Even though more software is self-serve and provides zero-day value, the biggest enterprise customers still need the Sales & Marketing machine, from front-loading marketing which generate leads for sales people/sales engineers to customer success, etc.
For the longest time, the guys driving the best cars coming out of Oracle's parking lot were the sales people. That's changing, but not as quickly as we expect.
As a point of comparison:
Box R&D: 37% of revenue S&M: 138% of revenue
Salesforce (based on last SEC filing) R&D: 15% of revenue S&M: 53% of revenue
Oracle (based on last SEC filing) R&D: 14% of revenue S&M: 21% of revenue
Interesting exception is Workday (based on last SEC filing) R&D: 39% of revenue S&M: 42% of revenue
This is still a winner-take-all business because a typical enterprise customer is still 2-3 years at the minimum (depends on the product; ERP tends to be much stickier). Box is encouraged to spend expensive investor capital to focus on growth (and in the process, limit their tax exposure).
I think it'll be interesting as Dropbox moves more towards the enterprise how much of the typical "enterprise sales" playbook would they adopt?
Curious, why doesn't anyone here mention SAP when the topic of enterprise software comes up? SAP is the enterprise software company (bigger than Oracle in business software). That being said:[0]
- SAP has 15,000 s&m employees (second only to it's 17,000 R&D employees) - Of it's €11B in gross profit, it spends €4B on s&m, or 25% of it's revenue (€16B). It spends roughly the same €4b on software development (Cost of software + R&d)
Here's the funny thing. The argument for why cloud is taking over is that the Cost of Sales is supposed to go down. Ya...... (my thoughts on this: http://www.techdisruptive.com/2012/11/28/how-are-we-going-to...)
[0]http://global.sap.com/corporate-en/investors/pdf/sap-2013-an...
edit: I should make it clear, I'm just repeating your point for emphasis in my first sentence. I'm in agreement with your whole post.
They (Box) just raised ($100MM, Dec/13) a month or two before this was filed. The market, however, is very ripe[1] and the IPO marketers are likely advising them to take it public. The Last round is basically a mezz round ($2B valuation) and if they flip this thing for 1.5x to 2.0x in 6 months those guys are going to be happy. The cash burn on the P&L is $14/month and $350MM would last 24 months, enough to inflect if its a real biz. Closer to inflection, a Secondary raise will generate liquidity for the remaining insiders. Given the uncertainty with the FED's propping up of QE, its not a bad idea if you are the #N player to not wait (risk of backwash/turbulence if the others take all investor appetite), given that its a two-stage exit for most IPOs these days.
Is this what the 2000 bubble was?
> Full context is useful.
== $1B+ val vs. $10MM LTM rev = 100x rev multiple.
edit: I should clarify again based on sibling/nephew comments... I think it's too far off topic to go into this in depth, but clearly running at a loss is expected and appropriate for companies at a certain stage of their growth profile. Even big companies (like Amazon, like someone noted) can do this if they prefer to invest in pursuing large enough growth opportunities out of cash flow vs selling debt or shares. Regardless, the revenue growth has to show up at some point, and spending in sales has to show ROI.
What?
Anyway, Amazon has razor-thin margins on some products but they're not loss making.
For example, Amazon has 'razor thin' margins and is operating at a slight loss. Does anyone really argue that they are not 'Profitable'?
That's what an IPO was originally supposed to be for, right? Raising capitol, rather than cashing out?
Perhaps, in a time prior to companies "routinely" raising massive sums (like $410MM) pre-IPO.
Just to add, right on their S1 risk factors:
We have incurred significant losses in each period since our inception in 2005.
We incurred net losses of $50.3 million in our fiscal year ended December 31, 2011,
$112.6 million in our fiscal year ended January 31, 2013, and
$168.6 million in our fiscal year ended January 31, 2014.
As of January 31, 2014, we had an accumulated deficit of $361.2 million
Granted the risk section is usually the absolutely worst case scenario, but it's interesting that they're losing more money at a faster pace each year.I didn't read anything thoroughly, but there are times when more revenue does not take you closer to profitability. Wasn't that the big downfall of pets.com? The more they sold, the faster they lost money. Could be that Box has sacrificed revenue to conserve some cash (i.e. if their costs per customer were higher than they charge).
So, yes the pricing model/ value proposition of a company's products will effect how many & what type of salespeople they employ, but salespeople should never be a significant fixed cost without a corresponding revenue stream (greater than their costs).
Nice gross profit margin growth from 67% to 79%, but now we know where vc money went: sales & marketing.
Profitability seems very very very far away, and in my opinion Box is not a buy for the average Joe. It seems to me that revenues are extremely dependent on marketing, as per "50% of the net proceeds in sales and marketing activities". Now that we can hear cloud storage war drums from afar I don't see this expense item going down any time soon. This IPO isn't going to be cheap, at whatever valuation CS, MS and JP come up with.
On the VC/Tech industry's double standards:
Funny how an investors ask and drill down startups on their customer acquisition costs, customer lifetime value, user & customer numbers, etc. and none of that information is made available on the S-1, the document that should really be the "bible" for any investor. I guess the public market is going to get the short end of the stick again.