This would sound a little less popular as: "Even if your college owns the land under the Chrystler building and has entirely predictable cash flow for loan service, you should be unable to construct a new academic building which you sincerely, but perhaps unwisely, believe to be your most important priority, unless you can come up with $160 million in cold hard cash."
I'm just finding it hard to square the narrative of sophisticated Wall Street operators conning low-sophistication average Americans into making wildly leveraged bets on real estate with the facts of this case, where (presumably) highly educated New Yorkers who own a lease with NPV of several hundred million dollars are assumed to be incapable of making a judgement call like "Do we want to build out facilities to support our core operations or not."
It's not like Cooper Union is the paragon of financial prudence here, borrowing money to play the stock market.
At least BofA could repo your landlady's estate, rent it out, and have it bounce back by now.
If you own the land under the Chrysler building, someone is going to be willing to lend you money. It seems to me this is the bank functioning pretty well.
I'm not saing that this would be good regulation or if this regulation would prevent this exact case. Just giving an example.
And what unintended consequences would that have?
Maybe a better idea is for those who actually need to be risk-averse to carefully consider the full chain of risks associated with their investments, and not merely put their full faith in abstract systems - especially regulatory systems, which fail quite often.
The financial crisis wasn't the result of banks conning the public; it was the result of essentially everyone at every level buying into too-good-to-be-true presumptions about the real estate market.
Noone considers full chain of risks. Most people feel they are immortal, feel that they are forever winners as soon as they won 3 times in a row. Besides there really no risk taken by decission makers. They often don't even loose their jobs.
The only thing we can do is set up barriers to curb the risky behavior. Some risks are worth to be taken but by hedgefund not a bank.
As for the financial crisis no catastrophy can be traced to a single cause but it often turns out that not failing at single point could have averted the catastrophy.
And are the limits of "how much gambling" the bank can do with the money defined by some universal prescription or by the particular understanding established by the bank and the depositor in each case?
If the former, then we're back to universal usurpation of everyone else's risk judgments by... whom, exactly? Yet more human beings, subject to the same failures of judgment as the people who you claim are incapable of effectively assessing risk?
If the latter, where's the evidence that there ever was a breach of that understanding? Reward is proportional to risk, and those seeking high-interest investment opportunities implicitly acknowledge that with higher return comes higher risk.
> Noone considers full chain of risks.
Plenty of people do, and where sufficient information to make a confident risk judgement is unavailable, plenty of people take that into account and plan accordingly.
"Most people" do not feel they are immortal or perpetual winners; indeed, although the systemic effects of the financial crisis have impacted us all, the number of people who did not engage in irrational real-estate speculation far exceeds those who did. (The "everyone" I mentioned above refers to segments of the chain of investment, not to individuals in general).
> The only thing we can do is set up barriers to curb the risky behavior
No; there are plenty of other viable alternatives, like providing mechanisms to insulate unwilling third parties against the risk-taking activities of others. Most public policy and regulatory intervention seems to do the exact opposite, however, and seeks to shoehorn everyone in society into a single uniform pattern of interaction, which, of course, exposes us all to the new systemic risks it creates and doesn't account for, and leaves us little room for escape.
Let's regard regulation as what it is: a flawed attempt to mitigate the downside of universal social systems in order to sustain those systems, and justify corralling everyone into them in order to maximize their putative upside. The problem is that it just doesn't work: at best we're reducing small and predictable risk impacts for massive and chaotic ones, which doesn't yield an environment suited to evolutionary resilience.
As in everything else, variation is the key to stability and survival, and top-down regulation of individuals' subjective risk judgments diminishes variation. We need lots of separate baskets to put our eggs in, not one giant over-engineered basket that's ultimately no more unbreakable than the Titanic was unsinkable.
If a normal company makes a bunch of mistakes, they go bankrupt, and competition takes over.
Note, of course, that the profits booked for such loans, were temporary and delusional. The bonuses paid, however, were real, and permanent - never clawed back.
The regulation that exist right now, and that people keep trying to expand, has the end result that ties the government too tighly with banks, and bailouts and other help from government become a necessity.
No it wouldn't. People would start banks, make lots of money personally, loose tons of money for the bank, and then do it again happily.
The person who ultimately holds the bag will be far far far removed from those who caused the losses.
Banks ran wild with unregulated markets that ended up being a huge percentage of the economy. That's what got us into trouble.
The whole securitization of debt and cutting it up into tranches only get fuelled up to such an extent, because there were customers hungry for yield but barred from buying anything that didn't have some official (even useless) triple-AAA stamp on it.
I won't get into the "providing liquidity" or "it's just moving money around" arguments (feel free, though), but it's not significantly different from taking out a loan or accepting funding for a start-up. In most cases, you are accepting more financial risk than you can afford to pay in the belief that you can leverage that capital to generate a profit above the principal and interest.
While in come cases it can be very much like gambling, that also covers "games" where skill can influence the outcome. For example, slot machines in a Russian casino are probably not the best risk. However, if you're a good poker player, you can do quite well in private games.
Bottom line: I think this is not a good case why you need more regulation of banks. It may be a case why you need more regulation of universities.
Too often the approach "this didn't work out, so we need more of it".
"I find the whole idea of borrowing money for investment purposes a little strange. Isn't that basically just gambling?"
which is exactly what my comment addressed. One can debate what investment strategies colleges should use, or how much risk they should take on - probably less than these people did, I don't know and I don't really care either. The GP was throwing around populist blanket 'debt = bad' rhetoric, that's the point I was agitating against.
I think you're reading "invest" more broadly than I am, and it's not unlikely that I am misusing a technical term, but I certainly do not want to be taken as arguing that debt is intrinsically bad.
Anyway I did read your post (and I'd argue, I read that reasonably) as saying 'debt = bad'. So if you're not saying that and only meant this particular investment, then I guess we're resolved our differences.
And this, ladies and gentlemen, is why meaningful bank regulation is long overdue. The signs of the present crisis were there to see for anyone with eyes in 2005: in that year my ex-landlady, who was from Bushwick, one of the poorest parts in New York, bought five rental properties with no-money-down loans.
Let's have this again: Bank of America found nowhere better to invest than in this clueless lady that perceptibly could not run her rental empire successfully, and they loaned her the funds anyway.