It would be relly nice if there was some common container format you could mount natively on these operating systems without the need for 3rd party software. I think I remember reading about LUKS supporting TrueCrypt's container format - but that, of course, only works on Linux. And frankly, I don't see Apple and Microsoft either supporting the TrueCrypt container format natively or getting together to define a new one.
Plus, BitLocker is not available on Vista Business and Windows 7 Pro. So if you don't want to use Windows 8, again, you are kind of screwed.
[1] At least it was/is the only software that I know of which allows you to do that. If there are alternatives, I would very much like to hear about them!
"LUKS" stands for "linux unified key setup" and it is an "on-disk format" and its reference implementation is found in cryptsetup[1]
LUKS on-disk format is supported in windows through doxbox[2]
cryptsetup also supports TrueCrypt,the on-disk format.
people usually say "LUKS" when they mean cryptsetup as it makes no difference to them but i think its important to know the difference.
[1] https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification
Just use PGP, probably the gpg [0] software. You can set it up so that each machine knows the others' public keys, or you can take a shortcut and copy the same private key to all your machines. Encrypt and decrypt as you like. This is "hacker" advice, however; gpg is not a consumer-oriented tool. You'll have to read some documentation and keep your wits about you. But that was true of TC as well, wasn't it?
Just to be clear, I appreciate your suggestion, and in many cases it is entirely sufficient.
But for me, right now, TrueCrypt hits kind of a sweet spot in terms of portablity, convenience and security.
If there's a replacement for this use case I'd really like to know about it.
Ditto:
If you're using FDE for your system disk, it is desirable to know that in the event of the OS becoming unbootable that you can open it using any old OS. Especially in the case of laptops, where you won't have any guarantees about what other machines are available.
As I said - it's a whole lot better than nothing. The "insecure" thing is mainly to remind myself that it isn't the be-all and end-all.
Why fund an audit then? Why beat this particular dead horse?
Can you imagine being that open source developer, putting hours of your (incredibly valuable, if you're a talented crypto dev) time into a project that gets relentlessly shit on, later raising more money to hunt through backdoors than you've ever seen for it?
How would you that make you feel? How would you feel when you thought about working on the code? When you thought about fixing bugs reported by people who were paid to look for them by people who openly distrust you?
That isn't a rhetorical question. I'd like you to imagine the situation the Truecrypt devs were in, try to empathize with them, and tell us about it.
I'm not trying to say Truecrypt should never have been audited, or that open-source projects in general should never be audited. But I do think this particular case was badly handled, and I don't think that's such a horrible thing to say. Things are mishandled all the time. We can always learn from our mistakes. Let's learn from this experience and make the next cross-platform crypto tool better for everyone.
I'm really having a hard time seeing the problem here.
Now can you answer my question?
* As far as I can tell, the audit project began without the consent of the Truecrypt developers. You can argue that this is necessary for some security reason, but it is also a rude gesture to an open-source project.
* The crowdfunding drive contained no provisions for handling the results of the audit such as developer resources, etc.. The existing developers were assumed to be both capable and motivated to drop whatever they were spending their free time working on to fix things that auditors found.
* The atmosphere around the audit push from the beginning seemed very negative. There was a distinct "Truecrypt is super sketchy" vibe in the HN comments, etc., surrounding it initially. I think that this was a good thing for the audit, which meant helping the audit directly hurt the Truecrypt brand. This dovetails with...
* Singling out Truecrypt as the target of an extensive, expensive audit seems somewhat absurd. There are several projects that could have benefited much more from an audit that weren't audited, such as OpenSSL, Linux's RNG, OpenVPN, any other TLS implementation, Tor, maybe TextSecure (though I don't know if TextSecure had enough of a userbase at the time to justify it, it certainly does now). Why were these projects not audited? I think it's because the Truecrypt devs tried to be anonymous, and low-profile, whereas these other projects are all backed by people with faces who are much harder to throw something at than Truecrypt was.
istruecryptauditedyet.com is a real page now, but what was it before? A giant NO on the screen? Is there an 'istextsecureauditedyet.com' even though TS uses novel protocols and crypto? Why not?
