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Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by michaelt on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @03:28PM (#8006265)
I agree that sounds like it would work, and it would avoid the hassle of dealing with a giant file listing thousands of certificates.

It depends on how worried you are about (a) proactively contacting site administrators; (b) stopping the CA issuing anything at all, instead of allowing them to issue shorter and shorter certificates as the end date approaches - and thereby demonstrating clear, immediate justice instead of slow, drawn-out justice; (c) 10 year certificates [1]; and (d) allowing website owners to proactively check for accidentally-issued certificates by monitoring the certificate lists.

(admittedly, monitoring the certificate lists wouldn't help if the bad certificate wasn't on the main signed public cert list, and people being MITMed were served a different signed public cert list. So this wouldn't be safe against CA insiders or CIA warrants)

[1] Really. https://www.positivessl.com/ssl-certificate-positivessl.php

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by AnthonyMouse on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @05:17PM (#8006791)
> 10 year certificates

Really browsers should just discard anything that isn't a root CA and expires more than two years from now as a matter of principle. Consider the consequences of issuing a certificate that far out on domain ownership transfers: Facebook bought facebook.com in 2005. The previous owner could still have a signed certificate for it.