Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by moxie on Sunday December 08, 2013 @01:29PM
(#6870652)
CT requires all CAs to willingly participate. They are, obviously, less than willing:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/certificate-transparen...
(Symantec is VeriSign)
The efficacy of CT will largely hinge on whether Google can get CAs to participate. Even if they can, it'll be a long road (it already has been), and TACK is immediately deployable in the short term.
Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by skybrian on Sunday December 08, 2013 @03:21PM
(#6871208)
Is it necessary to get every cert? Getting the CAs to participate would be the best way, but it seems there are workarounds that will result in a large number of certs to be listed, though not all of them:
"Google is currently operating a Certificate Transparency log, and we are filling the log with certificates that we retrieve while crawling the web. We are also actively working on monitoring and auditing software."
Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by rmoriz on Sunday December 08, 2013 @03:17PM
(#6871190)
Something like pinning for S/MIME would be great, too…
Re:Further improving digital certificate security
by ars_technician on Sunday December 08, 2013 @03:56PM
(#6871367)
It doesn't require all of them. They just need enough to reach a critical mass at which point they can start rejecting.
Also, a client can submit their cert to the log regardless of CA support. The only thing CA support is needed for is automated submissions.
If you haven't heard about it, it basically requires that a certificate be observed in a central database for the browser to accept it. The server provides a proof (signature) of it being in the database when it passes the cert to the client so no extra connections are required.
This makes it immediately known when another cert is issued for a site.