So if an authenticated PayPal email pops up in your Gmail inbox saying you must do this and that to unlock your account, you may be more likely to do so due to the legitimacy of DKIM.
I am reading HN on chrome, but unless I go looking for what browser I use, I wouldn't know.
Always sad. People willing to discount countless hours of expertise and knowledge because a user doesn't know what the name of their browser is. As if that means anything.
For example, I really don't give a shit if my neurosurgeon is aware of what his browser is named. Nor would I dream of calling him stupid if he didn't. Chances are he knows leaps and bounds more about me on most topics, just not casual desktop computing.
Likewise, discounting someone entirely because they're uncomfortable with or uninterested in computers is one of the most ridiculous, ignorant, and self-absorbed things you can do.
"Assume the user is stupid" isn't really being mean to users. It's just shorthand for "make everything as easy as possible. Sane defaults; great design; remove ambiguity; correct documentation; and so on."
I have mistakenly reported several Amazon security emails to their phishing team.
But I'm happy to continue backing up why this particular Wired headline is silly. DKIM is a cryptosystem backed by the insecure DNS. Mail has been spoofable since before RFC822. The whole idea behind phishing attacks is that you can't trust email. Nobody credible has ever suggested that DKIM resolves that problem; you will find no credible Internet security advice anywhere suggesting that a DKIM signature on a piece of email from Paypal or Chase means you should click on a link in that email and log into something.
So Gmail can simply deadpool hundreds of fake paypal phishing emails. That doesn't mean the occasional one that gets through by fooling DKIM is authentic - but the security benefits exist.
Unfortunately, in quibbling over the headline, which you are free to do, you argued that anti-spam has nothing to do with security.
Simply put keeping most of the spam that purports to be from paypal.com out of an inbox is a security issue, even if a determined spammer can thwart dkim via dns shenanigans.
US CERT seems to agree: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/268267
DKIM is one of many, many anti-spam mechanisms in place at Google (and presumably Yahoo). But of course, far fewer people would read and forward this Wired story if you had simply written "Mathematician Finds Weakness In One Google Anti-Spam Measure During Recruitment Attempt".
DKIM plays a key role in keeping phishing e-mails out of the inboxes of hundreds of millions of people who have no idea what PGP or an e-mail header is. It's a standard, not just a Google feature.
And if you'd read the story, you'd see that a number of companies fixed their weak crypto thanks to his efforts.
But, of course, far fewer people would upvote your comments if you didn't diss everything with a tone of condescension.
DKIM is an anti-spam mechanism. It does not authenticate the sender of an email message; to do that, use something like PGP. This is an interesting story, but it's not a story about a "massive net security hole". Mail on the Internet has always been spoofable.
What else do you want me to say? Mail on the Internet is spoofable, with or without DKIM. I literally don't know what I can do to placate you at this point.
DKIM doesn't validate the From line. But where is the weakness in trusting that someone with Google's private key approved the entire content of a message that is signed with Google's key, and so, my trust in Google should extend to the content of that email?
Domains simply are not a meaningful security boundary. At no point in the life of the commercial Internet have they ever been. Yes, there are security mechanisms on the Internet that are simultaneously (a) important and (b) misguided enough to ignore this fact. Fortunately, the most important of them are in practice difficult to reliably and scalably exploit.
This whole story is a tempest in a teacup. As Matthew Green said on Twitter: a 512 bit DKIM key says more about how little Google cares about DKIM than it does about any laxity on Google's part. Google is not lax about security.
Since this thread is also dead, we'll have to wait until someone else tries to get to the top of the front page with a DKIM story to continue arguing about DKIM.
DNSSEC is a boondoggle, and so far as I know no popular application on the entire Internet relies on it for security. But we don't need to hash out DNSSEC vs. DNS to see why a cracked DKIM key isn't a major Internet security hole.