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Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by the__alchemist on Thursday February 27, 2025 @11:42AM (#43195998)
Trivial is not a word I would use here! Rust's `unsafe` gets fuzzy as you transverse an operation's dependencies! There are many applications where marking a function as `unsafe` is subjective.
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Thursday February 27, 2025 @11:45AM (#43196033)
True.

I do think the ideal kind of memory safe language either has no "unsafe", or has an "unsafe" feature that only needs to be used in super rare an obscure cases (Java is like that, sort of).

Fil-C has no "unsafe", so in that sense Fil-C is safer than Rust. You don't need an escape hatch if the memory safety guarantees are dialed in just right.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by hotjump on Thursday February 27, 2025 @12:00PM (#43196179)
The problem of C code migration to memory safe languages is that legacy C projects aim for extremely high performance. Garbage-collecting languages would also be safe in any situation, but I want to note that the recent tendency toward Rust derives from its type-system based approach that imposes very few runtimes checks such as bound checking. I myself hope something like F* gets more attraction in the industry.
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Thursday February 27, 2025 @12:08PM (#43196265)
I hear the perf claim a lot and yet most of the time when I write C/C++ code it's not because it's the most performant. It's either because I'm editing a codebase that's already in C/C++, or I'm using libraries whose best (or only) bindings are C/C++, or because I want to make syscalls (and safe languages don't expose those as nicely as C).
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by rrrix1 on Thursday February 27, 2025 @12:31PM (#43196477)
For desktop, server, web, mobile, etc. This holds true. Not so much for embedded systems, anything with unnatractive memory capacity or processor performance. Rust is starting to make it's way in, but C and even assembly is still king AFAIK.
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Thursday February 27, 2025 @12:45PM (#43196616)
And yet there are embedded systems running JavaScript and Python.
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by kv85s on Thursday February 27, 2025 @06:42PM (#43199883)
Are there any real-world, production systems based on JavaScript and Python?

Toy systems, yes. Hey, I too, think CircuitPython is really neat. But I'm skeptical someone would base a PLC (or similar) on it.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by ckcheng on Thursday February 27, 2025 @08:23PM (#43200556)
Above was talking about embedded systems, and I really don’t know if the James Webb Space Telescope counts, but…

The James Webb Space Telescope runs JavaScript, apparently [1].

[1]: https://www.theverge.com/2022/8/18/23206110/james-webb-space...

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pjmlp on Friday February 28, 2025 @02:44AM (#43202847)
That is the usual myth, back when I initially learned C, hobby programmers in Assembly could easily outperform machine code generated by C compilers, that is why books like those from Mike Abrash exist.

C got its performance fame thanks to optimizing compilers that abuse UB semantics.

Microsoft team on .NET, especially the great Stephen Toub blog posts, has been showing off how much performance can be squizzed out of a managed language compiler toolchain when people actually care.

Also lets not forget Apple only moved away from Object Pascal due to an internal team doing MPW initially as kind of submarine project, due to their UNIX roots, and still their focus was C++, not C.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by titzer on Thursday February 27, 2025 @11:53AM (#43196102)
In Virgil, native targets have a couple of unsafe operations available, one of which is to be able to forge a closure from a pair of a code pointer and an object reference. This is used, e.g. to implement Wizard's JIT and fast interpreter, which generate new machine code at runtime. I can't imagine the level of proof necessary to make that safe--and not just the safety of the generated machine code, but it often lacks bounds checks because it relies on running verified Wasm bytecode, which cannot go out of bounds. So the proof would have to include a complete proof of correctness for the code validation algorithm (i.e. part of Wizard itself).
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Thursday February 27, 2025 @12:00PM (#43196176)
I dream of a JIT API that lets you propose machine code that is checked using an abstract interpreter to ensure that you have adequate checks to stay within the host language's type system.

Someday, man

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by porridgeraisin on Thursday February 27, 2025 @12:56PM (#43196704)
I don't get this, can you explain?
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Thursday February 27, 2025 @01:14PM (#43196879)
Sure.

