Why would an army saying be relevant to an Admiral in the Navy?
Carter replied: "No, sir, I didn’t always do my best."
And Rickover asked "why not?"
This significantly impacted Jimmy Carter and eventually became the title of a book: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/645520.Why_Not_the_Best_
I think GP is probably pattern matching a bit too much. It's plausibly connected, but I doubt it.
IMHO, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyman_G._Rickover article is a much more balanced take.
I think what you're country is seeing is general flaws in quality for basically everything American-made these days. Which, if I'm being totally blunt, are because Americans are lazy and don't care about quality and basically do the minimum that won't get them fired. Hell, I started my career caring about quality and craftmanship and now I do the minimum that won't get me fired too, because there's no point busting your ass for some lazy manager up the chain to take credit for it.
Corporate Power A preoccupation with the so-called bottom line of profit and loss statements, coupled with a lust for expansion, is creating an environment in which fewer businessmen honor traditional values; where responsibility is increasingly disassociated from the the exercise of power; where skill in financial manipulation is valued more than actual knowledge and experience in the business; where attention and effort is directed mostly to short-term considerations, regardless of longer-range consequences.
Political and economic power is increasingly being concentrated among a few large corporations and their officers - power they can apply against society, government and individuals. Through their control of vast resources, these large corporations have become, in effect, another branch of government. They often exercise the power of government, but without the checks and balances inherent in our democratic system.
With their ability to dispense money, officials of large corporations may often exercise greater power to influence society than elected or appointed government officials - but without assuming any of the responsibilities and without being subject to public scrutiny. Woodrow Wilson warned that economic concentration could ''give to a few men a control over the economic life of the country which they might abuse to the undoing of millions of men.'' His stated purposes was: ''to square every process of our national life again with the standards we so proudly set up at the beginning and have always carried in our hearts.'' His comments are apropos today.
Summary: https://www.worldfuturefund.org/Articles/rickover.html Full testimony: https://www.jec.senate.gov/reports/97th%20Congress/Economics...
Expect every salesperson in your company to optimize their own compensation.
If you want to change their behavior, then change your sales compensation plan to drive the behavior you want.
I don't think this is appreciated enough at the management and CEO level of engineering-based companies.
How many engineering-tied metrics were explicitly part of Boeing's CEO's comp plan?
And yet we're suprised when individuals act in their own self interest and produce bad engineering outcomes.
I had an econ teacher who loved the phrase Rules, Incentives, Action, Outcome. She even had pens with RIAO printed out for students. The meaning is that each step led inevitably to the other, but also that you could start at the outcome end, and work your way backwards to what rules created that outcome.
That doesn't make them honest or efficient or trustworthy, just canny and responsive.
By way of contrast, operations can only be seen negatively (if things are working, that's normal, and if things are not, that's bad) and development usually has conflicting incentives (stability! and features! and responsiveness! and bugfixes!) with cycle times and group responsibilites obscuring attribution.
(I hope that does not mean that resurrecting George Washington is necessary)
*At least in the von Neumann-Morgenstern style
> Governments don't lose power unless they lose a war, a rare event today that was common 100 years ago.
A good point, but of course they do lose power with every election - that's the point, a peaceful transition of power.
(Also much of the rest of the Warsaw Pact, and others around the world.)
Afghanistan is very much a reason why they no longer exist.
For example, one wouldn't claim that the de-facto American loss of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is directly affecting the stability of the American regime, would they?
Coming back to the Soviets, I would concur to a claim that the Afghan War was a failed national project, alongside the Chernobyl tragedy and the ecological disaster of the Aral Sea. The narrative I think proper here is first and foremost is the ordinary Soviet citizen's loss of trust in the Soviet way as such, rather than the specific fear of a foreign invasion.
It out-endured them within its own territory. Much as has happened to the US several times, with resulting embarrassment but not regime change.
Military spending on the part of the US, falling global oil prices, multiple internal contradictions and failures, revolt within Warsaw Pact states, and growing internal dissent were far more significant contributors to the ultimate fall.
Britannica and World Atlas give similar accounts:
<https://www.britannica.com/story/why-did-the-soviet-union-co...>
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-reasons-for-the-colla...>
In other words, if you want to solve a problem you need to align the incentives. If you don't your solution is likely to fail, especially on larger scales.
FTFY.
I care but I am not allowed to. VC only cares about numbers that are larger then previous numbers. They hire management who tells us to make the numbers go up. those numbers go up with production so production is king. Production can be increased with a decrease in quality if we degrade the process or improving the process preserving quality. Improvement takes time and money - two hard things. So degrade it is. It's cheap, fast, and makes management look like a super star. If management doesn't give a shit, why should you?
