this manipulative language. Criminal CFAA --- or, more accurately, federal sentencing law --- can legitimately be criticized for being draconian. But criminal CFAA has almost nothing but a few definitions in common with civil CFAA.
Causing damages under the civil cause of action defined by CFAA does not allow the government to fine you. That's not how this works.
A civil precedent on what counts as "exceed[ing] authorized access" under the CFAA also affects who might be subject to the full range of federal criminal penalties, in future actions. So Craigslist's interpretation winning, compared to EFF's, ultimately means more people threatened with 1-10 years in federal prison.
Seems to me that something like this is more like an NDA. Assuming someone saw and understood the sign, what are the legal ramifications? And how does this compare to establishments that require membership to use such as Costco?
Craigslist is a lot more like a free classifieds paper. The ads are received, typed up, and printed out by some office somewhere, and the resulting compilation is distributed in unattended and unlocked newspaper stands on the sidewalk.
"... for improper purpose, ..."
But in the 4/29/13 Order the Court says it would follow Nosal and that purpose is not enough to sustain "unauthorized access".
Instead it says Defendants' failure to cease and desist after receiving notification from the Plaintiff is the reason why it is not dismissing the CFAA claim.
If Defendants had simply "scraped" from a third party who was "authorized" to access Plaitiff's website (Google?), then perhaps the outcome here might have been different?
Well, the principle stays the same, but apparently Congress thought it changed enough that they had to write a new law to cover things.
Is it?
If thevshop is open to the public its not actually trespass until the shopkeeper asks one to leave.
One fine day I discovered a gross electrical code violation at the Hacker Dojo in Mountain View. I called the fire marshall then tripped all the circuit breakers then unplugged every electrical cord in the place.
One of the members called the police. The cop called the owner who told the cop that I was no longer permitted in the building.
"What exactly does it mean not be be in the building? Where cannI be without violating the law?"
"Just outside the door."
I assert that the plaintiff in this case is just like someone standing outside the shop, on a public sidewalk, looking in the window.
I'm not saying Craigslist should have won the suit on the legal merits. I'm ambivalent about that.
But surely, every time one company sues another company and their case isn't completely bulletproof, surely it can't be reasonable for us to say "that's just like what killed Aaron Swartz".
And it's even a similar kind of interpretive abuse: stretching its definitions to rack up steeper potential penalties against a lesser-resourced entity.
So no, not every lawsuit. But yes, if an expansive interpretation of the CFAA is deployed against someone, I think it's OK for them to remind the audience it's that law.
(Your exaggerated paraphrase here, "that's just like what killed Aaron Swartz", is far more "manipulative and grotesque" than the actual wording of their small aside.)
As the EFF amicus brief notes: "…although this is a civil dispute, the CFAA is also a criminal statute, and permitting Craigslist's computer hacking claims to go forward would also mean creating criminal liability."
Craigslist's specific allegations againt 3Taps would seem to qualify the responsible parties for imprisonment up to 5 years, on a first offense, by CFAA (c)(2)(B), if a prosecutor felt like making an example of them.
I don't think what 3taps did under any interpretation of the facts should be considered criminal.
Having said that:
If something's criminal, it's criminal whether or not a private entity sues you for it! Craigslist suing 3taps no more enables the DOJ than would Craigslist simply writing an angry blog post alleging the same facts.
Have you read the linked brief? That's its concern. It's clear and written by experts who agree with your opinion, as expressed here, that nothing 3Taps did should be considered criminal.
However, if that's your opinion, your defense of the use of the CFAA, upthread, is odd. CFAA (g) is clear: the elements allowing civil damages/relief are a strict subset of those that impose criminal liability. You'll only get damages/relief if you've proven that something that's criminally-prosecutable under the CFAA has taken place.
Of course, the standards-of-proof are lower in a civil case, and it remains unlikely most civil judgements would change a federal prosecutor's priorities. But your casual assurance upthread that CFAA civil actions and CFAA criminal prosecutions are "worlds apart" was misleading.
Craigslist was abusing the CFAA with an expansive interpretation – treating unapproved use as if it were the same thing as unauthorized access – similar to that of overzealous federal prosecutors. Craigslist's argument, if embraced by the courts, would make other cases imposing penalties on the reuse of otherwise-public data easier.
The reference is fair to make these points to a mass audience, although a bit macabre.