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Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by linuxhansl on Sunday December 22, 2013 @06:30PM (#6952259)
Form my past posts you'll know that I am critical of government spying and overreaching authority in the bogus name of fighting terrorism.

In this case, though, didn't the process work? There is no blanket spying, no action by the executive branch alone.

This a court order for a specific case in an ongoing criminal investigation, reviewed and signed by a judge. Isn't that how the system is supposed to work? The executive branch needs to request court order in order to commence surveillance... All checks and balances are in place.

If anything, this is good. The government could and did not spy on the user at issue here.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by MWil on Sunday December 22, 2013 @06:34PM (#6952283)
To echo what someone else said, the problem here is when presented with the following scenarios:

1) Levison saying "absolutely, you are entitled to Snowden's contact/header details and I will give it to you within 60 days (or more frequently for more compensation)"

vs.

2) The govt saying "not good enough, give us the keys to everything real-time and we promise we won't get his communications content plus we will ignore the other 399,999 subscribers we will have access to".

Arguments on pg. 76 describe how this discretion should not be allowed. Also, the govt said it required real-time access which I'm not sure is true - although certainly they would like it. That's why I think they should have compromised with Levison and they would have been granted what they wanted.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by meowface on Sunday December 22, 2013 @06:31PM (#6952265)
The problem in this case isn't the request ("we need email records of X user"), the problem is that they requested the private encryption key for the whole website, which would allow them to read the emails of every user.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by res0nat0r on Sunday December 22, 2013 @06:39PM (#6952297)
Just because the more specific requests for individual records were not complied with, and the government resorted to broader mechanisms in its subpoena to get the data it wanted, does not make it illegal.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by MWil on Sunday December 22, 2013 @06:45PM (#6952317)
What is the "it" you are referring to? The requests/subpoena?

Those can't be illegal, although they can result in illegal actions being taken.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by res0nat0r on Sunday December 22, 2013 @07:08PM (#6952379)
The gov't asked for specific access to specific account(s), those were not complied with, so they requested that the ssl certs be handed over so that they could get access to the specific individuals they needed. None of this is illegal.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by malandrew on Monday December 23, 2013 @12:36AM (#6953222)
I don't see why it isn't illegal since it is clearly unconstitutional. Asking for access to the keys to everything is absurd and clearly not aligned with "particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Asking for the keys is the same as saying "we're asking to search all persons and all things." That most certainly exceeds the scope of the word "particular", especially when you take the words "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation" into account, since they clearly don't have probably cause for the other ~399,999 subscribers.

If the Constitution isn't clear enough on this matter, maybe this is something that we should pass into law. The government should never ever ever being able to ask for access to all the information from any service provider in third-party doctrine cases.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by arh68 on Monday December 23, 2013 @07:32AM (#6953986)
The judge understood this, but can't convict on a pre-crime. Assuming good faith might seem laughable here, but it does apply. Until there is proof that the gov't did in fact access anyone else's data (w/o authorization), there is no charge. There is a good analogy somewhere in there about an apartment building. 364 days of the year, the gov't can't go touching the building's master key, but the one day they have an investigation, they get a copy.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by MWil on Sunday December 22, 2013 @07:17PM (#6952402)
The govts request was akin to asking for your hidden phone number in a phone book full of hidden phone numbers. On its face it was specific but it could not actually be carried out without generally applying to 400k people.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by dalke on Sunday December 22, 2013 @07:42PM (#6952455)
The government stated that they have filters which will make it so that no one would see any information other than what is requested. The judge stated that that was reasonable.

Using your analogy, the government wanted to "grep '^target_name$' phone_book.txt", so while software did see all 400k phone numbers, the government did not.

I happen to disagree with the court on this, but I think your analogy isn't useful as to understand why. Instead, there should be a balancing of cost vs. impact.

Levinson/Lavasoft stated that they would provide that pen register information for a development fee of some $2,000-$3,500. (Note: Verizon's price list says they charge about $700 for access to that data.)

The government refused to pay, saying that they were not aware of paying anyone else for pen trap data.

So the first question is, how much non-revenue generating work can a company be forced to do in order to respond to a pen register request? Obviously the answer has to be non-zero in order for the law to be meaningful, but it can't drive a company out of business.

The government points out that a cheap solution, which bypasses the internal architecture, is for the company to provide access to all of the data, and use filters to remove all non-relevant data.

