While ritual suicide might make the victims of an accident feel better, they are ultimately unproductive - there are many classes of disastrous errors that have nothing to do with negligence.
Not to mention also, even in incidents with a preventable cause, it is exceedingly rare for there to be a singular cause. Chernobyl, for example, was the culmination of a vast number of errors and safety lapses. Should the entire plant workforce kill themselves?
Things like nuclear meltdowns are black swan events, with a multitude of causes and guilt. What you're basically suggesting is that, in the case of such a black swan event, we will kill off a large proportion of the only people who can prevent it from happening again.
This is about human psychology, rather than reliability in the engineering sense. I truly believe it would lead to better safety, but not perfect safety.
The idea is that yes, all or most of the engineers involved in a nuclear accident of any significance would kill themselves. Not only would their knowledge be lost, their fellow nuclear engineers would carve their names on a black stone, bury it in the earth beneath their corrupted stain, and never mention them again. Their families would be rewarded only if they showed honor by staying to fight the nuclear corruption, and dying honorably when the disaster is contained.
This won't work perfectly, but it would let society as a whole live with the contradiction inherent in nuclear power: it sustains us, while running the risk of turning our children's children into walking bags of cancerous mutation.
This is also pure thought experiment: what would it take to have a culture of safety as serious as the threat of nuclear disaster? I'm not willing to pay this price, and yet, I'm thoroughly familiar with the mass balance equations governing extractable energy and haven't a clue how to post-carbon without at least some nuclear.
But here's the thing: we have already had two "nuclear accidents of any significance": Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Neither of those came even remotely close to "turning our children's children into walking bags of cancerous mutation". Nor will Fukushima. Yes, it's very bad for people near the plant, and for fishermen in the surrounding waters. But on a global scale, it's just not that big.
what would it take to have a culture of safety as serious as the threat of nuclear disaster?
Wrong question; the answer to it ask you ask it is that we already have a culture of safety at least that serious, with regard to nuclear power, because we treat nuclear power far more strictly than we treat other sources of power (like coal) that pose greater overall risk to humans. If we're going to effectively ban nuclear reactors because we're worried about radiation, we should also ban coal because we're worried about deaths from mining. And we should ban oil because of the risk of something like the Deepwater Horizon spill.
There isn't a simple solution to any of this; but a good start would be to be open and realistic about all the risks of all power sources.
Oh, I should have added: this claim isn't really true either. The WHO estimates that a million people die each year due to air pollution from coal plants. This is many orders of magnitude higher than the annual average deaths related to nuclear energy.
The difference is, there isn't a worldwide push to ban coal because of this; instead, there's a push to scrub the plant emissions to remove the pollution. So again, nuclear is treated much more strictly than other power sources, relative to its actual risk.
I don't believe so. Toxicity and Emissions of a coal-fire power plant does severely affect those in the neighborhood. Studies show that radiation dose is comparable. As and Se are found to have higher concentrations in soil samples.
So killing or having adverse health effects on far more people is OK, as long as the effects are diffuse? I'm not following the logic here. The number of people affected by Fukushima, even on the worst-case estimates, is less than the number of people affected in a year by the various aspects of coal plants that posters here have mentioned.
And I'm saying that this local perspective (which I understand might not be yours, you might just be trying to articulate the perspective of the NIMBY folks) is flawed, because it doesn't treat equal impacts on self-interest equally. It protests against nuclear plants, while not protesting at all against coal plants that have a greater impact on the same person's self-interest, simply because the impact of the coal plant is "diffuse": it pollutes their lungs over time, all the time, instead of bringing some probability of being in a Fukushima zone, but the total impact on expected years of life (or expected quality of life) for that person is still greater for the coal plant.
I understand that this perspective is common, but that doesn't make it right.
Furthermore, the risks of emphysema and cancer due to coal pollution are underrated. Coal causes much more deaths among people who don't live in coal plants than we like to pretend. (Conversely, nuclear is safer on the balance.)
No, it doesn't. It's a difference between risks taken willingly by the people who benefit from the outcome, and risks imposed on people who don't have a choice and don't stand to benefit. And it's obvious that it was meant that way. Don't be deliberately obtuse.
