This is probably a big part of why the USPTO sucks. If they had the resources to hire dozens and dozens of industry experts, and pay them aggressively competitive wages, they could probably fix most of the problems most of us have with the system as a whole.
In that system, only huge corporations will be able to afford to file patents that are worth anything. Everyone else gets screwed.
"So I had an idea the other day for a patent reform: property tax on patents.
As long as a company wants to keep the monopoly rights over a patented invention, they are taxed a percentage of the patent's market value each year. They can choose either to pay that tax or sell the patent to someone else.
The government would offer to buy any patent for its market value, using tax revenue gathered from other patents, in doing so putting the invention into the public domain.
This would discourage companies from building large 'defensive' patent portfolios, since they'd be expensive to maintain. It works for the 'lone inventor' scenario too, since the market value of a new, untried invention would be low.
Once a patent's value is proven by developing the patent, its value will rise. At some point, the benefit derived from the patent's monopoly rights will no longer be worth the cost, and the rational thing to do is sell the invention."
EDIT - I guess main point is - is the patent value declared by owner and does the value affect ability to litigate?
But I'm just a little guy. The darn property tax system is set out to screw me.
This is really the whole reason that corporations were invented: so that people could pool their resources together to achieve things that a single person could not achieve. In fact, they used to just be temporary and when the original stated project on the charter was complete then the corporation disbanded.
If a little guy company wants to own a patent under this scheme either a) they have to file the patent with a lower value so they can make the annual "property tax" but that may cap their wins in the future if it's infringed on. or b) get funding from investors to make the property tax payments. Or c) sell or license the patent to a larger entity that could benefit from it. In the case of (c) if it's truly as valuable as they say it is to the patent office then they should be able to find a suitable buyer.
Flat capped taxes on things produce market inefficiencies such as you see in the domain name arena: It costs very little to hold onto things that might be valuable one day. If instead there was a sliding scale to renew a domain based on it's value then you wouldn't really see domain squatters. They'd be forced to sell their domains to someone that could make more productive use out of the resource. Same with land and property taxes. And maybe the same for patents? I kind of like this idea.
And as far as the cost of entry, there are countless fields where patents could only conceivably be filed by someone with a lot of capital: auto, aerospace, medical, pharma, etc. There are certainly lone inventors working in these spaces trying to file patents but it's unlikely they're working on stuff where you need access to enormous wind tunnels or a medical testing population.
EDIT TO ADD: And aren't we as software developers going on and on about how software patents are worth anything? The cost of entry isn't very high at all and therefore they'd be worthless. Patents were supposed to protect the little guy from losing his large up-front research and development costs to the big established guys.
I always understood the purpose of patents was to provide incentive to bring trade secrets out into the documented open for the long-term benefit of society by having a great body of knowledge that anyone can use. So understanding of great inventions didn't disappear with the inventor. A short-term exclusivity on using the technology was the way to provide renumeration for being willing to share your discoveries with the public.
Rubber band scrolling is a cute, even useful, discovery, but it seems like it could be duplicated by just about anyone without any knowledge of what would otherwise be trade secrets. Is that worth documenting for future generations in this way given the high social costs of taking such documentation?
Would Apple really file their rubber-band scrolling patent at a value of $1bil, then pay some multiple of that per year when it's so easily avoided by their competitors? Probably not.
And if they do then more power to them. But it would put an upper bound of the amount of silly patents that a single large company could file and maintain (think IBM, MSFT, Apple, etc). Right now it costs a company hardly nothing to file all these and maintain them but they have a huge potential upside if your competitor steps on that patent landmine.
there isn't the same cost of entry for having a good idea.
There's probably a patent regime that actually would protect "the little guy" but it's long past time to let the USPTO wear that fig leaf over the current system. (Which is to say, I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm more saying, your point is inapplicable. And that's a shame.)
But by defensive usage I mean then at least you know someone else isn't going to patent your key stuff. And once you've got funding/get acquired, the patent could be declared as higher value (and additional fees paid/validation done), and then future litigation to anyone who infringed after that date could be for higher amount.
Just like ROTC, Department of Education can create an Engineering Corps that allows tech students that receive government loans to pay back their debt in form of service.
What you're saying is, de facto, that they should pay examiners more -- enough to be competitive with that -- in the form of student loan repayment. But then where does the money come from, and if it's available then why not reduce turnover by just paying examiners that much whether they have student loans or not?
The patent system can be made more reasonable if we address the problem of bogus patents issued by an overwhelmed USPTO. This would be a step in the right direction.
All that said, if tech heads aren't willing to serve their country, even for a one lousy year, they really should stop complaining about the broken services.
Being paid more to approve more patents is a perverse incentive so egregious it's incredible the system was setup like it was.
No matter what the fees are, decreasing the percentage of patents granted will effectively cut the budget of the agency. Even upper management that is sympathetic to the cause of increasing patent quality is going to find raising standards very painful.
Their budget needs to be completely decoupled from their revenue.
Then they have an incentive for more applications, but little perverse incentive to approve them.
Of course, if they get a reputation for denying spurious claims then they won't get as many applications from spurious applicants, but that's true regardless of their funding source -- you can't produce a sensible budget without considering the number of applications they're expected to process. If the PTO's goal is budget maximization then they'll want to maximize the number of applications, which means providing incentives (in the form of low standards for patentability) for applicants to file more applications. You can't really fix that without creating some powerful incentives for not approving bad patents, like fining the head of the PTO $100K personally for every patent the PTO approved and the courts have to invalidate.
In no way are they a "victim."
> The inventor must make an oath or declaration that he/she believes himself/herself to be the original and first inventor of the subject matter of the application, and he/she must make various other statements required by law and various statements required by the USPTO rules.
Now, it would be VERY difficult to prove the oath was broken. But if it was, it's completely and 100% valid to hold the inventor (here Apple) responsible.
I'm not saying that's what's going on here (or in most cases of an overturned patent), just that it may be Apple's fault. It's not a black and white situation here...
I presume that that's not possible, but still, maybe it would give their collective heads a shake.
Unfortunately some 70% of reexaminations are confirmed to have some sort of issues. This is very shaky ground to be used to routinely afford millions/billions in damages and effectively "lock up" ideas that are obvious or unpatentable.
edit: add source http://ptolitigationcenter.com/essentials/common-questions/#...
It is a good thing that a reexamination process exists to address bad patents when they are the focus of an expensive lawsuit.
Now, after we've been through lawsuit filings, discovery, back-and-forth over injunctions and a trial and gotten a verdict... The patent office turns around and says: "On second thought, we shouldn't have issued that patent in the first place.", which itself will be reexamined and appealed and ... adding onto the existing pile of appeals.
I happen to think that the patent office's invalidation is correct, but even if you don't... this is no way to run a railroad. Successful reexaminations should be a rare, exceptional case in a properly functioning patent system. Instead, we have case after case turning on them (Oracle v Google, the Lodys reexamination requests, ...).
Here's a radical idea: Maybe the patent office should work harder to not grant patents it is likely to invalidate later.