Isn't this the attack that reduced the strength of their PBKDF2 scheme by one (1) bit? Because they were unnecessarily calling PBKDF2 twice, where a normal system would have called it once and expanded the resulting key, resulting in exactly the same speed characteristics?

Your snark would sting more if you knew what you were talking about.

The reason nobody's hair lit on fire over this is that it's a stupid issue.

The speedup was apparently 4x, so rather 2 bit, or as the layman would say, only 1/4th the work. But thats not the point. If you can't trust them to deploy a fix to a stupid issue in half a year, why would you trust them to do it in a day should a serious issue arise?

But I agree, its a stupid issue. Snowden tells us endpoint security is the problem. So maybe the Windows 1Password client should stop

1) checking for updates over HTTP (no s here!)

   Bonus: you can specify the update URL in the response
   Bonus: you can specify parts of the dialogue shown to the user

2) download the update over HTTP

3) execute it with elevated rights without verifying it

This was maybe fixed in the last build from 2013-08-07:

    Improved security of automatic updates (using https:// when checking for a new version). Reported by David Thiel, iSEC Partners.

Since they use a CDN to distribute updates, these might still be downloaded over HTTP and still not be verified prior to running.

-- Update --

You got to be kidding me. So I upgraded my fake update server with a self-signed certificate (with a wrong CN, no less) and of course, the 1Password client happily accepts it.

Theres some good news, though. They now verify that the downloaded binary is signed (with their own key)!

But since I can control the update server that tells the client what to download, I can just supply the client with an old 1Password build that is still signed but does not implement the strong(isher) scheme in build #333. The installer doesn't complain and what user keeps track of build numbers anyway.

[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password.

The PBKDF2 speed up was 2x, not 4x. Jens was simply wrong about that. The "disputed" speed up comes from an PBKDF2 optimization that is available to the defender as it is to the attacker. 1Password makes use of that optimization. So it gives no advantage to the attacker. It is not a speed up when the defender makes use (as we do) of the same trick.

What versions of 1Password for Windows are you using? The check for updates is over HTTPS. The download is still from a CDN, but the binary is signed (by us). You can examine the trust chain to decide whether it satisfies your requirements.

However, until not so long ago (a few months, I think) you were correct that the 1Password for Windows updater was vulnerable to "evilgrade" attacks.

As stated, the check for updates is finally over HTTPS in the very latest build (333), but you do not verify the certificate in any way. So its essentially HTTP with obfuscation. This allows a malicious network to downgrade clients to build 332, where the check for updates is over plain HTTP and downloaded binaries are not verified.

Can you write a blog post about this? Need to get this information out there. Good job finding this.

I was wrong. The updater in 1Password for Windows 1.0.9.333 is vulnerable to an evilgrade attack. It fails to verify the the trust of the certificate on the (alleged) upgrade server and will accept any old self-signed certificated.

I would like to thank whoever sent us a Proof of Concept, and I would like to apologize for actually needing the PoC before sufficiently testing my own claims.

In 2011 they went from 1k to 10k iterations, too. This got done in advance of any known problems, and was a free upgrade.

Also, there were some design issues with their mobile app about 2-3 years ago (essentially, security could fall down to a 4-digit passcode in some cases), but they again fixed that by making the passphrase again the key to security.

In general I've found them nothing but responsive and competent on security issues (as well as better designers and general software engineers than any security company).

More accurately, they did call PBKDF2 once, but PBKDF2 internally calls itself twice if you request a key larger than the hash output size. It "expands" the key by generating two and concatenating. It's a stupid bug, but it's a bug in the spec.

Just to be clear: it's fine to take the output of PBKDF2 and expand it with SHA2. They didn't do that, but that would have been a totally normal design with the same "problematic" performance characteristics.

I'd just as soon pick sha2 as my pbkdf2 hash instead of bolting it on after the fact. That said, I'm not sure what's problematic. Expanding the key with sha2 results in the attacker needing to perform exactly as much work as you. There's no shortcut and no "problem".

[Disclosure: I work for AgileBits, the makers of 1Password]

The PBKDF2 speedup that hashcat achieved really was just 1 bit. This is because the other optimization is used by 1Password as well as by hashcat.

The particular flaw in PBKDF2 that hashcat was able to so brilliantly exploit not only gave it the 2x advantage, but also was connected to a clever AES speed up. (Only decrypting the last CBC block, with the penultimate block as the IV.

I presented a talk about this at PasswordsCon, the slides (PDF) discussing all of this.

Slides (PDF) : http://tooagile.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2...

Video: http://youtu.be/oqFwQIOucwo

The 1Password 4 Cloud Keychain Format has been available in 1Password for iOS since December 2012, and it has been working well in the 1Password 4 Beta for Mac. But rolling it out everywhere will take time. Transitioning between formats in a world where data is synchronized between systems takes time. It will continue to take time.

> To this day, they have not managed to rollout the new 1Password 4 Cloud Keychain that is supposed to fix these flaws.

The Cloud Keychain format is currently used in 1Password 4 for iOS.

1Password 4 for Mac is also in public beta and will probably be released around the same time as OS X Mavericks.

Of coures useless to those using 1Password with Windows and Android.

What comes first, security for users, or marketing a new release?

If this new format is more secure and ready to roll out, why delay?

What if Mavericks doesn't get released in October but gets pushed back to sometime next year?

Any good cross multi-device alternatives?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KeePass https://www.keepassx.org/ http://keepass.info/

I used KeePassX in the past but switched to 1Password since there was no browser support to speak of. Has that changed?

If you run KeePass (not X), e.g. via Mono on Linux or natively on Windows, you can use the KeeFox Firefox plugin. I believe there are Chrome extensions as well.

I didn't find a better linux-native browser-integrating non-cloud alternative yet :(

One is open source, the other isn't.

What is more important - security or convenience?

Security without convenience is mostly useless IMHO.

Personally, I am a Last Pass user. It is well included in most browsers out there and you have access to it on your mobile if you subscribe to the premium offer (12 dollars per year).

AFAIK LastPass is an online password manager, i.e., you do not only trust a software vendor like AgileBits for 1Password, but you trust your actual passwords to an online provider. Is that wise given that LastPass could get hacked or asked by authorities to provide your passwords – if there's not already an existing legal access channel?

As said elsewhere, passwords stored in LastPass are encrypted locally. They do not store your password so they officially don't have a way to decrypt your passwords. I agree that it's a matter of trust as your passwords are still stored on their servers.

Preferably with my own server (owncloud?) as a central keychain?

There's https://yithlibrary.herokuapp.com/ for a self hosted LastPass clone but unfortunately there's no Firefox or Chrome addons yet.

Yeah that'd be great. I have a dirty solution of syncing my latest keychain backup with owncloud but that's merely for backup