http://wiki.creativecommons.org/FAQ#Can_I_apply_a_Creative_C...

Guess I'll stick to mailpile and roundcube.

  // random salt
  $sSalt = '<'.'?php //'
  	.md5(microtime(true).rand(1000, 5000))
  	.md5(microtime(true).rand(5000, 9999))
  	.md5(microtime(true).rand(1000, 5000));
  
  @file_put_contents(APP_DATA_FOLDER_PATH.'SALT.php', $sSalt);

This looks like it would meet that requirement.

Edit: Since this is HN, I feel obliged to point out that there is a small vulnerability introduced by using a non-CSPRNG here. If an attacker is already surveiling you, and is able to perfectly deduce the state of your PRNG before you generate your salt, and the attacker plans to steal your db at some point in the future, he can get a head start in generating rainbow tables against your database.

But the main value of a salt is in being globally unique, which this is.

While it is true that he can get a head start, a head start is quite useless because the work necessary to reverse one hash is independent of the work necessary to reverse a different hash. That means that you still have to brute force each password individually.

https://github.com/RainLoop/rainloop-webmail

I'm no cryptographer, but I always thought that was generally a terrible idea... Or am I reading that terribly wrong, it is 5.30pm here and my brain has shut off for the day.

https://github.com/RainLoop/rainloop-webmail/blob/be45d989f8...

Roundcube and this solves the webmail client send nicely. IMAP PUSH solves the desktop end nicely.

But the reason I switched away from self-hosting my email was due to the lack of IMAP PUSH on iOS (ironically this was never a problem on several generations of dumbphones I had before, which supported IMAP PUSH).

As far as I can tell, all the current alternatives to get your IMAP email pushed to your iOS device require giving a third party full access to your email. Or does anyone know of anything I've missed?

[1] http://roundcube.net/

Last time I updated Apple Mail it included yet a few more fixes specifically for Gmail IMAP support. This makes me think that a compatible enough decent solution requires knocking together something custom at this point.

If you have to call them "Gmail IMAP features" they really aren't IMAP at all and it would be better to call them proprietary Google-extensions.

Gmail does not follow standard IMAP, and no standard IMAP client can fully interop with Gmail. That's a decision Google made, and you can't blame anyone else for the consequences of that.

It's my understanding that no standard (as in, RFC standard) IMAP client can interop with pretty much any widely-used IMAP server. This is a topic that comes up whenever IMAP is discussed on HN. All IMAP clients and servers are full of hacks to deal with specific servers or clients.

I don't think you can blame either Google or Apple or IMAP for this. It's how standards work: good for interop, but don't always deal with innovation well.

Also, how does it handle verifying signed messages from keys which you don't have? does it have support for searching via keyservers/using pka stuff to find a key?

It may be a little complex, but that's understandable since PHP can be used on any platform.

The colors could be better.

Purchase Subscription Key on gimroad.com

It should be gumroad.com

On the installation page, it says to do this:

    curl -s http://repository.rainloop.net/installer.php | php
    wget -qO- http://repository.rainloop.net/installer.php | php

It's no different to just download an installer and double click it.

Providing verification methods in alternative channels is essential if you need make sure everything is clean.

With a normal download, you're likely to wait until it's done before invoking it.

With a pipe-to-interpreter, the interpreter (php/sh/etc..) is possibly interpreting code as it receives in batches of (line/chunk/etc.).

A danger therein lies in the possibility of an unexpected pipe interruption (network, or software) feeding something that's technically runnable by the interpreter but logically broken.

Imagine coming down the pipe is "rm -rf /tmp/installer-data" but curl uses too much memory and the linux OOM killer nukes it and sh receives only "rm -rf /"

_If_ the pipe breaks up the incoming data, I assume its on 1 of these boundaries of 64kb-ish: http://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/11946/how-big-is-the...

http://stackoverflow.com/questions/4624071/pipe-buffer-size-...

In general, when I've seen this technique used in Ruby (RVM?, back in the day) and/or PHP (Composer recommends a similiar Curl install technique, but composer.phar is an digest-archive of sorts ....) the installer code tends to be about a paragraph worth of text.

All in all I understand your point. But your contrived example of rm -rf seems a little too contrived. In this case we're were talking about PHP code ... the chunked-piped code would still need to be valid PHP of what "rm -rf /" is not as it's missing important tokens to denote valid php expression(s).

It seems like it would be equally worrisome to worry about Brownian Motion flipping a bit in memory and catastrophically affecting my program execution -- possible but unlikely.

There are several scenarios where that logical pipe can fail. It doesn't have to happen cleanly on a 64-kb unix pipe buffer boundary. Some examples may include someone bouncing an office router and all TCP connection states getting reset, a neighbor microwaving lunch and WiFi radios croaking, a carrier having networking issues and connections timing out, the remote server restarting the web server after a software upgrade, etc..

I'm not sure curl (even with -s) will gracefully handle all of these cases defensively (doubly-so if the HTTP server was sending back chunked-encoding without explicitly specifying a Content-Length)

(anecdotally, since you mentioned flipping bits, it's possible but unlikely until you have to deal with it - http://mina.naguib.ca/blog/2012/10/22/the-little-ssh-that-so... )

At the end of the day, having not even considered what an active attacker could do but just what could naturally blow-up a small percentage of the time I'm inclined to say "that's bad, mmkay?" and try to persuade developers not to push that as a safe installation method. Even if they've triple-checked that the code they've written + interpreter can not possibly do harm in that case, the signal we should be sending (primarily to end-users) is that this may be an unsafe operation.

Huh? How do you explain I curl | tar -zxvf gigabytes of file without consuming all of my RAM and swap?

If curl was SIGKILLed, wouldn't that result in a "broken pipe", therefore causing the shell to abort? The only way the "rm -rf /" would be executed would be if the pipe shut down cleanly and the shell saw an EOF (since obviously there would not be a newline in the scenario you described).

See my longer reply to tenken for some other scenarios I could think off.

It's good practice to download, verify checksum/cert, then run.

  > If your network is Man-In-The-Middle'd you are probably
  > fucked in more than one way, and a backdoored php install
  > script is the least thing you should worry about.

The only reasonable security stance towards the security of your local internet connection is to assume that it's got something malicious on the other end of it. That's why using HTTPS is so important.

  > It's no different to just download an installer and
  > double click it.

I'm assuming that "non" shouldn't be there, so... I don't know how I feel about the whole curl/wget [url] | [interpreter] trend. In theory, it shouldn't really be that different from the days of downloading "setup.exe" and running it.

If for some reason you don't trust Rainloop then you shouldn't install anything of theirs no matter what the delivery method is.

It seems like no matter how you install the software, you likely have to put at least that level of trust in them. Unless you run it in its own VM or other sandbox, of course.

The TLS point is totally valid, though.

He didn't say it was because of PHP, he said it was because of http (i.e., because it's not over SSL).

> the exact same attack you describe could be done when you are downloading a Windows installer executable from a browser and double clicking it

Exactly, which is why people who are security conscious never simply execute a Windows installer downloaded from the browser (or wget, for that matter). At a minimum, one checks the file hashes. Ideally, one confirms that the executable has been properly signed and not tampered with (by right-clicking the file, clicking 'properties' and looking at the 'signature' tab, or else manually checking if it's been GPG signed).