If I told you that I have a snippet of machine code that:

- obeys the ABI of your safe language (ie it has exactly the calling convention that safe language uses)

- corresponds exactly to a function body whose signature is T->U (or whatever, different safe languages have different function type syntax)

- obeys the language’s type system.

Then you could run an abstract interpreter to check that the machine code follows that type system. Simple example: given the above claims, if we further assume that the host language impl puts argument one into register 5, and the first argument’s type is “pointer to an array of bytes”, and we know that arrays have a 64-bit length prefixed to the start, then the abstract interpreter would just need to check that any deref of register 5 is preceded by a bounds check on whatever was loaded at offset -8 from register 5. And so on, for every possible thing you can do in the language.

Then the JIT would just have to make sure it puts checks in all of the places that the absint expects them. If the absint fails, then the machine code is rejected.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by titzer on Thursday February 27, 2025 @06:11PM (#43199626)
This will kill baseline JIT performance.

I am trying out a couple of new directions, e.g. generating more of the tiers from a more abstract description, constantly shrinking the amount of hand-written compiler/interpreter code. My hard requirement is the end result has to be pretty darn close to what I'd write by hand.

One thing I am thinking about now is how to make more use of the implementation language's (e.g. Virgil) compiler to be able to paste together machine code templates gotten from writing in the implementation language. Think copy-and-patch compilation, but as language primitive. E.g. "please emit an inlined copy of the machine code for this function (first-class ref to said function) into memory here, under this ABI".

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Thursday February 27, 2025 @06:29PM (#43199763)
> This will kill baseline JIT performance.

You say that and then you describe exactly what I would have used as a solution: copy and patch.

Just have the checker check the templates that the baseline JIT is stitching together and then have a safe way to ask for the prechecked templates to be stitched together.

Bunch of details in getting that right obviously, but it doesn’t seem impossible.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by titzer on Friday February 28, 2025 @07:38AM (#43204955)
We're not that far off from each other.

> Just have the checker check the templates that the baseline JIT is stitching together

Sure, from my second paragraph, the templates it's using could be opaque things it got from requesting the static compiler generate a template from a first class function ref (at compile time), in which case the verification has already been done.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Friday February 28, 2025 @09:59AM (#43206314)
I think we're saying the same thing
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by amluto on Thursday February 27, 2025 @03:06PM (#43197911)
I think there’s a sense in which Rust is safer than Fil-C, though: Rust allows abstractions with little to do with memory safety but that still can’t be broken without 'unsafe'. So a struct called EvenNumber can fairly strongly guarantee that it contains an even number.

But Fil-C objects (at least for now?) only seem to allow one single capability type, and that capability grants unrestricted read/write access to the object’s bytes.

I wonder if one could build a handle system in Fil-C that would allow this to be extended. Or if a different variant of a Fil-C-like system could distinguish between pointers with different access levels to an object and could allow only the correct piece of trusted code to increase the permission of a pointer.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Thursday February 27, 2025 @03:18PM (#43198011)
I’ve thought about adding such things to Fil-C but have held off on going there because it feels like a bridge too far.

What I mean by that is: the memory safety issues of C are a total dumpster fire, while whether a number is even or not (and whether you can prove that) is maybe like icing on the dumpster fire. It just doesn’t matter by comparison.

So I want to decisively fix the memory safety issues and not lose focus.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by imtringued on Friday February 28, 2025 @07:07AM (#43204726)
Have you thought about building a C verification framework around Fil-C?

Fil-C doesn't necessarily have to run in production. It just needs to catch the bugs, e.g. by making it easy to fuzz C code compiled via Fil-C.

Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by pizlonator on Friday February 28, 2025 @10:00AM (#43206331)
I think you should run Fil-C in production.
Re:Imposing memory security in C [video] by transpute on Saturday March 01, 2025 @11:01AM (#43220564)
Why not both?