So, I think:
* The fundraiser should have supported Truecrypt while raising money for an audit
* The fundraiser should have incorporated costs to fix anything found as a result of an audit, with money going back to Truecrypt if nothing substantial was found
* The audit push should have been conducted with the consent, or better yet, solicitation, from Truecrypt developers
* The audit should have been conducted in a more respectful way, emphasizing the positive gain from auditing specifically Truecrypt rather than the negative aspects of Truecrypt's existing development style
In general, open source is a massive donation of time and effort and should be treated like the gift that it is instead of being taken for granted. I think that people took Truecrypt for granted and that's probably a part of the reason why its developer quit, because that is a very common reason for open-source developers to quit and I find it impossible to believe that it was not at all a factor in their quitting.
If you would truly feel happy if your project was shit on, donations effectively stolen from you, and a ton of work dumped on you that you did not ask for, but now must immediately address lest you be attacked for "ignoring the results of the audit," you are a special type of human to say the least.
Also, file encryption / decryption fails massively for some things. What I want is something that implements a filesystem. As otherwise things with many files get... annoying. Not to mention less secure.
If there's a better way to do this then let me know.
You can also use GnuPG or openssl to encrypt a file or a disk image.
Lately I took a look at actual filesystems for cross-platform use. I didn't find a great one, but depending on which OS you want to burden with an extra driver, pretty good ones include exFAT, NTFS, and UDF specifically version 2.01. Like you, I am curious whether better answers are available.
It works well as a TrueCrypt replacement for me personally, but has a couple of warts. Secure rm is slow on cleanup, and the user needs to be careful about the hidden files it uses to keep track of volume metadata.
That's not Windows-compatible, as far as I know.
Still interesting though.
Also, (as far as I know) all public evidence for your assertion is a purported email from one of the devs to Matt Green. He might just have been polite in that mail...
I'm amused by the idea that the actual words of the TC developers are less credible than whatever random thoughts are bubbling around a message board. But, HN, what are you gonna do.
https://www.fundfill.com/fund/TrueCryptAudited
There's no hint that the audit is for historic purposes.
As for your second paragraph, I already said that the TC developer might just have been polite in that mail. Technical people are often not able to stand up for themselves, especially if it comes to money.
Said every entity that has ever been audited in the history of time.
Of course you assume your partners' accounting books are legit, and you assume your vendors' IT controls are tight, and you assume your encryption software isn't backdoored. There is no guaranteed relation between your assumptions and reality until someone qualified checks it out.
Would you have bet money that Truecrypt was backdoored?
I don't think many people would have. Because they didn't really believe it. They thought an audit would be a "good assurance," but I really doubt many of them considered donating the money to Truecrypt, and the relative value of each.
An audit doesn't prove the absence of bugs. It doesn't change the fact that you should assume vulnerability and use defense in depth. It doesn't actually tell anyone that they're more or less safe.
And why Truecrypt? Why not any other crypto program? Why not one that was maintained and had a future? Wouldn't it be more worth it to donate that money to ensure that the people who use GPG know how safe they are? Or OpenSSL?
I think the real reason why Truecrypt got so much attention is that it A.) ran on windows + had visible source and thus was possible to be audited, and B.) had anonymous devs shrouded in interesting secrecy. If Truecrypt was linux-only and was developed by Jorge Schmorge in his off-time from Startuply, it wouldn't have gotten any burning desires to audit it.
Can you explain more what convinced you to spend time and money on this? What makes this more valuable than 70 Watsi patients?
Also, could you respond to my comment here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9312559
By allocating resources you are implicitly deciding that the target of your allocation is the most important thing to allocate your resources towards. I don't see how this could not be the case.
For whatever reasons the TrueCrypt developers chose not to do that, those are their own reasons. But when it comes to issues of security, you don't make assumptions and you don't trust without verifying. If, like you are implying, the developers took offense to that and quit out of spite, that's no one's fault but their own.