Huh? People do have a choice to move if they don't want to live near a power plant. And the plant is making the electricity they use, so they do benefit from it.
(That said, plenty of nuclear plants have been killed because the people who would have lived near the plant protested.)
No, the poorer you are the less attractive choices you have. But you still have the ability to weigh your choices and pick the one that poses you the least risk, all things considered.
The largest part of that mercury comes from coal-burning power plants. Coal power has contaminated the entire planet to the point where any food from the ocean has to be limited for vulnerable people.
There is no way you can possibly say that coal doesn't impose risks on people who don't have a choice and don't stand to benefit.
Coal is far more dangerous than nuclear by nearly every measure. The only reason it's more generally accepted is because that danger is spread out over a much wider area. Global coal power is analogous to a constant, ongoing Chernobyl, except instead of covering a small chunk of Europe, the same effects are diluted over the entire planet.
We all pay a measurable and fairly significant price for coal power generation in terms of shortened lives and increased chances of various disease. Nuclear power has not contaminated the planet to even remotely the same degree.
I personally think nuclear power can be made relatively safe, and that fears about accidents are exaggerated. I welcome disagreement there, but it's not possible to make a charitable comparison with coal in any way. The disparity in opinions and dangers between nuclear and coal is very real.
The problem is that you have no idea how Process Safety works, or even what it is, judging by your posts. As the parent to this post explained, these major hazard events are probabilistic, not deterministic. That means that they can never be completely eliminated, only guarded against and reduced to the point that the benefit is understood to outweigh the risk. There will always be risk.
You suggest that the engineers responsible for designing the plant should commit suicide if this once in a million year event takes place. What about the businessmen who accepted the risk? Or the government who stipulated what the tolerable risk was? Or the people who moved nearby, aware of the risk? Or the workers on the plant who, knowing what the correct maintenance procedures were to keep the plant safely operational, ignored them because it was 'too hard'? What if the root cause was a vector of risk which was poorly understood by everyone at the time? Or the engineering specification was correct, but the materials vendor skimped on QA? Or were lied to by one of their plants? Or a subcontractor of the plant? Etc etc etc.
What you propose, even as a thought experiment, is futile. Because even if you could reduce the risk to only systematic errors made in engineering design, if there was a perceived need or benefit to design the plant, you could always find a group of engineers desperate enough, naive enough, or vain enough to take on the risk. And therefore society as a whole would not be safer.
As it happens there's a large body of engineering knowledge which goes into making dangerous plants 'safe enough' to outweigh the risks to their workers, owners, and society at large. It's not foolproof, but arguably it does a good job of allowing societies to benefit from the dangerous processes we seem so desperate to use. And don't kid yourself - just because these massive events incur a media feeding frenzy, doesn't mean smaller hazardous occurrences don't affect the lives of thousands of people every year. Should we kill everyone who could in some way be held accountable for another's death or injury?
In short, don't let fear guide you into silly knee-jerk reactions. There are massive problems inherent with dangerous processes, and most of them relate to the very human failures of laziness and greed. We're working to improve the situation constantly, but it's a long road and a constant battle.
I'm not advocating ritual suicide, but I think it's worth noting that in the case of Fukushima, there is an easily identifiable single root cause to all the current problems: the fact that the backup diesel generators and the switchgear for them were sited behind a seawall that was overcome by the tsunami. If they had been on higher ground, none of this would have happened; there would have been a continuous supply of cooling water to the reactor cores and things would have shut down normally. The process that led to that siting of the backup generators should be fairly easily traceable, as compared to the design process for the entire reactor complex.
Sure, but who's responsible for that? I don't mean to say that there must be many technical causes of incidents, but rather that it is almost impossible to find a situation where there is a singular human cause.
The multitude of engineers that saw the plans before they went final? The managers who pushed for the generators to be placed there in the first place? The contractors who built it knowing full well that the design was garbage? How high up does it go, and how many degrees removed from the situation do we require before you're absolved of guilt?
We could do something silly to consolidate the guilt, like, "the last person to stamp the designs gets the blame", but that seems like it would encourage a culture of hot-potatoing instead, especially if the stakes are your own life ;)
To put a more extreme example of it: a bus driver falls asleep at the wheel, jumps a curb, and kills a person. Do we punish the driver for his negligence, or his shift supervisor for threatening him into taking an extra-long shift, or someone even further up who knowingly encouraged a culture of overwork?
