all we need are browsers to support it
So why isn't it already? Does it need public support? If so, is there a coordinated way we can encourage the vendors to acknowledge it?
My experience thus far is that most browser vendors only have one or two people working in this area of their code base, and those people are so overwhelmed that they spend most of their time just treading water. SSL cipher suite problems seem to be absorbing most of their time lately.
Google has a larger set of really good engineers working in this area, so for the most part they seem to take the lead. Right now, my impression is that they're pretty all-in on Certificate Transparency. The major roadblock with CT is that it requires all CAs to willingly participate. If that's even possible, my sense is that it's a long road, so I would love to see Chrome incorporate TACK in the mean time (and Trevor has even written the patch) while they try to drive CA adoption.
But ultimately, how they decide to spend their time is up to them.
EDIT: Nevermind, I think I understand why it wouldn't work: independently verifying customers is hard, so they would either have to trust each other or spend a nontrivial amount of money verifying each customer. If they trusted each other, the additional security would be worthless, since the host country of the principal CA could just order them to lie. If they each verified the customer independently, they would each incur the usual amount of fixed cost, so they couldn't offer much of a discount.
The UX for certificate trust on the Internet is dreadful and essentially hasn't evolved since the late 1990s. It is badly due for an overhaul. But we can get TACK working today; UX changes could take years.
This makes it sound easy: after all, there aren't many browsers, but really the problem is that everything that talks SSL needs to support it. Browsers are the starting point, after that I guess the OS-level libraries, then everything else.
Good for you for doing the work, though. You rock.
A great add-on for Firefox that helps you to detect any possible MITM is Certificate Patrol (https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/certificate-p...), it may be a bit annoying for some people though.
X.509 is broken, it only protects you against casual script kiddies on Starbucks. I know about people who deleted the CA directory from their systems, in my case I prefer to use Certificate Patrol (both in Firefox and Thunderbird) or use self-signed certs and then pgp sign the fingerprint.
How does the latter work? Is that possible with Firefox?
The problem with PKI is that there's no collision detection. e.g. Under the same PKI same CN should only have exactly one cert.
If you haven't heard about it, it basically requires that a certificate be observed in a central database for the browser to accept it. The server provides a proof (signature) of it being in the database when it passes the cert to the client so no extra connections are required.
This makes it immediately known when another cert is issued for a site.
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/certificate-transparen...
(Symantec is VeriSign)
The efficacy of CT will largely hinge on whether Google can get CAs to participate. Even if they can, it'll be a long road (it already has been), and TACK is immediately deployable in the short term.
"Google is currently operating a Certificate Transparency log, and we are filling the log with certificates that we retrieve while crawling the web. We are also actively working on monitoring and auditing software."
Also, a client can submit their cert to the log regardless of CA support. The only thing CA support is needed for is automated submissions.
This type of "pinning" is the only technique that we know of which has actually detected a CA-assisted MITM attack in the wild (a few times now). So it works really well, but only if you're running Chrome, and only if you're connecting to Google (or the few other pinned sites hardcoded in Chrome).
It doesn't scale well because not every website can (or is willing to) hardcode their CA information in browser binaries, the pinned information has to expire at some point (otherwise you can never change your CA), sites are still vulnerable to their own CAs, and it only works in browsers which are willing to maintain this hardcoded list of pins in their client binaries.
Trevor Perrin and I developed a dynamic certificate pinning solution called TACK (http://tack.io) that is designed to address all of those issues. It's a fully specified TLS extension; all we need are browsers to support it.
If you're interested in whats been going on with the CA system, "SSL And The Future Of Authenticity" is a Defcon talk where I discuss some of the problems with CAs, and even interview the original SSL protocol author about them: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8N4sb-SEpcg