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Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by atmosx on Friday June 12, 2015 @04:54PM (#9708470)
@tedu writes:

> There was a PGP usability study conducted a few years ago where a group of technical people were placed in a room with a computer and asked to set up PGP. Two hours later, they were never seen or heard from again.

This argument doesn't hold ground. If "technical people" can not setup a new GnuPG key in 20 minutes, they are obviously not "technical" in this context. I'm 100% sure OpenBSD is absolutely NOT fit for people who find GnuPG confusing enough to avoid usage.

> Or as Prof. Green put it, "Can someone who built GnuPG 2.1.1 on Debian/Ubuntu give me a hint on which libgpg-error you used?" If he doesn't which libgpg-error to use, I doubt I'm going to pick the right one.

I can, here:

    $ pkg info|grep libgpg-error
    libgpg-error-1.19_1            Common error values for all GnuPG components
Given that this is @tedu, I'm sure I missed the point/joke.

The only real argument here is that it's at least 10 times easier to write code than to read another mans code. So I give him that... Which one is more secure, GPG or signify remains to be seen.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by pstrateman on Friday June 12, 2015 @05:28PM (#9708664)
He's written a tool that solves one problem using one set of algorithms and a very simple format in a few thousand lines of c.

It almost certainly contains fewer bugs than gnupg.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by sliverstorm on Friday June 12, 2015 @08:33PM (#9709366)
Do one thing, and do it well
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by RexRollman on Saturday June 13, 2015 @08:10AM (#9710786)
Praise be Unix.
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by brynet on Friday June 12, 2015 @05:32PM (#9708689)
GnuPG is complicated, the gpg(1) man page is quite extensive compared to signify.

I imagine very few people have set up PGP without the help of a search engine.

    $ man gpg | pr | grep Page | awk '{print $6}' | tail -1
    58
    $ man signify | pr | grep Page | awk '{print $6}' | tail -1
    2
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Friday June 12, 2015 @08:42PM (#9709390)
I got back on GnuPG recently because an associate wouldn't communicate without it. We came up with a trustworthy way to exchange keys. After that, I just cut and pasted crap from this:

http://irtfweb.ifa.hawaii.edu/~lockhart/gpg/

Been working fine so far. I'm sure there's all kinds of complicated ways to use it but it just takes a few commands to do most of the work. I only use two these days: one for sending and one for receiving. I scripted the more complicated one (send) where I type an alias and a text file with it doing the rest. The decrypt command, -d (file), is easy to remember. Pretty simple compared to trying to learn OpenBSD.

Not to say they're wrong for making something easier or the interface couldn't be way better. Just that me using this thing with almost no thought argues against all this difficulty people are bringing up.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by kragen on Friday June 12, 2015 @09:49PM (#9709545)
Are you really confident that cutting and pasting crap from a random web page (particularly one without TLS, so the guy sitting across from you at Starbucks can MITM it) provides you with sufficient understanding to notice when you are accidentally doing something insecure?
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Friday June 12, 2015 @10:27PM (#9709634)
I cross-referenced it against the documentation. Let's assume someone won't, though. The commands' appearance make their intent pretty obvious. Further, using them produces output that confirms what the cheat sheet says. For instance, adding a public key said something along the lines of "public key added." Decrypting the incoming message showed its plaintext. Encrypting outgoing plaintext turned it into ciphertext other party decrypted. Along with a warning that the key didn't have others' signatures on it, which ironically re-assured me more because it shouldn't.

So, a visual inspection of the commands and their results in a sandboxed machine was about all one needed to know that they worked. My experience with similar tools helps there. More concerned people can thoroughly cross-reference them with the documentation, source code, program's author, and so on. Whatever level of assurance they like. The basic level, though, was incredibly simple.

