It does indeed use version information, not just the browser's but also of every installed plugin including Flash. So a single rev is going to give a new fingerprint. Plus, far fewer people are checking it as when it first launched, making those who do check it from time to time even more unique.

But note that a constantly changing fingerprint doesn't make it useless for tracking - if a site can keep any kind of cookie to persist between browser updates, it could add the updated signature. Then when you purge cookies and persistent storage, a site can re-add the cookie to keep on identifying you if your signature hasn't changed.

You'd have to purge all persistant storage at the same time as an update to avoid this, and even then (or if you never had persistent data to begin with) your IP or even geographical location will likely be enough to identify you again.

The gmail + trick can be defeated, though. If you own a domain, you can use arbitrary addresses and it becomes more reliable.

I use Google Apps (possibly not a good idea but soo convenient :/) with a catchall. I didn't catch any offender so far...

However (off topic), spammers are spoofing addresses as if they were coming from my domain. I receive two to three dozens automatic replies from mail servers (this address does not exist...).

I've properly set up DKIM and SPF records, making it obvious that these mails are spoofed, but I'm afraid my domain will end up on grey/black lists... Anyone out here familiar with this kind of issue?

The + trick is becoming well known with spammers anyway. I registered with one site as "[email protected]" having never used the "[email protected]" address anywhere and within a few days I was getting spam to "[email protected]" and "[email protected]". Whoever got that list of emails was clever enough to know to try removing the + portion.

Obviously you can never give out the "[email protected]" address and then assume that everything that goes to that address must be spam, but I've had legitimate contact from companies who have had to email me by removing the + portion because their internal email system wouldn't allow addresses with a + in them.

They're getting a little wise, but that didn't stop me from receiving spam to "[email protected]" a few weeks ago.

I've been using catch all's for years. I get 100+ bounced spam emails a day from people spoofing my domains (also have DKIM + SPF). AFAIK none of my domains have ever ended up on blacklists and no one has had trouble receiving legit email from me.

Good to know, thanks.

fastmail.fm lets you set up wildcard mx records -- so if your email is [email protected], you can get email at [email protected], [email protected], etc. instead of [email protected]. I imagine other email providers do this too.

Yes, I have my own domain and have been doing this for years. It generally works as expected, and so far I've had at least four unique addresses that were leaked to spammers. One of them was the address I used for newegg.

If you do go this route, I'd recommend using a whitelisting approach. I do get a lot of spam sent to random addresses at my domain.

I've also had personal information leaked through NewEgg. For me it was my name and my parents email address when I got them to buy me a video card when I was 16. Eventually they got an email addressed to my full name and their email about car insurance rates or some random spam. I would really think NewEgg would be better than that.

Hmm, that's a useful tactic as I'm seeing + addresses becoming much less effective due to the reasons I gave above.

I think a lot of sites have caught on to the + trick, though, because more are more disallow the + character in the email validator.

More like laziness. They probably only allow something like:

  ^[a-z0-9_.]+@(?:[a-z0-9-]+\.)+\.[a-z0-9]+$

In my experience it's been ignorance rather than laziness. I suppose you could argue that the root cause of the ignorance is laziness. If someone is writing a validator, they probably ought to check what constitutes valid input.

It's not a sign of catching on, but of using an old email validation pattern from the days of Matt's Script Archive (seemingly). It's the sign of a website that has used cargo-code programmers. You're probably just seeing it more because you're trying to use plus-addressing more often (confirmation bias), but it's been this way for years and years. It's actually better now than it used to be.

I wish they wouldn't..

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Email_address#Valid_email_addr...

"Maybe every time I rev Firefox Nightly I change identity."

Unless the nightlies have a different behavior than the releases, the patch level is not reported anymore. The changes went into 16.0.2 which was released on 10/26/2012. initial report on b.m.o[1] reads as follows:

  Steps to reproduce:

  1) Load http://www.delorie.com:81/some/url.txt

  Actual results:

  The User-Agent header exposes the security patch level as either a minor version
  number or as an alpha/beta/pre indicator. This data is exposed twice: in the 
  Gecko version and in the application version.

  While it is of value to expose this data to e.g. AMO, exposing it to all sites
  makes the browser more fingerprintable (see https://panopticlick.eff.org/ ) and
  doesn't serve a purpose more important than user privacy. Point releases don't
  change functionality beyond security and stability fixes, so sites shouldn't be
  sniffing the patch level anyway.

  Making trunk, alpha and beta builds look like release builds for sniffing
  purposes reduces sniffing-related failures that waste time when treated as
  functionality-related regressions by mistake.

  Expected results:
  Expected the version numbers to show the major version of the most recent 
  Firefox beta that Mozilla has shipped and not to show the security patch level 
  or an alpha/beta/pre indicator.

  Additional information:
  Internet Explorer doesn't expose the security patch level in its UA string."

[1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=728831

Amusingly so far my privacy has been best protected by Mobile Safari on a popular iPhone model on the latest OS version:

"Within our dataset of several million visitors, only one in 857,908 browsers have the same fingerprint as yours."

As it doesn't allow for plugins, my fingerprint should (cookies aside) match that of any other <popular device> user.

So maybe the solution here is coming up with a 'secure browse' profile that every browser reports the same fake fingerprint.

Security in numbers.

> So maybe the solution here is coming up with a 'secure browse' profile that every browser reports the same fake fingerprint.

There already is: https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en

This also has the advantage that no other solution has: it completely hides your location as well, whereas even with a "standard" browser, your IP address + time zone alone can do a lot to identify you.

even the tor bundle requires some additional steps for increased privacy http://dpaste.org/hAyZG/

Many of those options are now set by default in Tor Browser.

Last time I checked they were not.

I just checked now - many are but certainly not all. There are a couple of things that probably affect practicality a lot, like referer sending.

Well, some pieces of information, it can be useful to provide to the server. But, yes, standardizing or even dropping certain fields seems like a nice first step.

You said it yourself: everytime your Firefox build is updated, you change identity.

Considering the development model used by most modern web browsers, I'm pretty certain those who do this type of fingerprinting in the real world will long ago have adjusted their matching algorithms to be aware of this. I doubt they even care if they get a fully unique fingerprint, they probably just define some percentage of matching as being "close enough to a likely match" to report you as being someone they have seen before.

Just mentioning this lest anyone get the wrong idea that setting your browser to update frequently might be a defense.

Identity matching algorithms use a fuzzy match to identify users because the only way to get an exact match is with by storing an identifier on the user's machine, or in memory for the duration of the browsing session. A lot of factors can change and it may not significantly alter the weight of the match.

One of the most effective methods of fingerprinting people is to enumerate the fonts they have installed on their machines (via flash). You don't even need the browser version number to uniquely identify most - the only solution is to disable flash.

As chrome sandboxes flash, I wonder how much hassle it would be to only allow a small subset of fonts through?

Most browsers have "run plugins on click" options, very useful in general.

> Maybe every time I rev Firefox Nightly I change identity.

Indeed; the user agent is part of the fingerprint.

Tracking in the short term is still possible though, and some would find it very useful :(