There is no full list, and there is no leak. We're drafting a more formal response now.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7505757
A lot of people are getting nervous that you're not taking security seriously at Coinbase. Ignoring whitehat reports would seem to be a serious issue.
Those aliases are cheap insurance, but they aren't free: they'll cost you some tech support cycles.
A basic tech support person might be able to fend off the dozens of word salad "security notifications" sent by ESL students, but as they get more complicated and no less often irrelevant, you need people who actually know how your infrastructure works.
On top of the technical hassle comes the customer experience hassle of keeping a bunch of wanna be hackers happy as they demand rewards and their name on your site for their idea of a CRSF vulnerability that happens to have no basis in reality.
Not just emails, either. See also event logging: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/03/details_of_th...
According to the original researcher, he mailed them and got no response, and got no response at all from several other attempts at contact,.
I wouldn't be surprised one bit to find that the inbox for that address is full of spam and crackpots, but, like 'tptacek said, if you're going to have the list you had better dedicate resources to reading it.
I love this. Look these silly free social sites do it, so it must be ok. Anyone know if BofA or WellsFargo allow user enumeration?
You're correct. They don't. Not even to authorities without a warrant. Which is the point I was trying to make in my earlier comment.[0]
Wells Fargo has 10-11 digit (depending on if it's WF or previously Wachovia) account numbers. One portion defines the bank branch where the account was opened, another portion defines the account type, and the last digit is a check digit. You can guess at an account number by attempting a deposit (in person or online).
There's also the fact that BofA and Wells Fargo have account numbers displayed in cleartext on pieces of paper that are handed to strangers.
I'm not arguing the merits of Coinbase's security, but traditional banks don't fare well either. Coinbase can improve. Traditional banks are limited by standards that they can't change.
So I started generating random numbers between common document number ranges (1000000-4000000).
Our public health system has a web app that lets you check your enrollment status by entering an document #, and there are no CAPTCHAs! So the attack was like this: generate a random document number, send a request to the public health app and get the target's info (name, date of enrollment and other info). The most interesting thing was that I tried to login into all accounts by using the birth date of the target as a password (the bank's password policy: just numbers, a min. of 6 numbers...). Around 40% of the clients were vulnerable.
The fact that they didn't help the customer until they took their grievances public indicated to me that either Coinbase don't care about their customers, or they were too busy trying to balance their books because of some proprietary trading gone wrong.
Thus I think it was foolish of Coinbase to release the letter condemning MtGox. Now anything that happens to Coinbase makes them look like total hypocrites. People, glass houses, stones etc.
It's one thing for a magic card trading company to morph into a Bitcoin exchange and have problems... but for a hot-shot start-up in San Francisco with self-proclaimed tech superstars at the helm and millions in the bank to screw up royally, well, it's just embarrassing.
There are rumors that a joint statement will be released at 5PM Pacific Time...
Joint Statement Regarding CoinBase
Apr 1st, 2014
The purpose of this document is to summarize a joint statement to the Bitcoin community regarding CoinBase.
This tragic violation of the trust of users of CoinBase was the result of one company’s actions and does not reflect the resilience or value of bitcoin and the digital currency industry. There are hundreds of trustworthy and responsible companies involved in bitcoin. These companies will continue to build the future of money by making bitcoin more secure and easy to use for consumers and merchants. As with any new industry, there are certain bad actors that need to be weeded out, and that is what we are seeing today. CoinBase has confirmed its issues in private discussions with other members of the bitcoin community
We are confident, however, that strong Bitcoin companies, led by highly competent teams and backed by credible investors, will continue to thrive, and to fulfill the promise that bitcoin offers as the future of payment in the Internet age.
In order to re-establish the trust squandered by the failings of CoinBase, responsible bitcoin exchanges are working together and are committed to the future of bitcoin and the security of all customer funds. As part of the effort to re-assure customers, the following services will be coordinating efforts over the coming days to publicly reassure customers and the general public that all funds continue to be held in a safe and secure manner: Kraken, BitStamp, Circle, and BTC China.
We strongly believe in transparent, thoughtful, and comprehensive consumer protection measures. We pledge to lead the way.
Bitcoin operators, whether they be exchanges, wallet services or payment providers, play a critical custodial role over the bitcoin they hold as assets for their customers. Acting as a custodian should require a high-bar, including appropriate security safeguards that are independently audited and tested on a regular basis, adequate balance sheets and reserves as commercial entities, transparent and accountable customer disclosures, and clear policies to not use customer assets for proprietary trading or for margin loans in leveraged trading.
The following industry leaders stand by this statement:
Jesse Powell — CEO of Kraken
Nejc Kodrič — CEO of Bitstamp.net
Bobby Lee — CEO of BTC China
Nicolas Cary — CEO of Blockchain.info
Jeremy Allaire — CEO of Circle
p.s. Yes, this is the MtGox letter... who will be the last man standing? :-)
Check the forums over at BitcoinTalk, for months now, people using Kraken have been unable to withdraw their money, and deposits have been going 'missing'. The fact that support is conducted over a public forum, out of sheer desperation on the customers part, tells you something.