But if you can focus in on a single technical decision that had such a large impact, you can at least focus attention on how that particular technical decision got made. Yes, many humans will have been involved even in that single technical decision; but it's still a lot more manageable to look into how it got made than to look at how the entire plant got designed.
We could do something silly to consolidate the guilt
I'm not talking about guilt; I said I wasn't advocating ritual suicide. I'm talking about how to prevent it from happening again. To do that, you need to be able to focus on something that can actually be changed. Take your bus driver example:
Do we punish the driver for his negligence, or his shift supervisor for threatening him into taking an extra-long shift, or someone even further up who knowingly encouraged a culture of overwork?
Depends on the facts. Was the driver negligent? Could he have reasonably predicted that he would fall asleep at the wheel? How could he have acted on such a prediction?
Did the supervisor actually threaten him into taking an extra-long shift? If so, how did he get away with it? Aren't there rules about preventing driver fatigue? (Certainly commercial airline crews have strict rules about how long they can fly before they have to rest.) If not, why not?
Is there a systemic culture of overwork, encouraged from higher up? Do bus drivers in this company routinely drive longer hours than the industry average? Than the average in other similar occupations?
The point is that if you can focus in on specific causal chains, you can direct efforts at changing them. In the case of Fukushima, if you can focus in on how the technical decision to site the backup generators that way got made, you can direct efforts at improving that process. Did the engineers just not realize that siting the backup generators that way was a bad idea? Was the question never even asked? Or did the engineers realize it, but management overruled them? Or did the original design have them sited differently, but time pressure during construction persuaded someone (not the engineers or managers who did the original design) to change the location in order to meet some deadline?
All this, btw, reinforces your point that ritual suicide doesn't help anything.
Such things sometimes can't be predicted. If you fall asleep because of exhaustion, you don't necessarily see it coming (it happened to me several years back, one minute I was fine and the next I blacked out). You cannot criminally persecute a person for falling asleep. Only if he did something against the law, like also being under the influence of alcohol.
> Did the supervisor actually threaten him into taking an extra-long shift?
You know very well that supervisors rarely have to threaten their subordinates in low-end jobs. I have a personal acquaintance who's a truck driver. And he was explaining to me how when the new management came in, they first did some lay-offs based on silly reasons and after that nobody dared arguing.
Also do some reading on Japanese culture. Subordinates rarely question their bosses (or change jobs for that matter). It happens in many cultures. If you're from the US, then what's natural to you may not apply in other countries or cultures.
I'm not saying that blame cannot be assigned (it can clearly be, especially in the case of broken engineering designs), but seeing people here suggesting "ritual suicide"? OMG.
But why would you even take that risk? Not to mention that tsunamis can easily reach 100 feet in wave height; I'm not sure you could build a seawall that could keep one out.
Besides, it was pretty clear to me reading the sequence of events at Fukushima that there was entirely too little thought given to backup decoupling - there was too much of a zipper effect of one failure leading to another.
I'm not a lay person on this - I worked for 3 years on airliner designs, and much of that is finding ways to deal with failure cases. The nuke industry could learn a lot by consulting with airframe engineers.
Yes, that would work, as long as you also protected the switchgear and the power cabling leading to the pumps that serve the reactor.
The nuke industry could learn a lot by consulting with airframe engineers.
I think the nuke industry in general does pay attention to these things; I was actually somewhat surprised to find that the designers of Fukushima had missed such an obvious failure mode.
1. hydrogen being vented into an enclosed area
2. no backup method for determining coolant levels
3. backup generators were not protected
4. no backup method for adding coolant (I would have had a gravity fed backup system)
5. critical systems were located too close to the reactor - I would have moved them further away so they could be repaired without the workers being irradiated
None of these are expensive to do.
3. Backup generators were located in different areas. The only mistake is that they were ALL at ground level. That's unfortunate that they were all wiped out at the same time but one of the largest Tsunami ever, some stuff that almost never happens. They'll learn from that.
> None of these are expensive to do.
Yeah, when you are building the plant, it's not expensive to do. When you have to modify an existing design, it's way more expensive and you'll have to make a good case for why you need it.