So no, you can't blame the people who wanted or performed the audit. The audit did not "cost us" TrueCrypt in any way.
Truecrypt's primary installation base was Windows. Where's the audit for that?
I don't think the developer quit out of spite. I think they quit because they felt underappreciated, overwhelmed with un-fun requests related to the audit, and were very rudely awakened to the fact that it's easier for a project that implies Truecrypt is backdoored to raise money than for Truecrypt to raise money.
Is a third option even possible? Micropayments? Reputation?
Sleepycat did it with BerkeleyDB (they were bought by Oracle, though, and I don't know if Oracle changed this arrangement), the same goes for MySQL (which, of course, is now owned by Oracle, too). There are a few more, I guess, that I do not know about.
OPSI is backed by a company and uses a model where OPSI itself is free software (in both ways), but new features are made available to paying customers only initially, until development of these features has been paid for.
Also, there are cases of companies making software open source, but making money by doing one-off customization or (obviously) support contracts.
I am not trying to poo poo open source development model, or decry evils of commercialism. I think we can all benefit from finding an alternative.
So you can argue that it's unsustainable, in the way that you can argue that the moon is made of cheese. It's just not true.
Besides, FoundationDB wasn't open source, was it? It was just free of charge, which isn't a business model at all.
The people who _did_ write the code were not directly compensated for it. Indirectly - perhaps.
This is my point. It is not [currently, in its present form] sustaintable, due to the fact that people and corporations who use open source software do not [generally] pay for it.
Except, of course, for all of the companies that do, which is every company that uses Red Hat and many that use Ubuntu, Snort, and numerous other, smaller projects. Red Hat and Canonical may not have created Linux, but what we have today would not have been possible without their (highly paid) contributions. If Linus and the other original developers were gone tomorrow, Red Hat could easily keep Linux going for the foreseeable future.
The point you're trying to make is that people don't pay for open source. And you're right. But companies do pay for support for open source, and they do pay for valuable cloud features that tie into open source software for a small fee.
We don't really know the percentage of the companies who do pay, but judging by the recent openSSL debacle, it's not great.
I know this is probably not the right forum, but I was hoping to engage collective wisdom to come up with a third option, which would guarantee payment of some kind for an open source development.
Micropayments have really only seen success for things with very broad userbases (like musicians on Patreon). Right now what we've got is essentially patronage.
I thought the Truecrypt developers quit because the US Government forced them to surrender their private keys.
Are you implying that "the devs lost interest" is mutually exclusive from "the devs were facing burnout from dealing with a hostile community"? To me, the latter is causal to the former, but you might disagree.
In a commercial setting, there is financial motivation for a company to hire and train new developers, but in the case of an open source project this may not be the case.
How do we motivate people to fix or continue development of open source projects? Is it possible at all?
Hm. Maybe it is impossible to motivate people to continue development of open-source projects. There are very few long-lived open-source projects, and very little open-source code. You're probably right that motivating people by anything other than cold, hard cash is impossible -- after all, what do people want in life besides money?
The Truecrypt developers supposedly left because it wasn't interesting/fun for them anymore. I believe that. Funding this audit required ~$65k in donations, probably more than the Truecrypt project ever saw. If you were the developer of a project that you knew was solid, and you knew had no backdoors, how would you feel about people essentially maligning you being able to generate more cash than you've ever seen for your side project? That'd make me want to quit too.
At the end of the day, which is more preferable -- a TrueCrypt that was never audited professionally, or a TrueCrypt with active developers?
How can we ensure security in open-source software without driving the developers away in the future?
I think one way would be to match every single audit donation with a donation to the upstream developers. If it's worth spending a dollar to audit software, it's worth spending a dollar to keep that project alive and show the developer you care. It would have taken twice as long to get the audit funded, but maybe then the developer wouldn't have been hounded away.
Personally, though, I think this audit was a colossal waste of time and resources. All it told us was something every truecrypt user was assuming already, and it cost us all Truecrypt. What guarantee is there any of the new developers are going to be as trustworthy as the original developers, or as skilled?