Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by Someone1234 on Thursday October 02, 2014 @04:20PM
(#8402877)
The HK title is identical to the article's title but the article's title is misleading. Even the author goes into great pains in the first paragraph to say that this will look at "[the] process in broad strokes" and not really in-depth.
Plus the article is really low-tech (spending a very long time teaching us about tokens) and very pro Apple (e.g. making claims that make no sense like "it may very well be the safest way to make any type of credit card payment" yeah, except those dozens of other identical systems we already have, and have had for at least a year!).
I have nothing against Apple Pay at all. I am glad they joined the party. This article though is meh.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by natrius on Thursday October 02, 2014 @06:30PM
(#8403470)
"claims that make no sense like "it may very well be the safest way to make any type of credit card payment" yeah, except those dozens of other identical systems we already have, and have had for at least a year!"
Pause for a second and believe me when I say that you are very wrong.
Virtual, one-time use credit card numbers are very different from the EMVCo tokenization specification that Apple Pay implements. These differences have important security and privacy implications.
Apple Pay is literally the safest way to use a credit card today. Read the specification if you don't understand why this is true.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by personZ on Thursday October 02, 2014 @07:12PM
(#8403623)
Apple Pay is literally the safest way to use a credit card today.
Credit (and debit) cards in Canada and elsewhere have had NFC functionality for several years now. You never hand your card or numbers to anyone, but instead through chip insertion or proximal NFC it communicates with the identifier on the card, which the payment processor can correlate with you, and using the secret on the card cryptographically signs a transaction.
The most secure way I can use my credit card...is to use my credit card: Nothing that can be usurped is passed to the POS terminal.
Apple is essentially injecting themselves in a simple process that works extremely well.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by natrius on Thursday October 02, 2014 @07:32PM
(#8403692)
EDIT: I think this might be wrong, FYI.
Sure, you never hand the card over when you pay with NFC, but that card number is being sent through computer systems that current events prove are very vulnerable.
NFC and Chip-and-PIN protect the merchant from fraud, not the user. A malicious customer can't use a stolen card at a merchant that only accepts Chip-and-PIN payments.
EMVCo tokenization generates a token that can only be used with one-time cryptograms generated with a secret key that never leaves the device. If someone hacks a merchant you pay via Apple Pay and tries to use your token as a card number online, it will be rejected even though it looks like a card number.
EMVCo tokenization is a new thing. It is better than what came before it because it was designed with that goal in mind. People are reluctant to believe this for some reason.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by personZ on Thursday October 02, 2014 @07:56PM
(#8403767)
EMVCo tokenization generates a token that can only be used with one-time cryptograms generated with a secret key that never leaves the device
You mean exactly like the EMV that is on every Canadian credit card since about 2007? NFC / Chip hold unique tokens that have on device cryptography, exactly as you've described. You can't "steal" anything of consequence via NFC or the chip, and that's why it was designed. Further while you say that it's for the vendor, the liable party for fraud is actually the credit card companies, which is exactly why they made EMV.
You seem to think this is all new because of EMVCo, however it is a standardization for the last mile: Google Wallet originally was doing what the credit cards themselves do, holding the secret key and identifiers on an NXP secure element. There are issues with that (largely carrier related) which is why the industry started moving to software-held tokens, as in the Apple solution. Presenting an iPhone token offers zero additional security over presenting a Canadian chip or NFC credit card, and that notion is rather ridiculous.
Note though, replay attacks require downgrading the card and suggesting it's not actually EMV-secured. And um, it appears all you need is a cell phone to clone one card onto another, if I'm really reading this right? No wonder we need EMV or stronger, Apple Pay protections.
Frankly, the way I see it, we can't move fast enough to one-time use card numbers, however we achieve it... then I suppose more fraud will attack the next weakest point, perhaps passwords or IT systems.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by natrius on Thursday October 02, 2014 @08:03PM
(#8403795)
Hm. There's a chance that your contactless card sends a different token that isn't your credit card number when you pay that way. I'm not sure. If so, you're right that it's basically the same level of security.
However, the new way lets you do the same thing in software without giving all your transactions to Google, which is nice. We'll be able to do online payments that are as secure and private as NFC, which we can't today.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by orand on Thursday October 02, 2014 @04:52PM
(#8403032)
The article contains original reporting with newly sourced details not available elsewhere. As a result, as of this moment it's the most detailed article available. It's the best you're going to get, like it or leave it.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by surreal on Thursday October 02, 2014 @04:32PM
(#8402929)
Could you elaborate on the dozens of identical systems? I haven't yet managed to find one where no one except the credit card networks can see my CC number (and I thought the tokenization spec was only released 6 months ago...)