The corner stone of this system is nuclear weapons nonproliferation. This is, on one hand, unjust - why Australia cannot have its own nuclear arsenal and not be dependent on USA to give them protection? But on the other hand, though, think what would happen if we didn't have proliferation and every second African country had nukes (e.g. Yemen Houthis, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Algeria, etc.).
How Algeria would resolve, say, Algerian-Spanish their territorial dispute if Algeria had nukes and Spain did not?
This system is certainly not perfect, but it worked, we'll see if it will work in future.
I don't blame them though because they do have a whole country full of about 15 times as many space-constrained citizens next door (Indonesia)
And yes we didn't spend so much on defense as Trump says, but(!) America never really wanted us to be too powerful. They were really happy to play top dog, obviously the more powerful we are as EU, the more viable a geopolitical opponent we are. The US have never really been too happy with nuclear capabilities in Europe and this is the main thing that deters agressors like Russia. Even the UK's is largely built by the US like the Polaris missiles.
Countering the Soviet Union in Europe had the advantage that the countries were accustomed to an existing alliance and working together. In the western Pacific, South Korea, Japan, the Philipines, Australia, etc. are not at all used to working together. Many are traditional enemies with long-termm animus. And the distances are enormous.
The top US foreign policy goal since 2020, arguably, has been to bind them together with each other and with the US to counter China. The US has been amazingly successful for such a short time, but it's still far from NATO levels of integration.
History is written by those who remain in power and Rickover was a man who embodied speaking truth to power. His career was largely ended when some corporate powers he spoke truth to finally punished him for his opposition.
> but whatever his lessons are
Rickover was very forward about his lessons: https://govleaders.org/rickover.htm
Near the end of his career he mainly wanted to spend time promoting his own philosophies, however his anti "power" message was obscured via political spectacle and threatening corporate power ensured that those that wrote the history books made sure his accomplishments and philosophy faded into obscurity.
> During [the 1960s], Schratz believed, he lost his opportunity for major command because he published a facetious story in 1963 about Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover's burial plans.
Furthermore, he either is unaware of, or elides parts of stories that would refute his implications:
> Having achieved brilliant success with the pressurized water coolant system in the Nautilus installation, innovation in other types of plants was stifled. The USS Seawolf plant, developed in tandem with Nautilus, utilized liquid sodium as coolant, promising much smaller and more compact reactors. Because of limitations in metallurgy, the system was unsuccessful. The program was scrapped, and its obvious superiorities were never again reexamined, even after twenty years of further progress in nuclear technology.
The S2G reactor used in the Seawolf (SSN-575, not SSN-21) was, to quote Rickover, “expensive to build, complex to operate, susceptible to prolonged shutdown as a result of even minor malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair.” First of all, you're running liquid sodium as a coolant; famously, sodium and water are not friends. Second of all, this choice now puts a hard limit on the time you have at sea to be shutdown for emergent repairs, maintenance, etc., because if the plant temperature drops below (or even near, realistically) the melting point of sodium (admittedly fairly low, at ~98 C), you're now stuck.
So I think it's less that the "obvious superiorities" were left alone due to fear of Rickover's wrath, and more because no one wants a cantankerous and potentially explosive reactor in the middle of the boat they're operating.
Similarly:
> When nuclear power was adapted to surface use for large combatants such as aircraft carriers and missile cruisers, new systems apparently were not examined. For instance, a smaller and more efficient combination of nuclear power for normal cruising plus an overdrive of conventional gas turbine plants for high speed use had been proposed but was not investigated further.
The Enterprise (CVN-65), the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, was fast. Really fast. During initial sea trials, she outran her escort [1], which had a listed top speed of 34 knots. And she can maintain that effectively indefinitely. I see no reason why other proposals _should_ be investigated.
But it's this line that really paints the picture:
> The cult of personality and the dominance of the Rickover program tended increasingly to isolate the nuclear Navy officers from the real Navy.
"the real Navy." And there we have it. A bitter officer, angry that he was passed over at even a chance for nuclear command, lashing out at the fact that the organization's newest shiny toys got all the attention.
It was and I'm sure remains a common complaint while I was in that nukes stay in their own world, that they don't participate in general work like stores loads (which is bullshit; I definitely did my share of them), etc. Our retort was always "I'll trade my $5/day propay for your schedule," and no one ever took us up on it (propay is the method by which the Navy gives additional pay for certain jobs; all nuclear trained personnel get $150/month extra, with qualified supervisors getting $450/month extra – also, there are non-nuclear personnel who receive more, like the Assistant Navigator).
