Re:Maintaining digital certificate security
by richardwhiuk on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @02:31PM
(#8005956)
That's useless. A compromised CA could create a certificate for an arbitrary start and expiration date. So this only penalises users who have had a certificate legitimately, and doesn't work at all if the CA's crown jewels are stolen.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security
by AnthonyMouse on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @02:38PM
(#8006002)
> That's useless. A compromised CA could create a certificate for an arbitrary start and expiration date.
Sure, next month they could still be issuing certificates that expire in 23 months and they would be valid. But a year from then they'll only be able to issue certificates that expire in 11 months, and after two years they'll only be able to issue certificates that are already expired.
An arbitrary start and end date means that you could post-date the certificate to be good for two years starting from 1 year ago, even though you created it today.
That's what the parent post is talking about.
[edit: You're right. Even w/ arbitrary dates, end dates crossing the threshold will still not be accepted.]
His idea deals with the problem of CAs having no incentive to do their job properly: they won't lose their ability to issue certs.
You are addressing the other problem: CRLs essentially.