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by surreal on Thursday October 02, 2014 @05:54PM
(#8403313)
Your linked example is drastically different. Although the merchant only sees a virtual card number, Google sees, stores and charges your real credit card number the old-fashioned way.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by DannyBee on Thursday October 02, 2014 @06:21PM
(#8403419)
You say "Google sees your real credit card number".
(I'll address the rest later)
Somebody sees the credit card number, even in token based systems, even if it's only for a moment to acquire a token.
In other words, either Apple stills sees it while it acquires a payment token, or someone does to issue the payment token, as it's the only mechanism that identifies the account number to get a token for. The tokenization specification has a whole section on what identification and verification should be taking place to ensure the "primary account number" (credit card number) that the payment token is replacing is one the user has authorization for.
So let's focus on the "stores and charges". Yes, Google stores and charges your primary account number. This is just because Google happens to be the one doing the payment processing.
Even in a token based system, again, somebody on the other side knows what real primary account number (credit card number) this token links back up to so they know what to subtract money from. The token based stuff is not an full anonymization protocol, it's mainly a way to securely avoid transmitting and storing credit card info to/by random merchants. In that respect, the virtual credit card numbers provide the same protection. They are one time use, and interception or storage by the merchant can not harm you.
Secondarily, the payment tokens are also a way to reduce the number of networks your credit card number goes over, when used properly. The virtual credit card numbers perform the same function here too.
The person who knows in either system is usually your payment processor (though in case it isn't, it's possible for the tokens to be used there too. however, nothing in Apple Pay currently guarantees this happens with the tokens). Since that is google here, it makes sense they would have the primary account data to do the lookup.
If you are expecting tokens to replace credit card numbers all the way to the issuing bank, you are sorely mistaken. The lookup happens much earlier than that.
The TL;DR is that virtual credit card numbers are in fact, a method of tokenization. The only reason they went with "token" is because they don't have to be credit card numbers, and because not all virtual credit card implementations have the same guarantees.
In any case, if you want fully tokenized systems, those have existed too, just not en masse.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by natrius on Thursday October 02, 2014 @06:38PM
(#8403496)
EMVCo payment tokenization is more secure and more private than Google Wallet. With Google Wallet, two people know your card number and purchase history: Google and your issuer. With EMVCo tokenization, just your issuer knows your card number and purchase history.
It's better. It's the future.
"If you are expecting tokens to replace credit card numbers all the way to the issuing bank, you are sorely mistaken. The lookup happens much earlier than that."
Now look at figure 2 on page 8, and you can see ... It's not the issuer doing the tokenization or the PAN lookup, firstdata is doing it (in this case), just as Google is doing it in the Wallet case.
Firstdata sells an approved apple pay solution.
It happens that Apple does not provide payment processing services, and is thus not doing it. That of course, does not change how many parties see your card number :)
Now, maybe there are issuers doing the tokenization, storage, and lookup themselves. But it's not required.
The actual spec leaves these functions to an "Agent" (not an issuer) and defines an Agent as "An entity appointed by the Card Issuer to perform
specific functions on behalf of the Card Issuer. Some
examples of these functions include card processing,
Cardholder verification using the 3-D Secure
protocol, and Token Service"
There is also nothing that assumes they do not appoint multiple agents (and in fact, specifically forsees this happening), etc.
Love to see something that says otherwise, but i can't find it.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by natrius on Thursday October 02, 2014 @06:56PM
(#8403553)
That whitepaper is from 2012. The tokenization there is for merchants to be able to keep a token on file for a customer instead of keeping a card on file. It's like getting a Braintree or Stripe token to use for payments, but instead, you're getting a First Data token.
Again, I have not seen a single implementation that claims to actually perform token usage all the way back to the issuing bank, just some diagrams that say "it's supposed to work that way" in some magical world where issuing banks run token service.
(and i've looked at actual implementations).
If you look at the comments on the blog, the author actually agrees with what i said:
"Yes, the token is issued by the payment network, but Apple is not the payment network. The network would be Visa/MasterCard/AMEX. Apple receives the token from the payment network when the card is stored in Apple Pay (or Passport), then the token is provided each time a payment is made."
Note: Issued by the payment network. This is not the same as "bank who issued you the card". In fact, it's exactly the people I said it was (look at definition of payment network in the spec).
Also note: Apple sees the card to get the token to store in the wallet (it has to, unless the client directly understands how to route to an agent for a given card and connect there, which at least as apple has implemented, it doesn't). If you remember, above you said in an EMV world, only the issuer sees the real number. This is 100% false. Apple has no other way to get a token other than providing the PAN and letting an agent do ID & verification as part of a token request.