If CoinBase did go down, would you bet against the other providers crafting a public relations message to drum up business for themselves? It's dog eat dog out there - the idea that there is a community of Bitcoin businesses looking out for each other is a joke.
Unless the company actually had inadequate reserves to meet customer withdrawals, thus leaving the solvency of the company at risk of a good old-fashioned fractional reserve style bank-run...
I know CB is not a financial company and they are not obligated to provide the same protections to consumers/customers.
Phishing is not the only reason why a customer would not like their bank to confirm that they have an account.
As a matter of fact in this situation, when someone sends a fund request, CB should never let the requesting party know the name of the account holder, unless the account holder explicitly gives them permission, maybe not even then.
With any other organization law enforcement would require a warrant to get basic confirmation if a customer has an account and the name on the account.
On the password reset form, there's a big difference between saying "That email does not exist in our system"/"Emailed password reset instructions" vs "If that account is registered, we will email you instructions".
If you say, "we don't allow two accounts with the same email address", you have the same issue as coinbase.
I can't see how you can avoid making the experience for the duplicate user exactly the same as a new user.
> I can't see how you can avoid making the experience for the duplicate user exactly the same as a new user.
The workflow diverges at the email verification step, before you grant any access to the site. Existing users get an email informing them that someone has tried to sign up a second time using their email address while new users get the standard email verification email.
I highly recommend not allowing account creation before email address verification. I have a difficult to spell last name, so I have one email address that contains my initials and a common word instead of my last name. You'd be surprised the number of people who don't know their own email address and the number of sites that allow people to sign up (and apparently transact significantly) without verifying email addresses. Off the top of my head, if I wanted to, I could steal one person's tax accounting account (I got confirmation that they filed their state taxes this year, and later confirmation their state accepted their filing), another person's car rental account, and a third person's business's trash service account. From time to time the one person tries to reset their car rental account password. I imagine I could reset the passwords for all of these accounts (and others) and get the last 4 digits of their credit card numbers and other personal information and use that as a starting point for gaining access to other accounts they own. In the case of the tax account, I could probably re-download the tax paperwork and get their SSN. Neither the tax accounting company nor the car rental agency replied when I informed them that accounts were set up with the wrong email addresses. (I also get business quotes from time to time. Hopefully some day I'll get email from a business or person who knows the person who keeps trying to reset their car rental account.)
If you have enough users who forget they already have an account and your signup process makes them get too far before verifying their email address, consider moving email verification earlier in your workflow.
I assume that was the original point - that on risque dating sites, the recover password system tries to hide membership.
Just because email address is known does not imply that other personal information should be given away.
Doesn't seem innocuous. Maybe coinbase ought to be making pseudonymity more easily accessible.
Stopping email address validation is, I think, impossible for a company like Coinbase, but revealing the name doesn't have to happen.
On the other hand, providing the first and last name could be very valuable to the users, though. If I send coins to [email protected], I'd like to see the real name behind that address.
On the other other hand, if anyone can make any first and last name they wish, then the safety of that goes away. Maybe I make [email protected] with the same real name.
EDIT The users agreed to have their names given to people they transact with. Does that include strangers attempting to transact with them? I'm thinking "no" but can see the other side.
(1) is opt-in on the recipient's side and fails with something like "that recipient email address doesn't have an account, the name doesn't match, or they haven't decided to allow name verification"
AND
(2) is only available on payments above your highest guess at the expected value of matching an account-email-name triple for spearphishing, and the error messages (and timings) are identical if the name doesn't match or the given email address doesn't have an account.
I imagine there are few profitable attacks where an answer "yes, email_address with name has a Coinbase account" costs a minimum of 100 USD to an attacker and getting an answer "Either email_address doesn't have an account, that name doesn't match our records, or they've chosen not to share their name" costs 0 USD. However, I'd have to think a bit more about that 100 USD minimum.
"This is the bullshit excuse they are trying to use to make it SEEM like its not a vulnerability."
Coinbase is deliberately misleading their users regarding privacy if they do not fix this issue!
I suspect that the person who made this Pastebin just ran a huge list of known leaked emails, or dictionary based emails through the minor information leakage vulnerability discussed yesterday (https://hackerone.com/reports/5200). I would be willing to bet that this brief list is actually all he got back, and he is just lying when he says "Full list much bigger."
Since the vulnerability was reliant on knowing the email first, and since my email used on Coinbase is not a known email that I publicize I doubt he would have been able to discover my Coinbase account, nor the Coinbase accounts of anyone else who uses a sufficiently random and unknown email address when signing up.