I'd take using GPG over learning Emacs or OpenBSD any day. In level of difficulty, that is.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by mortenlarsen on Saturday June 13, 2015 @02:21AM (#9710095)
The problem with copying and pasting from a website is not whether you think you know what the command does. It is that copying from a HTML page might contain stuff you can see.

https://thejh.net/misc/website-terminal-copy-paste

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Saturday June 13, 2015 @10:39AM (#9711127)
Damn! That was a surprise! Alright, point taken. I'll... have to validate things on terminals a lot more thoroughly in the future. And type my own code by hand based on the documentation. Maybe just make my own cheat-sheets for the cut and paste. Text files.
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by mortenlarsen on Saturday June 13, 2015 @05:46AM (#9710473)
s/can/can't
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by bashinator on Friday June 12, 2015 @11:45PM (#9709788)
Agree with regard to Emacs, but OpenBSD has some of the best technical documentation I've ever come across. For example, their networking FAQ[0] or (especially) the PF guide[1].

[0] http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq6.html

[1] http://www.openbsd.org/faq/pf/

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Saturday June 13, 2015 @12:04AM (#9709823)
Their documentation is great. I won't disagree in the slightest. I also praised them in other places for working as hard on docs as software itself. Docs are lacking in most places. The only point of these comments is that people are way overhyping the difficulty of basic GPG use given I installed it easily using Google and used it by cut n pasting a cheat sheet. Others have too. That's all I'm trying to do here while using things like the overall OpenBSD experience (or Emacs) as points of comparison to support that.

I'd have to use my brain with either OpenBSD stuff or Emacs. Of course, I cheated there too: Absolute OpenBSD. I know I could've used their great docs for everything but the reviews of the book were too good. I had to attempt using it to shortcut the learning process. Lol.

[dead]
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Saturday June 13, 2015 @10:37AM (#9711118)
There's a good reason for that, actually. Besides, it doesn't matter how long ago I went to key-signing parties and such. The number of people I know using PGP I can count on one hand, maybe two. I have reliable channels to them to get keys. Web of trust is useless to me and despite my poor memory I can remember debating people about its many weaknesses even back when we did it a lot.

Modern tech has moved on to more interesting and reliable reputation systems. Web of trust's time has passed, for now.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by rjcz on Monday June 15, 2015 @04:05PM (#9721698)
I meant the whole thing - subkeys, their very purpose (even CAs use subkeys to sign certificats!) or usage, etc.

Seems a bit strange for security researcher - that's all.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Tuesday June 16, 2015 @12:38PM (#9727064)
Lost much of my memory in an accident where I took severe head injury. What my brain kept it kept. What it didn't it didn't. Most stuff I hadn't used in forever went poof. Web of trust model was one of those. Some things I'd just have to straight up relearn and I'm not bothering unless I have a need given only so much memory to spare.

Hope that makes sense.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by dang on Saturday June 13, 2015 @04:46PM (#9712594)
> you haven't a slightest clue

No personal swipes, please.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by rjcz on Monday June 15, 2015 @04:01PM (#9721668)
How is this personal?

I'm not trying to insult anyone, it's a mere statement of a fact - the OP hasn't a slightest clue about web of trust, subkeys, key-signing, etc. and he clearly demonstrated it in several comments. In those he spreads misinformation and FUD - and those are signs of a troll. So if I say "you haven't a slightest clue" to such an individual, I'm being polite.

Good day.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by jrcii on Friday June 12, 2015 @07:26PM (#9709174)
I'm surprised that there seems to be a consensus here that using the GPG command line tool is complicated when the HN community regularly discusses, for example, time complexity of algorithms.
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by pstrateman on Friday June 12, 2015 @08:11PM (#9709321)
Using gnupg unfortunately requires a fairly complete understanding of the specific Web of Trust model used.

On top of that the interface is atrocious, go find someone with an image in their pubkey and try to display it from the command line.

Good luck.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Friday June 12, 2015 @08:57PM (#9709433)
You actually just need a reliable way to get information from them once plus a good cheat sheet (see above comment) on GPG. So, you both use cut and paste to (a) generate keys, (b) add keys, (c) send messages and (d) receive messages. Exchanging the key file is the only step that requires slight thought and there's a dozen ways to do that.

I still don't use or fully understand the web of trust model as I haven't studied it in ages. I do use GPG every night with the right person on the other end, though. Still don't know anything else about it. Don't want to, either.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by elsjaako on Saturday June 13, 2015 @07:20AM (#9710683)
But then a friend tries to be more secure and sends something using --throw-keyids or --hidden-recipient. He tells me I should use --try-all-secrets, but adding that to enigmail doesn't work. I still don't know why.

