It depends on how worried you are about (a) proactively contacting site administrators; (b) stopping the CA issuing anything at all, instead of allowing them to issue shorter and shorter certificates as the end date approaches - and thereby demonstrating clear, immediate justice instead of slow, drawn-out justice; (c) 10 year certificates [1]; and (d) allowing website owners to proactively check for accidentally-issued certificates by monitoring the certificate lists.
(admittedly, monitoring the certificate lists wouldn't help if the bad certificate wasn't on the main signed public cert list, and people being MITMed were served a different signed public cert list. So this wouldn't be safe against CA insiders or CIA warrants)
[1] Really. https://www.positivessl.com/ssl-certificate-positivessl.php
Really browsers should just discard anything that isn't a root CA and expires more than two years from now as a matter of principle. Consider the consequences of issuing a certificate that far out on domain ownership transfers: Facebook bought facebook.com in 2005. The previous owner could still have a signed certificate for it.
Sure, next month they could still be issuing certificates that expire in 23 months and they would be valid. But a year from then they'll only be able to issue certificates that expire in 11 months, and after two years they'll only be able to issue certificates that are already expired.
That's what the parent post is talking about.
[edit: You're right. Even w/ arbitrary dates, end dates crossing the threshold will still not be accepted.]
You are addressing the other problem: CRLs essentially.
It seems like the way to fix this is to phase out bad CAs over time. And since certificates already have expiration dates and CAs typically don't issue certificates for longer than a couple years this should be easy: You don't trust any certificate signed by that CA which expires after a date two years from when you blacklist them. So the certificate some website got six months ago keeps working until it expires in a year and a half, but the certificate someone gets from them tomorrow fails immediately because it expires two years and a day after you removed the CA, which the site operator will discover in their testing and use a different CA before it reaches production.