As a result of this “expanding array of theater airborne and other sensor networks,” as a 2007 Department of Defense report puts it, the Pentagon is attempting to expand its worldwide communications network, known as the Global Information Grid, to handle yottabytes (1024 bytes) of data. (A yottabyte is a septillion bytes—so large that no one has yet coined a term for the next higher magnitude.)
It needs that capacity because, according to a recent report by Cisco, global Internet traffic will quadruple from 2010 to 2015, reaching 966 exabytes per year. (A million exabytes equal a yottabyte.
All da bytes.
If you assume:
Every person on the planet owns 10 computers.
There are 7 billion people on the planet.
Each of these computers can test 1 billion key combinations per second.
On average, you can crack the key after testing 50% of the possibilities.
Then the earth's population can crack one encryption key in 77,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 years!
If you want to decode AES, you either need the key or find a weakness in the algo.http://www.eetimes.com/design/embedded-internet-design/43724...
Also, I didn't say "brute force", I said "decode".
Except maaaybe the aggregate computing power of the entire PlayStation Network for a long long time. I haven't run the numbers for AES.
EDIT: Yeah, no way without an algorithmic breakthrough.
1. Differential Cryptanalysis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard#NSA.2...
A general technique, but the DES standard turned out to have been developed to be resistant to it before it was known about in public circles.
2. Impossible differential cryptanalysis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_differential_crypta...
This general technique was invented and quickly broke 31 out of 32 rounds of Skipjack.
Schneier wrote in 1998 "I can't imagine that the NSA would field an algorithm with 32 rounds when they could break 31, so I believe that the NSA did not know about this attack. And the cryptanalysts are still working on improving their attack, so it is possible that they will get to 32 rounds."
But no one yet has.
that's important because it doesn't contradict respected people at Google, or require magic crypto cracking.
i'm repeating myself here, so sorry, but there are two separate issues:
1 - nsa is getting a lot of data from the people routing traffic. likely all metadata. and perhaps some (significant) subset of unencrypted traffic.
2 - despite the misleading prism slide, they don't seem to be getting complete, direct access to the web companies' data.
the uproar about the slides put the initial emphasis on the web companies and has confused discussion since.
but the consistent story that seems to be emerging is that it's the ISPs, who have much more of a tradition of collaborating with NSA, who are providing a lot more data than people expected. and that data is being stored without legal approval, relying on the idea that "no-one looks at it" without a warrant.
at least, that's the most consistent view i can find.
what worries me most at the moment is how much hardware would be needed to store and process all that data, and whether that is feasible.