The secondary question is, where does the boundary sit? Is it at the company/filter layer, where the company is force to release all records to the filter, or with the filter/human investigator layer, where the humans only see the relevant data?

Personally, I put it on the company/filter layer. The government and the court disagree with me. Their view is that you can trust the filter to do what it says it does. (When Levinson asked for oversight or audit of the filter, the judge denied the request.)

However, in the case of a "grep ... phonebook", where the filter program can be audited, and run with oversight from both sides, then I find the request to be more reasonable.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by devicenull on Sunday December 22, 2013 @09:07PM (#6952719)
> Levinson/Lavasoft stated that they would provide that pen register information for a development fee of some $2,000-$3,500. (Note: Verizon's price list says they charge about $700 for access to that data.)

plus

> The government refused to pay, saying that they were not aware of paying anyone else for pen trap data

So the government is not aware of paying anyone, despite Verizon having a (semi)public price list?

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by dalke on Sunday December 22, 2013 @09:12PM (#6952734)
I had the same thought. But note that one is a development fee and the other is a service fee.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by malandrew on Monday December 23, 2013 @01:18AM (#6953320)
And one involves a developer who is likely of a much higher technical ability. Given his technical ability, Levinson's hourly rate is probably several times higher than the rate for the Verizon employee that would be assigned to do the work. It's not like a manager would authorize putting their best and brightest to do work that does not generate revenue.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by dalke on Monday December 23, 2013 @07:53AM (#6954039)
I take it you didn't read the PDF? Levinson also gave a time estimate of "between 20 to 40 hours" (p114), which works out to $40 to $80 per hour. Let's call it $50 for the ease of comparison. This is an entirely reasonable hourly fee.

Verizon quoted a $50 court processing fee, which almost certainly takes less than 1 hour to do. It charges a $50 activation fee, which can't reasonably take 1 hour, and $10/day pen tap fee, and I doubt a Verizon employee is spending more than 12 minutes per day per pen tap.

In other words, those documents show that Verizon is almost certainly charging more per unit time than Lavasoft would, and definitely not "several times" lower than Levinson.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by malandrew on Tuesday December 24, 2013 @01:19AM (#6958497)
No I did not. This PDF and the White House NSA recommendations I have on my todo list for after the 25th of the month. Unfortunately, right now I cannot find the time to read anything this long.

That being said, thanks for the clarification and specific relevant facts from the PDF.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by MWil on Sunday December 22, 2013 @08:19PM (#6952556)
As far as the law goes, there should always be disclaimers that metaphors and analogies are sometimes useful but only get you so far. Especially when it comes to technology, they almost never hold water and look silly years down the line when the technology is better understood by the general population. I don't have the necessary education or knowledge to make a better analogy so for that I apologize.

EDIT: Oh, I am a lawyer. I was just noting that in law school (and internet law especially) you have to be wary of judges/parties using analogies in their arguments b/c they are almost always imperfect in one way or another

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by dalke on Sunday December 22, 2013 @09:11PM (#6952733)
Have you skimmed through the PDF? I've found that even though I don't have any legal training, it's usually pretty easy to read at least the transcripts. Do that a few times, and things start to make some sense.

I've found court judgements are often quite easy to understand, if you don't mind skipping a lot of citation references. For example, Computer Associates v. Altai helped me understand the abstraction-filtration-comparison test as applied to copyright of software.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by MWil on Sunday December 22, 2013 @10:03PM (#6952893)
see my edit above, I did more than just skim, I did a pretty thorough initial reading as you can see from my comments here
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by dalke on Sunday December 22, 2013 @10:41PM (#6953006)
Indeed you have! I find it difficult to track account names, especially unfamiliar ones, and didn't note that I had even commented elsewhere on your threads of doing that reading.

(For example, it wasn't until 7th grade that I noticed that various books that I really liked were all written by the same author, so I should get more books by that author.)

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by malandrew on Monday December 23, 2013 @01:20AM (#6953330)
It would be interesting, if, when replying, other comments by the person on the same HN post were available.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by malandrew on Monday December 23, 2013 @01:14AM (#6953312)
I would imagine that some sort of pair programming recorded session, where either side can pause the session and argue against what the other side would like to do next and why they believe it to be inappropriate.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by res0nat0r on Sunday December 22, 2013 @07:30PM (#6952429)
Again, a broad request like this is not illegal...
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by retrogradeorbit on Sunday December 22, 2013 @10:07PM (#6952901)
This is true, of course. The dominant power never legislates against its own self interest. And so many of the darkest parts of human history were done legally. The real issue here goes deeper than the law.

