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Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @09:02AM (#4692701)
DKIM is an anti-spam mechanism. It does not authenticate the sender of an email message; to do that, use something like PGP. This is an interesting story, but it's not a story about a "massive net security hole". Mail on the Internet has always been spoofable.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by Erwin on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @09:30AM (#4692830)
Gmail (possibly Hotmail) put a little lock icon next to DKIM authenticated email from some senders, such as eBay & PayPal and outright reject unauthenticated emails from such domains. They've flaunted this feature in the past

So if an authenticated PayPal email pops up in your Gmail inbox saying you must do this and that to unlock your account, you may be more likely to do so due to the legitimacy of DKIM.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @11:00AM (#4693199)
The reality is that people will act on "Paypal" mail that comes from "Payapal.ng". Let's not pretend that DKIM has much to do with that decision. I agree, though, that the little lock in the Gmail UI is misleading.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by borski on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @02:22PM (#4694273)
That UI affordance is actually incredibly frustrating for us, because we get that question a lot. Tons of people get confused by it.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by downandout on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @05:47PM (#4695217)
Just register serverX-paypal.com (where x is a number) ftw. People in general are stupid. When asked what browser they use, the overwhelming majority respond by saying "Google". That says all that needs to be said about the general public.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by onthedole on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @06:06PM (#4695288)
Quite a sad view of humanity. I don't think people are stupid, I think they just don't care and shouldn't care about the browser. It's a tool used to get access to the information they need.

I am reading HN on chrome, but unless I go looking for what browser I use, I wouldn't know.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by shinratdr on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @06:28PM (#4695359)
Decoupling the concept of "you don't intimately know what I have spent my entire life playing with" from "stupidity" seems to be really difficult for the tech crowd.

Always sad. People willing to discount countless hours of expertise and knowledge because a user doesn't know what the name of their browser is. As if that means anything.

For example, I really don't give a shit if my neurosurgeon is aware of what his browser is named. Nor would I dream of calling him stupid if he didn't. Chances are he knows leaps and bounds more about me on most topics, just not casual desktop computing.

Likewise, discounting someone entirely because they're uncomfortable with or uninterested in computers is one of the most ridiculous, ignorant, and self-absorbed things you can do.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by ithcy2 on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @07:21PM (#4695533)
This is about maturity and empathy, and it's certainly not exclusive to the tech crowd. [Insert half-baked pseudo-psychiatric idea about the link between tech people and empathy and Asperger's and so forth]
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by 001sky on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @07:32PM (#4695559)
This is a useful consideration. It Appears to be an affliction of many (if not all "experts") of various stripes.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by drivebyacct2 on Thursday October 25, 2012 @12:50AM (#4696426)
I'm immediately tempted to apply it to politics. I won't, or at least certainly not here, but it's interesting to think about.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by DanBC on Thursday October 25, 2012 @03:34PM (#4699122)
Stupid is a harsh word. But it's short and simple and easy to understand.

"Assume the user is stupid" isn't really being mean to users. It's just shorthand for "make everything as easy as possible. Sane defaults; great design; remove ambiguity; correct documentation; and so on."

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by shinratdr on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @06:29PM (#4695361)
Why does not being intimately familiar with the structure of a URL make someone stupid exactly?
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by Evbn on Thursday October 25, 2012 @11:37PM (#4700752)
Same reason handing your wallet to a stranger who calls himself Dr. Bankersmith is stupid.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by shinratdr on Monday October 29, 2012 @11:25PM (#4715868)
How in the hell is that even somewhat similar?
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by Evbn on Thursday October 25, 2012 @11:35PM (#4700739)
"People" includes major websites like Amazon and banks that send official email from phishy domain names.

I have mistakenly reported several Amazon security emails to their phishing team.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by __alexs on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @02:14PM (#4694223)
Does that Padlock really have anything to do with DKIM or SPF? I thought it was just some magically hard coded thing for eBay and PayPal messages. My own DKIM signed messages certainly don't get it.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by kooshball on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @09:40PM (#4695953)
DKIM/SPF is used. However I believe both gmail and hotmail use a whitelist for the showing the padlock.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by ryan-c on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @05:32PM (#4695147)
For GMail, it's an optional feature that AFAIK is not on by default, and it is hardcoded for eBay/PayPal only.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by rsingel on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @11:18AM (#4693292)
Are you saying that 1) anti-spam is not about about security and that 2) DKIM, even if properly implemented, doesn't make spoofing harder and security better?
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @11:21AM (#4693305)
I'm saying that DKIM is an anti-spam mechanism, and that there are real ways to authenticate the actual sender of a message, like PGP or S/MIME. Calling a cracked DKIM key a "massive Internet security hole" is like calling a bug in SpamAssassin a "massive Internet security hole".
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by rsingel on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @11:36AM (#4693379)
You didn't answer the questions. That's because you well know that anti-spam is security. Just because DKIM isn't foolproof, doesn't make it useless as a layer in anti-spam and security.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @11:55AM (#4693473)
You asked a question that had nothing to do with my comment, so I've declined to engage with you on that point. I'm not interested in litigating whether DKIM is "useless" or not.

But I'm happy to continue backing up why this particular Wired headline is silly. DKIM is a cryptosystem backed by the insecure DNS. Mail has been spoofable since before RFC822. The whole idea behind phishing attacks is that you can't trust email. Nobody credible has ever suggested that DKIM resolves that problem; you will find no credible Internet security advice anywhere suggesting that a DKIM signature on a piece of email from Paypal or Chase means you should click on a link in that email and log into something.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by rsingel on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @01:54PM (#4694113)
Saying that DKIM doesn't adequately verify an email is genuine ignores the point of DKIM which is to weed out emails that clearly aren't genuine.