As I also said, the spec very specifically does not require anything else, delegating token service providing to agents.
Do you have anything to refute that issuing banks are going to be 100% compliant with the EMV tokenization spec (and apple pay) if they delegate the vault/lookup to someone else, like the payment processors?
(I pasted the definitions from the spec, it specifically says the card issuer or the agent can perform this )
How about if they delegate to multiple people?
How about if they delegate to stripe, or google, or whoever?
The tokens only go exactly as far as the parties agree they want them to.
Two parties still see your card in Apple Pay: Whoever initially asks for the token to store (Apple right now), and whoever is playing vault. Apple just doesn't store it.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by giovannibajo1 on Thursday October 02, 2014 @06:21PM
(#8403425)
No, the tokenization spec has just been released and Apple Pay is the first (large scale) implementation. Tokenization is a combo of a token bound to a device, a one-time signature made through a secret store in a non-readable chip, and a personal authentication of the person through a non-static code.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by zecho on Thursday October 02, 2014 @06:09PM
(#8403374)
This is great and all, but of the 9 million merchants that accept credit cards at the point of sale, Apple says only 220,000 locations will accept it at launch.
Walmart and Best Buy have gone so far as to basically say they have no plans to implement and maintain NFC at the POS.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by lstamour on Thursday October 02, 2014 @08:32PM
(#8403897)
This will change and quickly. All it takes is retailers being responsible for fraud and bam, new systems appear within 18-24 months, at most. I give it 3 years tops until you're cursing some place that requires you to insert a chip or wondering at the security of handing your card over to someone else to swipe...
At least here in Canada, we went from "it's announced" to "it's everywhere" in about 2 years. Now.... whether the terminals will accept my contactless card, that's another question. I can't travel with just an iPhone until I know I won't need that card in my back pocket...
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by rconti on Thursday October 02, 2014 @08:37PM
(#8403906)
October 2015 they'll be liable for CC fraud if the transaction in question was not cleared on an NFC+EMV capable terminals.
I don't know where your info is from, but it's either old, or they'll change their tune fast.
Also, some businesses can avoid PCI audits if 75% of their transactions are cleared on NFC+EMV terminals.
The liability shift you keep hearing about bundles NFC+EMV together into a single concept. They're inseparable as far as CC liability is concerned.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by spilk on Friday October 03, 2014 @10:31AM
(#8405676)
Walmart already has EMV terminals. I don't go to Walmart very frequently, but last time I went there, I was unable to use my Amex card with the usual swipe; the terminal told me I had to insert the card into the chip reader. I haven't run across another retailer in the USA yet that even supports using the chip, must less requiring it when it's present (Many places have new terminals with chip readers but they are not enabled. See Target, Home Depot, etc.)
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by DrewRWx on Thursday October 02, 2014 @11:18PM
(#8404193)
I was under the impression that the liability transfer only required a POS supporting EMV with the idea being that merchants would take the opportunity to support NFC.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by pradn on Thursday October 02, 2014 @05:35PM
(#8403233)
Only if everybody uses phones with Apple Pay compatible payment systems will every business see the need to support Apple Pay. I hope everyone gets on the same standard soon.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by shekyboy on Thursday October 02, 2014 @05:40PM
(#8403257)
With the upcoming EMV transition most businesses are on that path. New POS terminals will have NFC built into it.
Additionally this system offers a secure mechanism to the merchant as well without making a dent to their business processes. That should motivate them to move quickly on it to prevent Target/Home depot style mess.
Finally the narrative around this is going to evolve the public perception. They are going to demand this from merchants for security, which should move the ball forward.
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by mcintyre1994 on Thursday October 02, 2014 @05:39PM
(#8403253)
Do they need anything above and beyond an NFC reader that supports contactless cards? Contactless is getting really popular in the UK - it's super cool if it is just that that it needs to work. Contactless on the tube too!
Re:Apple Pay: An in-depth look at what's behind the secure p...
by lstamour on Thursday October 02, 2014 @09:34PM
(#8404048)
The ones that roll out alongside chip-and-pin seem to be all that's needed to meet the requirements of this system from a technology standpoint. Behind the scenes, the hardware passes your fake device-account number as it would a credit card, and someone turns that into an actual credit card number deep in a financial system your retailer uses. There's different standards for contactless payment, though, and I bet Apple's partnering with EMV players because it wants to be as compatible as possible with existing arrangements.
Plus the article is really low-tech (spending a very long time teaching us about tokens) and very pro Apple (e.g. making claims that make no sense like "it may very well be the safest way to make any type of credit card payment" yeah, except those dozens of other identical systems we already have, and have had for at least a year!).
