edit: I found this on the issue: http://www.zdnet.com/the-real-story-in-the-nsa-scandal-is-th...
I think it is completely feasible that the NSA would or does collect all or a great deal of voice traffic, because that's a tiny piece of network traffic these days.
I don't remember him using that particular phrase at all at least in his initial video - I remember him talking about the ease with which they could access data using a 'selector' like an email address, not making claims about specific connections to servers or anything similar. He's not responsible for what journalists say, and we can't expect them to clearly restate it all the time, but what we do know about the extent of surveillance is disturbing. It's still unclear exactly what is recorded, when and how and I'm sure we'd all love to know more, but in the meantime it's not very useful to try to discredit his claims based on the interpretations of others.
https://eslkevin.wordpress.com/2013/06/10/edward-snowden-int...
My beef with the phrase though is that Greenwald keeps repeating it and sticks by the story that the NSA slides said it so it must mean something, without bothering to ask his supposedly very knowledgable source to expand further on the topic.
Going from "NSA has direct access to servers of major internet companies" to "Some NSA analysts' database accesses inadequately audited, according to random sysadmin" is a textbook walk-back. Of course you will never see the latter headline on Greenwald's blog.
It is my experience that systems auditors rely heavily on sysadmins to do their jobs. At a minimum the auditors are "just" another set of users and the sysadmins' responsibilities include supporting the auditors even more closely than they support regular users of classified systems. Frequently the auditors themselves do not have systems-level knowledge of the computers they are auditing.
Security on every classified system that I've seen was generally limited to a series of a checklists that some talented specialists once put down in a manual and are left to low-skilled employees to check off each day/week/month - if it isn't specifically on the checklist they have little to no knowledge of it. That includes glaring procedural holes. Essentially security is all CYA, so that everybody involved can say they followed the rules and not lose their job if something goes wrong.
For example, checking out your neighbor, girlfriend or a public person's records for curiosity is probably a big red flag.
"...Not only that, when NSA makes a technical mistake during an exploitation operation, critical systems crash. ..."
Well, if they have no access to the actual company servers, how could you then reconcile the above statement?
Also, by the way, 5% auditing is an very high rate. With a 5% audit rate, you'll catch evil-doers in no time at all.