During my time at Electric Boat while my boat was being built, I was frequently in shift work. Navy nuclear shift work is ostensibly 8 hours, with 3 shifts, but by the time you factor in pre-shift training, pre-shift brief, shift handover, post-shift cleanup, and any other administrative actions deemed necessary, it's about 12 hours. 12 hours a day (or night, more accurately – I was on the midshift), 7 days a week, for months. Zero days off. The non-nuclear personnel, in contrast, were not in shift work, and since all of their equipment didn't exist yet, their job mostly consisted of showing up to the building we had assigned, puttering around for a few hours, and calling it a day. And yet, their leadership would harangue us during the brief time we spent passing each other for petty details like boots not being shined, uniform being wrinkled, etc. So yes, nukes generally develop a hatred of non-nukes, while the non-nukes often regard nukes as being elitists.
> Nuclear enlisted men never stand nonengineering watches, rarely if ever help load stores and weapons, never have mess-cook duty. As a result, second-class petty officers from the "front end" pull mess-cook duty, serving nuclear-trained third class from the engineering department.
Not only do we not stand non-engineering watches, if we try to qualify for them, we're told no, because "it would demoralize the other watchstanders," quoth a non-nuke Chief to my buddy when he went for the final checkouts on a non-nuke watch station. Apparently demonstrating that someone's job is actually incredibly easy, and they're just not that great at it is mean.
We absolutely load stores; see previous comment. We absolutely do not load weapons, but then again, nor does anyone else who isn't in the weapons department. This is an absurd strawman. Finally, while I'm sure it depends on the command, on my boat, nukes had to crank (mess duty). Joke's on the crew, though; we viewed it as a vacation. You mean all I have to do is wash dishes and listen to music, or serve food a few times a day? Sign me up! Also, at least on submarines, rank doesn't really matter. Generally, E1-E6 can all talk shit to each other, and if you're good at your job, you can talk shit to O1-O3 and get away with it, maybe at most getting a reprimand from the Engineering Officer (who is an O4). In fact, even the nukes would be delighted when we got a JSI (Junior Staff Instructor; some students who graduate the final part of training are extended an offer to stay for 2 years as a sort of initial shore duty, and as part of this, they frequently manage to hit E-6 by the time they're at their first command) who was too big for their britches. I distinctly remember a fully qualified E-2 A-Ganger (auxiliary mechanic, non-nuclear) yelling at our brand new non-qualified E-6 to stop reading a book and qualify something so he'd be useful. The guy tried pulling the "you can't talk to me like that..." card, which was immediately shot down by everyone around him, including the nukes. Your ability, which is formalized in your qualifications, is the only thing that matters.
I'm not denying that Rickover was abrasive, nor that he had little to no regard for the chain of command, Naval tradition, etc. Nor am I saying he didn't have his ethical problems – he absolutely did, especially near the end of his career. However, IMO he had good reason for his beliefs, he created a legacy that still stands, and he advanced the USN into the 21st century.
[0]: https://www.usni.org/press/oral-histories/schratz-paul
[1]: https://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/Recent/Article-View/...
Your experience mirrors mine, down to the cranking being a vacation.
As I alluded to elsewhere I ended up outside Engineering for a substantial part of my career. Amusingly towards the end of my career I was offered a leadership position in the Engineering Department (I was in the Aviation Department, and this was an LHA) due to my background and my reputation within weeks of transferring onboard. It was unheard of, and there were some interesting meetings in the CPO Mess and Wardroom that I was involved in for that, but I ended up not taking it because I simply didn't want the hours.
It was great for the War on Terror era, when submarines were only useful against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and ISIS aircraft carriers. :) Spending money on subs, which includes staffing, operating, and maintaining them, was a waste.
Now the US needs to build capacity, which takes time. It turns out that getting the next AI startup moving is faster than building new nuclear submarine manufacturing facilities, training workers, creating supply lines, and building subs. MVPs generally are not good for submarine warfare.
I've heard enough stories that makes me feel like there are plenty of examples of the PoC rushed to production level experiences with various military equipment.
It's a pendulum many people in tech deal with. But I resent seeing officials, who know better, taking one side or the other in order to always criticize the people doing the hard work of managing these very complex, often cutting-edge projects.
At one point, for at least some projects, the Department of Defense elimated the professional managers and had military officers manage their projects directly. What could go wrong?
It's certainly true the strategic arms processes and nuclear submarine engineering benefited in a long term view.
I just find myself asking if the US army recruiting tag line Be The Best You Can Be was really met, or if Rickover achieved what might be more akin to crystallography "local optimum" where there are better peaks out there, but this one is mine. (To borrow another army concept)
Viewed from Australia the current state of US submarine construction is woeful. We're on the brink of being ripped off having prepaid for access to Virginia class subs soon, and AUKUS subs in future. We expect to be told we cannot have Virginia class subs ever, we cannot have longterm crewing or command ever, but we can host them retained in US HANDS and we can continue to pay for them.
Not that Rickover made that happen, but whatever his lessons are, the US submarine building industry doesn't seem to have learned then, or be able to apply them.