I don't quite understand why you think that a model which shows that lobbying government leads to economic inefficiency would lead to skepticism in the wonders of a free-market society. It seems like quite the opposite should happen.
Of course, in reality it's unlikely that anything would happen regardless of what the economic models showed. The fact that tariffs are inefficient has been widely accepted in pretty much every school economics for the last two centuries, but tariffs are still ubiquitous.
However, lobbying is not a problem of the free market. It's a failure of establishment of one.
If such models were studied, and one were actually trying to make a free market work, it would encourage a specific law that should have been installed with the separation of church and state: the separation of state and economy.
It should exist for the same reason the church is separated from the state, they can do nothing but corrupt each other.
Start with something along the lines of: 'the government may pass no law impeding free trade' and or 'the government shall have no power to regulate commerce' - and go from there. The interstate commerce act of 1887 was one of the first major anti-free market laws the US Government pushed through.
I might be misunderstanding you by thinking you just said that the government should never regulate trade; to dispel my confusion could you please explain how your idea of state/economy separation will handle coordination problems? How will it avoid tragedy of commons, or other race-to-the-bottom kinds of situations?
1) Fixing the commons by eliminating them - grant property rights to the users which align their incentives with a longer-term health of the "thing" and allow markets to emerge.
Free Market Environmentalism has a few examples of this working in the real world: http://www.amazon.com/Free-Market-Environmentalism-Terry-And...
2) Allow local communities to form their own rules on how to manage their own resources, and monitor each other.
Governing the Commons by Elinor Ostrom (winner of the "Nobel in Economics" by her life-long work on these issues) has empirical data of cases from Kenya to LA: http://www.amazon.com/Governing-Commons-Evolution-Institutio...
I think he sort of touches on that when he talks about how the approach doesn't work on a global scale. It's fundamentally similar: when it's one coal plant, you can deal with it, but how do you sue a million coal plants all over the planet each one contributing a small part? But I think it falls apart even at the local level when pollution from individuals becomes significant, as easily happens now.
This is just one possible solution, of course.
That said, the many-to-many transactions don't seem a problem to me considering that homes and roads are fairly static. AirBnB alone manages 375000 people sleeping on homes owned by another dozens or hundreds of thousands of people every single night.
This kind of transaction, on the other hand, would probably just happened once a decade, if that.
You're right that many-to-many transactions are workable in general. However, they're workable when both participants are willing. For pollution, only one participant is willing. The polluter doesn't want to pay damages, you have to force him. Many people can come together to force one entity to do something (class action lawsuits) and one large entity can exert its power to force many people to do something (government), but it's really hard for many people to force many other people to do something. When both the source of the pollution and the damage it causes is spread out, the cost of enforcement overwhelms the damages. Imagine a metro area with 100,000 road owners who are being held liable for pollution-related damages to five million local residents. How do the individual residents collect, when the individual road owners don't want to pay? Do they sue each one for 1/100,000th of 1/5,000,000th of the total damages in the area? Traditionally, this is solved by the local residents organizing and then exercising power through that organization, i.e. government.
What we have now is free pollution up to an arbitrary point where it becomes very expensive (because it is illegal). The obvious dominant strategy in the current system is to not care about pollution unless you are near the legal limit.
A lot of popular debates come down to people treating a feedback loop as a straight line, and picking different points on the loop as starting points. Some examples: nature vs. nurture, lobbying vs. corruption, chemistry vs. thoughts (e.g. in cases of depression).
I.e. economists would have a much less rosy view of the wonders of the free-market should be economists would have a much less rosy view of the wonders of NON-free-markets
Or am I misunderstanding you?
Even if we went straight to direct democracy (which I like in theory, as well as I like the idea of demarchy), the special interest with the biggest advertising budget would win.
I wonder, could an elected technocracy (by which I mean different governments and representatives for different spheres of influence) solve this by limiting both the tyranny of the masses and the influence of any one corrupt official? Or would whatever process controls the final budget still have enough power to corrupt the system?
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations: "Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power."
Later:
The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship, and all those laws which restrain in particular employments, the competition to a smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have the same tendency, though in a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of employments, keep up the market price of particular commodities above the natural price, and maintain both the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock employed about them somewhat above their natural rate.
On bargaining power between labour and capital ("masters"):
The masters, being fewer in number [than labour], can combine much more easily: and the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit, their combinations, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work, but many against combining to raise it.
...
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and, one may say, the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy till the moment of execution; and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen, who sometimes, too, without any provocation of this kind, combine, of their own accord, to raise the price of their labour. Their usual pretences are, sometimes the high price of provisions, sometimes the great profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands. The masters, upon these occasions, are just as clamorous upon the other side, and never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity against the combination of servants, labourers, and journeymen. The workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of those tumultuous combinations, which, partly from the interposition of the civil magistrate, partly from the superior steadiness of the masters, partly from the necessity which the greater part of the workmen are under of submitting for the sake of present subsistence, generally end in nothing but the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders.
There are many more examples in Wealth of Nations: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3300/3300-h/3300-h.htm
As for modern economics and markets, there's Coase (eponymous theorem on market extermalties), Olson ("Logic of Collective Action"), and Akerlof ("The Market for Lemons") and a whole slew of other market failures:
I suspect that if such models were studied seriously, economists would have a much less rosy view of the wonders of the free-market economy. And the same goes for the benefits of a democratic system versus other forms of government.
Because lobbying is not the exception - it's absolutely standard.