Does having TLS everywhere make this much harder?
Back in the real world, you can also passively fingerprint TLS handshakes to characterise the client device. Most of these proxy networks masquerade as "normal" clients, but if the type and variety of device fingerprints for an IP suddenly changes, that's a signal too.
Is there incentive for them to? If anything, you might be paying extra for the data use and not even know it, right? They would lose money
if someone wants to knowingly host a proxy they should. stuffing it along with other apps is shady and if LG wants to disallow those apps from their store than w/e but like we don't need governmental stuff encroaching on this stuff. if LG wants to do moderation on those apps than whatever.
there was a lot of fighting over this stuff back in the early 2010s because the alternative was effectively a balkanized corponet.
smart TVs, by virtue of being devices you can write apps for, have morphed into more general purpose computing devices and keeping it as open as it can be is important. the backsliding from stuff like Android has been horrible for the ecosystem and that shouldn't be normalized, let alone as a legal requirement geez
The support costs of malware remediation fucking suck. The moment you try to implement some kind of blocker in place like this is the moment you flood your call center(s) with thousands of ignorant consumers that have zero clue what you're trying to tell them, can't comprehend that they have "a virus problem", and are not going to calmly listen to a support rep try to suddenly train them on what the issue is and how to fix it.
(Bonus points for liability on what we direct a customer to do or not do.)
all Jimbob knows is that "comcast has blocked me from getting to my pornhub" and is very angry at the rep they have on the phone.
There's a reason we used to be told to blow people off with a 'contact your local computer shop' and it's time and money and liability.
Even if no one goes to jail, the NSA could make residential proxies much harder to operate in the US simply by detecting them and reporting them to ISPs. It would be good for ISPs to then validate the reports properly, give warnings, etc.
- Malware that can record video and audio from infected devices.
- Infrastructure for foreign covert influence campaigns.
- Botnets used in hacking and DoS attacks.
Second, everybody screamed loudly when they were cracking down on file sharing traffic. You're saying spying on the citizens is ok when it's for this little reason over here, but not this one over there. It doesn't track.
Not to mention most ISP abuse mailboxes are automated these days because they are flooded with LLM-generated reports from "security" grifters.
The tech industry flooding the market with countless IoS (Internet of Shit) devices didn't help. This has moved way beyond accidentally installing spyware on your PC. People are intentionally bugging their homes with these devices.
I understand the FCC is trying to crack down on this stuff - starting with routers - but of course that gets pushback too. You can't win.
ISPs already deal with abuse reports like this, the system just isn't being operated comptently.
Are American citizens being harmed by having huge numbers of bad actors control and abuse their internet connections? Absolutely, every day.
I want the US government to intervene in these criminal operations which are actively harming the internet and society.
Most Americans agree with this policy and don't see it as infringing on their freedom at all. Our choice is to enforce basic standards or allow our cities to become horrible places to live, and the same is true of the internet.
So yeah, it seems pretty reasonable to give people repeated warnings, then slow or pause their internet until they take basic steps to stop their connection from being used to abuse others.
You actually think the actors that went to the trouble to surreptitiously set this infrastructure up are going to share it with everyone for free?
They are intentionally made hard to detect and access is sold to the highest bidder.
Most ISP abuse reports are routinely ignored. They might as well be a dead letter box.
Okay, I was being imprecise. These residential proxies aren't "open proxies" in the traditional sense, but they're usually "open" to anyone willing to pay a small amount of money to use them.
> Most ISP abuse reports are routinely ignored. They might as well be a dead letter box.
This is where regulation might play a role, or at least a change in attitude. Companies shouldn't be allowed to pollute the internet in this way when they can easily prevent it.
Unless you are doing GFW China-level traffic analysis against a blacklist, which again how do you prove?
Why do you think that? These are proxies, so they're making huge numbers of outbound connections to websites on behalf of the people operating them. They are the "exit nodes" in this setup.
You could probably just count the number of unique destination IPs they connect to each day. If the average residential user connects to 5,000, an infected machine is probably connecting to 50,000+.
But the simplest approach is to buy access to these illicit proxy services and use them to make requests to web servers you control. If you see your own unique request arrive from a residential IP, you've proven that connection is being used as a proxy.
> But a company can't block US residential IPs if it would also cut off many of their real customers.
since when do companies care whether they cut off real customers? i've been paying for residential proxies for everyday internet browsing for nearly 6 months. because it's the only way to pass the captcha service of another famous company headquartered in San Francisco
anyway if the costs are high surely they can pay the end users. at least then there's awareness and agreement. the ones bundled in apps or software seem less ethical to me than offering them some money per month to host it.
Fix social media, and leave the consumers alone.
Also the firehose of spam will continue regardless of what you do on the consumer end.
Services can dramatically reduce abuse by blocking entire IP ranges based on country of origin, organization, or type (hosting providers). But a company can't block US residential IPs if it would also cut off many of their real customers.
The US government (probably the NSA) should be cracking down hard on US residential proxy networks. They're a genuine national security threat, actual data/identity loss of American citizens, act as infra for foreign covert influence campaigns, botnets used in hacking/DoS attacks, etc.
Major US ISPs (Comcast, AT&T) should detect clearly suspicious activity coming from customer IPs and warn them to scan their computers, check their TV apps, and find whatever is turning their internet into a proxy. It's very bad for the customers too (slows things down, gets their IP banned, etc)