The key idea is nobody has managed to design parts that won't fail. But they have figured out how to design highly reliable systems out of parts that fail.
Current designs use lots of redundant safety systems. New designs depend more on simple physics...eg., fuel that expands enough when it heats to damp down the reaction, or large quantities of coolant with very high thermal capacity and conductivity. At Argonne's IFR project, they shut down coolant circulation and electric power, and the reactor quietly shut down with no damage.
The ultimate solution is probably the molten salt reactor. With liquid fuel you continually remove fission products, and with most of those gone you don't have decay heat issues anymore.
What I would like to see is mandatory escrow of a large percentage of profits from highly-profitable, possibly-disaster-prone industries. If you go disaster-free for 20 years you get your escrowed money with interest. If not, you lose (an appropriate amount of) it.
Simply having it around as a cultural trope ain't gonna do it. I'm talking about a voluntary pledge that assumes the force of law.
Turn it around: if an engineer thinks he can build a perfectly safe nuclear plant, why shouldn't he pledge his life? Similarly, if an engineer thinks she can't build a perfectly safe nuclear plant, that there is a significant risk she'll have to kill herself and leave her children motherless, would she agree to build it?
Regardless, reading up on the Code of Hammurabi is interesting :)
Fact is, seppuku is a part of relatively recent Japanese culture whereas it's not a part of European culture. In Europe suicide has been socially unacceptable since the fall of the Roman Empire.
So in a sense, this idea (while not nearly as extreme as yours) actually exists today. Architects and Engineers regularly take risks when they attempt to create something new. When it doesn't work, they are usually held accountable:
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/11/06/mit_sue...
2) nuclear is so expensive to clean up that they run for decades after the initial design, presumably many of the initial designers are dead, and every incremental change should involve a suicide pact?
Remuneration for such an undertaking would have to go up by a large multiple to make such work attractive.
This is the point. The cost of operating the plant would have to take into account what are currently deemed externalities. If that turned out to make the plant too expensive to run, that's the market.
2. What do you consider "perfect"? A lot of things aren't engineered to be perfect, because that's expensive. Instead, a lot of questions -- like with sea walls -- resolve around things like "ten year storms", "hundred year winds", "thousand year earthquakes". It's very possible that the flaw in this design was considered, but it was concluded that it would take a once-every-thousand-years disaster to breach the sea wall and cause a problem. Everyone involved may have agreed that a 1% chance of failure of the lifetime of the plant was acceptable.
Everything is a cost-benefit analysis. At some point, risks are declared "small enough" and everyone agrees to move forward. In this case, a regulatory agency in Japan -- representing the interests of the government and people -- could very easily have signed off on the risk posed by the positioning of the generators.
And more importantly, just because a small risk ends up being realized doesn't mean we were wrong to take it in the first place. Negligence can cause accidents, and negligence can exacerbate accidents, but also sometimes shit happens. Wasting time, money, and people trying to shrink a one-in-a-million risk just because it happened once is stupid, and we do it all the time.
Third, an obligatory "do you even know how bad coal is?" A hundred thousand miners in the US died mining coal in the last century. 6000 died in China in 2004. "Oh no," you say, "nuclear is extra bad because it poisons places for hundreds or thousands of years!" Underground coal fires: a seam of coal exposed through mining can catch fire and burn underground forever. We have no way to put them out. The most famous of these is in Pennsylvania, where a town had to be abandoned because the coal mine underneath it was burning and releasing noxious gasses up to the surface, along with the occasional flaming sinkhole. The fire is expected to keep burning for hundreds of years. There are dozens or hundreds of fires like in the US, and dozens or hundreds more in China.
I wouldn't want to go swimming in that water released from Fukushima, and by all accounts radiation poisoning is a terrible way to day. But so is being crushed to death in a mine collapse, or slowly starving to death underground in the dark, or dying of the various cancers and ailments related to the carcinogens coal plants routinely belch out. Everything we do has risks, from driving to taking a shower to building power plants.
You are presenting a false dichotomy: the choice is not between a world with nuclear disasters and a world with no disasters. It is a choice between nuclear disasters and non-nuclear disasters. We should seek to minimize the chance of nuclear disasters, yes, but we shouldn't treat them as "special" just because they're "scary". We should weigh the risk of a nuclear plant against the risk of non-nuclear plants, fairly, and make the decision that saves the most lives.
