https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/12283
Someone asking you to write a test for new code and then making this blog in response is just so pathetic.
One way is for the PR maker to signal their own attention to detail/effort/commitment by jumping through the (quite reasonable) hoop of writing a test.
Is this extra effort? Yes. But if your motivation in opening the PR in the first place is genuinely to improve the world, then do the slightly harder thing that actually improves the world given the constraints on maintainer attention it operates under, not the thing that is slightly easier for you but leaves your contribution indistinguishable from the sea of slop out there.
per the response: "I'm not sure what kind of test would you like me to write for this change, as it's simply adding 4 quotes"
- <a class="item muted sidebar-item-link" href=${$(this).data('href')}>
+ <a class="item muted sidebar-item-link" href="${$(this).data('href')}">
I know zero about this code path, but suppose it's expected that `${$(this).data('href')}` is already a properly quoted value, like `"https://example.com"`. Then the first line expands to: <a class="item muted sidebar-item-link" href="https://example.com">
and the second expands to: <a class="item muted sidebar-item-link" href=""https://example.com"">
which would have all kinds of room for mischief. Or suppose the template engine auto-quotes values that it injects, so the quotes aren't necessary at all, which is a pretty common approach. The point is that you don't randomly want to throw quotes into HTML or single quotes into SQL just for giggles. You have to write tests demonstrating that the existing common use cases still work after the change, even if it's simply adding 4 quotes. foo onclick
the following shouldn't render: <a class="item muted sidebar-item-link" href=foo onclick>
The following should: <a class="item muted sidebar-item-link" href="foo onclick">> Show us the exploit hitting a remote server.
Watch out, their script works on HN too, as a proof here's me logging in to YOUR computer's root account (a bit more redacted for obvious reasons):
$ python3 ./poc/chain_alpha.py --target dangus > out.txt
$ grep Backdoor out.txt | sed -r 's@[^:]+$@ [REDACTED]@g'
[+] Backdoor admin created: [REDACTED]
$ grep IP out.txt | sed -r 's@[^:]+$@ [REDACTED]@g'
[+] IPv4 address for dangus: [REDACTED]
$ grep 'debug2: shell' out.txt
[+] debug2: shell request accepted on channel 0
$ tail -n12 out.txt
================================================================
[+] COMMAND EXECUTION CONFIRMED!
================================================================
Server-side output (received via SSH, with `set -x`):
+ id -u
0
+ id -g
0
================================================================
$ sha256 ./poc/chain_alpha.py
c10d28a5ff74646683953874b035ca6ba56742db2f95198b54e561523e1880d7 ./poc/chain_alpha.py
The Forgejo disclosure process looked pretty simple and straightforward to me. The bold and all-caps words that bothered the author are just making sure you know how to disclose vulnerabilities safely without leaking zero-day exploits to a wider audience than necessary.
I'm also not impressed with a carrot disclosure that looks like this. Running a python script to compromise a locally hosted instance? Bruh, you have physical hardware and host shell access. That python script could be doing anything including running as root.
Show us the exploit hitting a remote server.