So Gmail can simply deadpool hundreds of fake paypal phishing emails. That doesn't mean the occasional one that gets through by fooling DKIM is authentic - but the security benefits exist.

Unfortunately, in quibbling over the headline, which you are free to do, you argued that anti-spam has nothing to do with security.

Simply put keeping most of the spam that purports to be from paypal.com out of an inbox is a security issue, even if a determined spammer can thwart dkim via dns shenanigans.

US CERT seems to agree: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/268267

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @02:03PM (#4694158)
What seems to be happening here is that you don't like the fact that I criticized the Wired headline, so you're moving the goalposts from "Massive Net Security Issue" to "Thing That Might Make It Harder For Google To Reject Spam". Then, when I point out that you're moving the goalposts, you respond by simply repeating the claim --- and then suggest that pointing out what DKIM actually is amounts to a "quibble".

DKIM is one of many, many anti-spam mechanisms in place at Google (and presumably Yahoo). But of course, far fewer people would read and forward this Wired story if you had simply written "Mathematician Finds Weakness In One Google Anti-Spam Measure During Recruitment Attempt".

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by rsingel on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @04:32PM (#4694929)
I know you are the resident curmudgeonly voice of security truthfulness on Hacker News, but it's really odd that you keep referring to anti-phishing measures as anti-spam, as if they have no relation whatsoever to security.

DKIM plays a key role in keeping phishing e-mails out of the inboxes of hundreds of millions of people who have no idea what PGP or an e-mail header is. It's a standard, not just a Google feature.

And if you'd read the story, you'd see that a number of companies fixed their weak crypto thanks to his efforts.

But, of course, far fewer people would upvote your comments if you didn't diss everything with a tone of condescension.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @05:07PM (#4695063)
Ryan, I wrote:

DKIM is an anti-spam mechanism. It does not authenticate the sender of an email message; to do that, use something like PGP. This is an interesting story, but it's not a story about a "massive net security hole". Mail on the Internet has always been spoofable.

What else do you want me to say? Mail on the Internet is spoofable, with or without DKIM. I literally don't know what I can do to placate you at this point.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by reinhardt on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @04:21PM (#4694867)
Framing it as a mere anti-spam weakness rather than anti-phishing is kinda disingenuous.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @05:09PM (#4695068)
Here I'm just going to refer you to "Three Myths About DKIM", linked from the front page of the DKIM site:

http://jl.ly/Email/threemyths.html

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by Evbn on Thursday October 25, 2012 @11:43PM (#4700769)
None of those myths talk about spoofing the sender domain.

DKIM doesn't validate the From line. But where is the weakness in trusting that someone with Google's private key approved the entire content of a message that is signed with Google's key, and so, my trust in Google should extend to the content of that email?

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Friday October 26, 2012 @12:39PM (#4702988)
I already provided one specific example upthread: most domains people care about host applications with bugs that allow attackers to generate arbitrary mail from those domains. This is, please note, a very different problem than "being able to generate arbitrary mail under a specific signature". It is considerably easier to forge mail from BANKOFAMERICA.COM than it is to forge mail under the S/MIME signature of a specific Bank of America employee.

Domains simply are not a meaningful security boundary. At no point in the life of the commercial Internet have they ever been. Yes, there are security mechanisms on the Internet that are simultaneously (a) important and (b) misguided enough to ignore this fact. Fortunately, the most important of them are in practice difficult to reliably and scalably exploit.

This whole story is a tempest in a teacup. As Matthew Green said on Twitter: a 512 bit DKIM key says more about how little Google cares about DKIM than it does about any laxity on Google's part. Google is not lax about security.

Since this thread is also dead, we'll have to wait until someone else tries to get to the top of the front page with a DKIM story to continue arguing about DKIM.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by alexchamberlain on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @10:45AM (#4693135)
It authenticates the domain of the sender, right?
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @10:58AM (#4693193)
If you want to impute that much authority to it, sure, but the actual signature verification depends on the insecure DNS anyways. Do not make security decisions based on DKIM. It's an anti-spam mechanism and that's all.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by alexchamberlain on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @11:19AM (#4693295)
My personal opinion is that all email should be considered from a random person.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @11:20AM (#4693301)
I tend to agree, and further suggest that DKIM shouldn't really change that calculation.
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by jrabone on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @11:50AM (#4693452)
Curious - does DNSSEC add much to the amount of trust one can assign to DKIM verification? Or are there better solutions (both for trusted DNS and DKIM-alike)?
Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by tptacek on Wednesday October 24, 2012 @12:03PM (#4693509)
The limitations of DKIM are bigger than the fact that it relies on DNS. The bigger challenge is that domain names are not a particularly valuable trust boundary. Applications on the Internet are full of bugs that allow attackers to source messages from other domains.

DNSSEC is a boondoggle, and so far as I know no popular application on the entire Internet relies on it for security. But we don't need to hash out DNSSEC vs. DNS to see why a cracked DKIM key isn't a major Internet security hole.

Re:How a Google Headhunter’s E-Mail Unraveled a Massive Net ... by Evbn on Thursday October 25, 2012 @11:47PM (#4700779)
How does that signature verification work? Something like a callback to paypal.com to get the verification? (Analogous to downloading an SSL cert from a website without using a trusted side channel like a handwritten note?)