1. If the prosecutor can prove that incriminating evidence is encrypted, you can be compelled.
2. If you ever divulged your passphrase to the government or provided the plaintext, you can be compelled.
3. If you have not divulged the passphrase and the government has no proof that incriminating evidence is encrypted, you cannot be compelled.
If I remember correctly, the prosecutor cannot both compel you to give up a passphrase and use your knowledge of the passphrase as evidence against you (e.g. to prove that you controlled the computer in question).
Yep:
Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit[1]
* Instant passcode recovery for all iOS versions up to iOS 3
* Simple 4-digit iOS 4/5/6 passcodes recovered in 10-40 minutes
I think you missed the fairly huge disclaimer hidden away at the bottom of the page:
> iPhone 4S, iPhone 5, iPad 2+, iPad Mini and iPod Touch 5th gen support is limited to jailbroken devices only (iOS 5 and 6).
The chances of a target device being jailbroken are not particularly large. This should, of course, serve as a reminder that if you are running a jailbroken device you should probably have a passcode a little more complex than four digits!
[1] http://www.appleexaminer.com/iPhoneiPad/iOSAnalysisTools/iOS...
EDIT: This device was found on the AppleExaminer page:
http://www.cellebrite.com/forensic-solutions/ios-forensics.h...
"Using UFED Physical Analyzer, physical and file system extractions, decoding and analysis can be performed on locked iOS devices with a simple or complex passcode. Simple passcodes will be recovered during the physical extraction process and enable access to emails and keychain passwords. If a complex password is set on the device, physical extraction can be performed without access to emails and keychain. However, if the complex password is known, emails and keychain passwords will be available."
My son has verified this personally...
The offline attack you need a password suitable for protecting against police GPU cloud running john the ripper. Android you can set this up (2 different passwords), but should then make a script that deletes adb and su, add it to rc.local and reboot. Also helps to sabotage the recovery partition so it deletes user data should anybody try to flash something to system image
There's also mobiflauge, which is experimental deniable encryption and has 2 passwords, one to open a decoy install and one for your secret files full of stolen government intel you took pictures of to fool casual searches, and not ripped apart JTAG forensics.
True, but iOS does have an option to wipe the phone after 10 unsuccessful PIN attempts. Given that iCloud backup is pretty simple to setup, there's no reason not to configure this option, IMO.
You really need to use iTunes and an app like PhoneView for backing up all your data locally and storing that data in encrypted form outside the jurisdiction of your country.
http://images.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_Oc...
The phone is covered with them, just copy one and use it.
However, with a fingerprint ID, you can now use a cryptographically strong password to encrypt your phone (which you have to enter on device boot or after 48 hours of the device being idle [1]), while still having the convenience of actually being able to use your phone once it's on via the fingerprint scanner. So I see that as a security win.
Of course, Wired's premise isn't even valid in some countries, e.g. the UK, which have powers to legally compel you to hand over your passwords regardless. For all I know this is true in the US too.
[1] http://9to5mac.com/2013/09/11/apples-details-fingerprint-sen...