Even if you have your own rack at a colocation, you could argue that if you don't have full disk encryption someone could simply copy your disk.
I am just trying to be practical. If someone is intent on reading what users specifically send me, they can probably find bad hygiene on my part and get it but my concern is they should not be able to do this wholesale at scale for everyone.
You can have full-disk encryption then. It can still possibly be compromised using more advanced methods like cold boot attacks but they are relatively involved, and is very detectable in the form of causing downtime.
Having the private key of the root cert does not allow you to decrypt traffic either.
It's "well known"? News to me.
I doubt the NSA has storage space for even 1 year's worth of "most of encrypted Internet traffic", much less for permanently storing it.
I suppose it's both but the latter is a more scarce resource
By "law enforcement", I'd assume the feds and not local. Why not just say which agency? Wouldn't this pretty much be FBI? Why use such a generic term?
the point is, this isn't the action of local authorities. this is state level activity. if it is local, that's a level of sophistication and corruption that I have ever been aware.
We(?) more or less want this to be a place of general curiosity,
perhaps revolving loosely around those things, but not tightly clung to them.
just kidding, it's just backup access via the datacenter wifi.
These kinds of infrastructure is present everywhere, for a very long time. Just because not everyone is talking about the matter doesn't make it non-existent.
For example, in 2003, I saw how Japan monitored their network traffic in real time. It was eye opening for me, too. Technologies like DPI which required beefy servers are now trivial to implement with the right hardware.
This is all I can say.