The thing is, not many people believe a word the government says any-more. This is the government that doesn't "collect" any information on their citizens, doesn't "torture" anyone and so on. The government can make any promises it wants, with no intention of fulfilling them, then claim that the meanings of the words are not what you think they are, but the real meanings are secret, and why they're secret, is secret, and no one can ever know the true meaning lest we all be killed by terrorists.

And isn't it funny that the government can't seem to bring itself to find this pen-register information development fee, but there seems to be an infinite line of deficit spending for all kinds of corporate subsidies, bank bailouts, spying equipment and wedding killing drones.

The lawyers may argue and the courts may rule, but at the end of the day the core of this apple is rotten. And there's worms in it. Take a bite. It tastes like "freedom".

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by malandrew on Monday December 23, 2013 @12:40AM (#6953233)
I can't understand why it is not illegal by way of being unconstitutional since it clearly tramples on the 4th amendment rights of all the other subscribers.

Absent clear mechanisms for watching the watchmen to make sure they not only respecting the 4th amendment rights of the other subscribers, but technically incapable of doing so (in order to mitigate rogue actors that want to impress their superiors via fishing expeditions), I can't see why we should have any reason to believe this information will not be abused. The government, especially the NSA and the FBI (by way of parallel construction), have proven to be outright liars. This alone should be enough for a judge to rule against the right of the government to make such broad requests. The government has be proven guilty of lying here. The burden is now on them to show that they are no longer guilty.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by rayiner on Sunday December 22, 2013 @07:07PM (#6952376)
The problem was that the site was designed in such a way that there wasn't a key per user.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by MWil on Sunday December 22, 2013 @07:14PM (#6952393)
The problem with describing that as a problem is that there's no mandated way to operate a business (other than lawfully)

Levison didn't design it to make it harder for the govt specifically, he designed it that way to make it stronger for his users as against the rest of the world and would then make exceptions for the govt (which they turned down when he offered to custom-tailor a solution)

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by infinity0 on Sunday December 22, 2013 @07:15PM (#6952396)
The problem was that the site was designed in such a way that the user didn't have their own keys.

I don't even understand how it got to this stage. Would you rent a house where the landlord had your keys, and you had to call them up for access?

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by MagicWishMonkey on Monday December 23, 2013 @10:16AM (#6954635)
That is how SSL is meant to work. Do you have your own SSL keys to your banks website? Of course not.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by alexwright on Monday December 23, 2013 @05:12PM (#6956859)
You can have a client side key BTW. It's a complete dick to setup and each UA is different so it's really not viable for a product for the unwashed masses. But for something like Lavabit I don't think would be unreasonable.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by MagicWishMonkey on Saturday December 28, 2013 @10:24PM (#6978144)
Ladar had a hard enough time making ends meet with the service as it was, adding something like that to the mix would have alienated a huge portion of his userbase.

You would think his users would be pretty savvy but he spent lots of time and money walking people through simple tasks like configuring Outlook or Thunderbird to check their email. I'm pretty sure support was his biggest operating expense.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by alexwright on Sunday December 29, 2013 @09:34AM (#6979620)
I should have said for a product like Lavabit, ie mail as secure/private as SMTP likely gets right now, I hope it wouldn't be unreasonable. However, in my heart of hearts, I knew it was too much to ask for.

I guess anyone that knows how to create and setup a client side TLS cert and key would also already know privacy and SMTP can't really live together, and would setup a deaddrop for gpg encrypted messages.

Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by wmf on Sunday December 22, 2013 @06:34PM (#6952273)
Arguably asking for the SSL key is overbroad since it would effect all Lavabit users. But the government only asked for it after Lavabit refused to implement targeted mechanisms in a reasonable way.
Re:Lavabit Proceedings Unsealed [pdf] by mattkrea on Sunday December 22, 2013 @08:13PM (#6952547)
If you read in the arguments he is willing to comply with the pen register but the FBI argues that the SSL keys are required for this to function. Based upon my understanding this would mean that the pen register would use the keys and essentially pull a MITM attack on all traffic or the FBI just really doesn't understand that the mail wasn't encrypted once it hit the server and if their pen register functioned after the SSL termination they could get what they wanted without the keys.