I have nothing against Apple Pay at all. I am glad they joined the party. This article though is meh.
Pause for a second and believe me when I say that you are very wrong.
Virtual, one-time use credit card numbers are very different from the EMVCo tokenization specification that Apple Pay implements. These differences have important security and privacy implications.
Apple Pay is literally the safest way to use a credit card today. Read the specification if you don't understand why this is true.
http://www.emvco.com/specifications.aspx?id=263
Alternatively, read the best technical summary of EMVCo tokenization: http://clover-developers.blogspot.com/2014/09/apple-pay.html
Credit (and debit) cards in Canada and elsewhere have had NFC functionality for several years now. You never hand your card or numbers to anyone, but instead through chip insertion or proximal NFC it communicates with the identifier on the card, which the payment processor can correlate with you, and using the secret on the card cryptographically signs a transaction.
The most secure way I can use my credit card...is to use my credit card: Nothing that can be usurped is passed to the POS terminal.
Apple is essentially injecting themselves in a simple process that works extremely well.
Sure, you never hand the card over when you pay with NFC, but that card number is being sent through computer systems that current events prove are very vulnerable.
NFC and Chip-and-PIN protect the merchant from fraud, not the user. A malicious customer can't use a stolen card at a merchant that only accepts Chip-and-PIN payments.
EMVCo tokenization generates a token that can only be used with one-time cryptograms generated with a secret key that never leaves the device. If someone hacks a merchant you pay via Apple Pay and tries to use your token as a card number online, it will be rejected even though it looks like a card number.
EMVCo tokenization is a new thing. It is better than what came before it because it was designed with that goal in mind. People are reluctant to believe this for some reason.
You mean exactly like the EMV that is on every Canadian credit card since about 2007? NFC / Chip hold unique tokens that have on device cryptography, exactly as you've described. You can't "steal" anything of consequence via NFC or the chip, and that's why it was designed. Further while you say that it's for the vendor, the liable party for fraud is actually the credit card companies, which is exactly why they made EMV.
You seem to think this is all new because of EMVCo, however it is a standardization for the last mile: Google Wallet originally was doing what the credit cards themselves do, holding the secret key and identifiers on an NXP secure element. There are issues with that (largely carrier related) which is why the industry started moving to software-held tokens, as in the Apple solution. Presenting an iPhone token offers zero additional security over presenting a Canadian chip or NFC credit card, and that notion is rather ridiculous.
Note though, replay attacks require downgrading the card and suggesting it's not actually EMV-secured. And um, it appears all you need is a cell phone to clone one card onto another, if I'm really reading this right? No wonder we need EMV or stronger, Apple Pay protections.
Frankly, the way I see it, we can't move fast enough to one-time use card numbers, however we achieve it... then I suppose more fraud will attack the next weakest point, perhaps passwords or IT systems.
However, the new way lets you do the same thing in software without giving all your transactions to Google, which is nice. We'll be able to do online payments that are as secure and private as NFC, which we can't today.
For example: https://support.google.com/wallet/answer/2740044?hl=en
Token-like services are also common for contactless payment systems ...
(I'll address the rest later)
Somebody sees the credit card number, even in token based systems, even if it's only for a moment to acquire a token.
In other words, either Apple stills sees it while it acquires a payment token, or someone does to issue the payment token, as it's the only mechanism that identifies the account number to get a token for. The tokenization specification has a whole section on what identification and verification should be taking place to ensure the "primary account number" (credit card number) that the payment token is replacing is one the user has authorization for.
So let's focus on the "stores and charges". Yes, Google stores and charges your primary account number. This is just because Google happens to be the one doing the payment processing. Even in a token based system, again, somebody on the other side knows what real primary account number (credit card number) this token links back up to so they know what to subtract money from. The token based stuff is not an full anonymization protocol, it's mainly a way to securely avoid transmitting and storing credit card info to/by random merchants. In that respect, the virtual credit card numbers provide the same protection. They are one time use, and interception or storage by the merchant can not harm you. Secondarily, the payment tokens are also a way to reduce the number of networks your credit card number goes over, when used properly. The virtual credit card numbers perform the same function here too.
The person who knows in either system is usually your payment processor (though in case it isn't, it's possible for the tokens to be used there too. however, nothing in Apple Pay currently guarantees this happens with the tokens). Since that is google here, it makes sense they would have the primary account data to do the lookup.
If you are expecting tokens to replace credit card numbers all the way to the issuing bank, you are sorely mistaken. The lookup happens much earlier than that.