It was not as you describe; the original design was absolutely not correct. The original design was additionally so difficult to implement in reality that one of the manufacturers of the structural parts proposed a design change - one that made the flaws of the original twice as bad - that architects approved without any actual review.
I've been there several times, since it's a popular spot for conferences - looking up at the doors to nowhere in the lobby atrium is haunting.
I'm probably willing to let my claim stand without anecdote (deviations from design occur outside the engineer's control), but honestly it's the weaker point, so let it drop. The more important one is that engineers design within a set of constraints, and if these parameters are exceeded, it is not the fault of the engineer.
This is the problem. The solution proposed is that they have a bit more skin in the game.
The roof of my house has a certain maximum load it is designed to carry. This load is mostly based on expected snowfall. Conceivably, in a year with exceptional snow fall the maximum load could be exceeded and the roof could collapse, killing my family and myself. However, I -- both through my representative government which makes the rules on minimum maximums and also through my decision to live in such a home -- have decided the risk is acceptable.
If the architect has not misrepresented the maximum load of my roof, why should he be held responsible if it collapses in unexpectedly extreme weather and kills me? If he should not be punished, why is nuclear special?
Example: Technician with respirator samples gas levels in giant "empty" natural gas tank, gives OK to welder and steps out of the tank. Welder grabs technician by the arm, escorts him back into the tank and invites him to hang out for a few minutes while he fires up his torch. Technician waves his probe around a few extra times, double checks the display, and crosses his fingers.
I'm sure there's plenty of this sort of thing going on in industry today. Still, probably better not to formalize it.
In the various projects I've worked on, I've seen that happen first hand. What works better for the quality of the product is to have a collaborative, open process about finding bugs, fixing them, and rewarding people for having a quality result.
So what if it's not your fault? I'm not entirely sure this is a good idea, but it might increase safety just a little. A tiny probability that a lot of people won't die is a net benefit.
And if an incident did happen, a few extra innocent people dying is barely anything to worry about. Especially if it helps at preventing it from happening at all.
I don't think it will ever happen, but I think it's a good idea.
My observation is that the biggest obstacle to things going into desired direction of aligned incentives is hierarchical management system. You can't expect workers (engineers in nuclear example) to take all responsibility or even feel responsibility when they rarely have a say in budgeting, safety policy or overall strategy of corporation they work for. If the system was more democratic so to speak then I can see it happening but currently most endeavors are interested in "minimal pay, no say" policy when it comes to hiring.
Did you ever work on a project where you said to your boss, "We need to do X or this won't work," and your boss said, "X is too [expensive | time consuming | difficult], we won't do that."
Or a project where your boss hired a bunch of incompetents at the last minute because the project was running late, and the new hires made endless mistakes that you then had to fix?
Do you want to seppuku because your nuclear plant blew up because your boss was an idiot and wouldn't listen to the engineers?
And don't suggest that the engineers become whistleblowers. We all know how that turns out.
What about getting that level of commitment from the owners? And if that's not practical, why not remove the profit incentive?
Maybe activities with as massive negative externalities as running nuclear plants should be run as non-profit organizations. Possibly as research institutions, with a strong anchoring in the surrounding local community.
Your idea is the latest in a long list of stupid, short-sighted, and ignorant semi-articulated fears.
So, we shouldnt build driverless cars unless some engineer is ready to kill himself over it? Seriously, stop the drugs.
Our world is not even vaguely ready for any of this.
I'm perfectly serious, in that it's within the human experience and it would work. I also suspect our world society can't wrap its head around that kind of medieval pact, and I'm not even sure I want to live in that world.
Still, knowing you have to hang yourself if the plant goes critical is pretty good motivation to do things right and not cut corners.
EDIT: well, this is getting misunderstood. My point here is: would you accept a lesser guarantee of safety? If you really believe that nuclear power can be made safe, these hypothetical engineers aren't at risk.
Let's say I took a pledge to kill myself if a meteor ever knocks the flame off the Statue of Liberty. Would any of you worry about me? No?
Maybe we shouldn't build nuke plants at the moment, then.