I'm trying to do this with some friends, and we keep on running into problems like that. Everything turns out to be easy to solve, but only if you know exactly how it works.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Saturday June 13, 2015 @10:42AM (#9711135)
You'd have to be an idiot to read those command names and try them. Whereas "gen-key," "import," "export," "-e," and "-d" have obvious, low-risk usage. More so if you cross-reference against the docs.

Nice strawman, though.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by FullyFunctional on Friday June 12, 2015 @07:35PM (#9709198)
I have the misfortune of having encrypted some files in the past with PGP. At the time, the default algorithm appeared to be IDEA which was removed since for patent reasons. Find the old sources and getting it to built is not trivial.

These days I'm leaning towards bundling encrypted files along with the C code that encrypted it and that works better if the latter is small and self-contained.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by vbezhenar on Saturday June 13, 2015 @05:16AM (#9710420)
That's a very interesting concept of a cross-platform self-unpacking archive. Unfortunately it requires the C compiler binary which is missing on the Windows platform out of the box. Perhaps some kind of tiny C compiler or interpreter windows binary might be bundled along for 99% compatibility.
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by derefr on Saturday June 13, 2015 @07:26PM (#9713148)
I know that the RAR format, for one, effectively embeds the compensating decompression program for whatever it did into the archive, in the form of some bytecode for a VM with an ABI that has been stable since RAR was created. So RAR has actually been a bunch of different algorithms over time, but unrar(1) doesn't need to care; it just runs the embedded program in its VM. (Most exciting fact: this means that older versions of the program can decompress archives created by newer versions, using algorithms that didn't exist at the time the older version shipped!)

It would definitely be possible to do the equivalent for encryption. The main problem† being that while compression algorithms get outmoded, encryption algorithms break. This is true of all encryption, but it's especially scary when you can just scan a disk and signature-identify crackable files by the embedded algorithm.

So, if you were going to do something like this, you'd probably want a higher-level abstraction than "self-describing encrypted file"; maybe something more like a "self-describing encrypted mutable volume." Mutable so that it would (hopefully) get an update() operation called on it at least every so often (even if just from a fsck-during-mount), letting it start a background process to change out an old-and-broken backing-store encryption algorithm for a new-and-trusted one (think of how bcrypt handles strength changes.)

---

† There's also the performance problem: if you have a stable ABI, and it was frozen 20 years ago, how would you ever do something like elliptic-curve operations efficiently? Heck, doesn't using a frozen ABI mean you couldn't make use of a modern processor's native instructions for RSA ciphering et al?

The answer to this, I think, is VM-runtime instruction-level pattern-recognition ala urbit's "jets". The new version of the encryption program would prepend a program for the stable ABI, that tells the old version how to (inefficiently) implement elliptic-curve decryption in terms of things it understands. However, running this program against a new version of the decryption VM would recognize the signature/pattern of "what elliptic-curve decryption instructions encoded in [this VM]'s ABI" looks like, and execute a native procedure with the same preconditions and postconditions as that instruction-sequence instead. Sort of like typehints for a JIT, but where the instruction-sequences themselves are the hints, since they have canonical forms.

Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by kragen on Friday June 12, 2015 @09:47PM (#9709540)
The paper is full of jokes like this. It’s clear, though, that GPG is much larger than we would like our TCB to be, and that it does have serious usability problems, some of which are inherent to its trust model and therefore cannot be papered over by GPG frontends. (They don't, however, stop you from using it to authenticate upgrades, as Debian and Ubuntu do.)
Re:Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You by nickpsecurity on Friday June 12, 2015 @08:35PM (#9709372)
You made a good point: OpenBSD is way more complicated than GPG. I set up GPG with one command I got off the Internet. I also got a cheat sheet giving common commands I need for common scenarios. These people weren't just barely technical: they were unable to use Google as well. I'm dismissing the study as having little value. Need a new one with people who can follow steps they find on Google. If they fail, the author's point would stand.

One more thing they forgot to mention: GPG is apparently so secure that Snowden leaks show that NSA hates running into it and even uses it internally. Biggest endorsement one can get. I'd replace the interface for sure, though, where users would never see it.