The TL;DR is that virtual credit card numbers are in fact, a method of tokenization. The only reason they went with "token" is because they don't have to be credit card numbers, and because not all virtual credit card implementations have the same guarantees.
In any case, if you want fully tokenized systems, those have existed too, just not en masse.
It's better. It's the future.
"If you are expecting tokens to replace credit card numbers all the way to the issuing bank, you are sorely mistaken. The lookup happens much earlier than that."
I disagree. Care to explain?
If this was true, i'd agree. But it's not, AFAIK.
"I disagree. Care to explain?"
Nothing in the spec that i have seen requires that it be used all the way to the issuing bank.
In fact, here is one actual implementation: http://www.firstdata.com/downloads/thought-leadership/EMV-En...
Now look at figure 2 on page 8, and you can see ... It's not the issuer doing the tokenization or the PAN lookup, firstdata is doing it (in this case), just as Google is doing it in the Wallet case. Firstdata sells an approved apple pay solution.
It happens that Apple does not provide payment processing services, and is thus not doing it. That of course, does not change how many parties see your card number :)
Now, maybe there are issuers doing the tokenization, storage, and lookup themselves. But it's not required.
The actual spec leaves these functions to an "Agent" (not an issuer) and defines an Agent as "An entity appointed by the Card Issuer to perform specific functions on behalf of the Card Issuer. Some examples of these functions include card processing, Cardholder verification using the 3-D Secure protocol, and Token Service"
There is also nothing that assumes they do not appoint multiple agents (and in fact, specifically forsees this happening), etc.
Love to see something that says otherwise, but i can't find it.
This is how things work in 2014: http://clover-developers.blogspot.com/2014/09/apple-pay.html
(Clover is owned by First Data.)
It's pointed to from their apple pay solution as to how it works?
"This is how things work in 2014: http://clover-developers.blogspot.com/2014/09/apple-pay.html "
Again, I have not seen a single implementation that claims to actually perform token usage all the way back to the issuing bank, just some diagrams that say "it's supposed to work that way" in some magical world where issuing banks run token service.
(and i've looked at actual implementations).
If you look at the comments on the blog, the author actually agrees with what i said: "Yes, the token is issued by the payment network, but Apple is not the payment network. The network would be Visa/MasterCard/AMEX. Apple receives the token from the payment network when the card is stored in Apple Pay (or Passport), then the token is provided each time a payment is made."
Note: Issued by the payment network. This is not the same as "bank who issued you the card". In fact, it's exactly the people I said it was (look at definition of payment network in the spec).
Also note: Apple sees the card to get the token to store in the wallet (it has to, unless the client directly understands how to route to an agent for a given card and connect there, which at least as apple has implemented, it doesn't). If you remember, above you said in an EMV world, only the issuer sees the real number. This is 100% false. Apple has no other way to get a token other than providing the PAN and letting an agent do ID & verification as part of a token request.
As I also said, the spec very specifically does not require anything else, delegating token service providing to agents.
Do you have anything to refute that issuing banks are going to be 100% compliant with the EMV tokenization spec (and apple pay) if they delegate the vault/lookup to someone else, like the payment processors? (I pasted the definitions from the spec, it specifically says the card issuer or the agent can perform this )
How about if they delegate to multiple people?
How about if they delegate to stripe, or google, or whoever?
The tokens only go exactly as far as the parties agree they want them to.
Two parties still see your card in Apple Pay: Whoever initially asks for the token to store (Apple right now), and whoever is playing vault. Apple just doesn't store it.
Walmart and Best Buy have gone so far as to basically say they have no plans to implement and maintain NFC at the POS.
E.g. http://mainstreetinc.net/retail-pos-prepares-emv-nfc-apple-p...
At least here in Canada, we went from "it's announced" to "it's everywhere" in about 2 years. Now.... whether the terminals will accept my contactless card, that's another question. I can't travel with just an iPhone until I know I won't need that card in my back pocket...
Unless Apple can show that Walmart will actually lose customers by not doing it, I don't see them adopting Apple Pay soon.
EDIT: Nevermind. I wasn't aware that NFC was the only requirement on the merchant-side for Apple Pay to work.
http://clover-developers.blogspot.com/2014/09/apple-pay.html
So we have a hash function whose workings are known only to Apple and Visa, MasterCard etc.
I wonder how long that'll last.
Additionally this system offers a secure mechanism to the merchant as well without making a dent to their business processes. That should motivate them to move quickly on it to prevent Target/Home depot style mess.
Finally the narrative around this is going to evolve the public perception. They are going to demand this from merchants for security, which should move the ball forward.
The merchant may end up facing higher fees for using card & sign terminals instead of chip & pin or NFC & token.