At the very least, you SHOULD keep the 2FA credentials in a separate database (IE, keepassxc can keep multiple databases), so an attacker would need to double their efforts to get both parts of the login.
Even if it's only random-ish, password managers do key stretching (for example by hashing the password 600k times - bitwarden has a high default value and lets you increase it if you like) so that it has to take some computational effort to check if a single password is correct. That's why it take a few seconds to unlock your vault each time.
With these in place I think you're pretty safe for a long time. (Well, maybe until quantum computing breaks those cyphers?)
But this is why I use security keys like yubikeys. Doesn’t matter if an attacker knows my main password for any number of reasons, there’s fuckall they can do with it without my physical key.
And even if they get into my vault and extract passwords, for many websites (in particular the most important ones) they’d still need to use my security key, they can’t just use the passwords.
Attacks are still possible (with browser session fuckery?) but much harder that yet another breach where a website was storing passwords in plaintext
Note, it’s best to not select “remember me” for Bitwarden: https://bitwarden.com/help/twostep-faqs/#q-why-is-bitwarden-...
I like, no I think it's simply a hard requirement, that I can recover from nothing but the contents of my head. I can wake up naked in a foreign country and regain everything.
That's not true. A long sentence of your choosing is easy to memorise and plenty long enough to not be able to be guessed by a computer (brute force).
\s
I'm sure German is not alone, but it is the only one I'm aware of - though with over 7000 known languages I doubt anyone knows enough to state anything with confidence.
Hackers rarely break through the front door. They find a vulnerability elsewhere in the code, your OS, other programs on your computer, the companies servers, the companies staff, and so on. You have to have full faith not just in the encryption algorithm, but its implementation, everything and everyone around it and everywhere it operates and interacts with. Any one of these could be a route in.
This is what I do for my keepass database. It means I can store my database in a cloud service of my choice for sync purposes too.
There is literally no point to encryption if possession of the ciphertext is sufficient to extract the secret.
I use KeePass, never upgrade it, and only back it up to my own cold spinning drives. If malware stole my local vault I'd be in trouble, but it's more convenient than keeping my passwords on paper.
The reason for those losses was partially that LastPass was encrypting with extremely low iterations on long-standing accounts (it also may not have helped that they didn't encrypt URLs either). That was a terrible practice which isn't duplicated by credible alternatives.
As a matter of opinion you may still be right, though personally I consider the risks of a bad password to be higher than a leak purely because without a password manager making it simple to use long random passwords most do tend to be bad ones (duplicated/short/guessable/engineerable) as those are the only ones that are memorable.
It's the usual trade-off between security and usability, with the perfect being the enemy of the good, especially in regard to pushing less technical users to solutions which may not be ideal but are still much safer.
But why would it be better to use passkeys?
Because don't sites with passkeys generally still allow you to fall back to password, since it's common for people to lose their phone and then lose their passkey? Whereas sites with 2FA obviously don't, and have more complicated/secure recovery mechanisms?
So seems to me like 2FA (TOTP's) are currently vastly better in practice?
If an adversary can successfully phish someone, they can often also trick them into providing TOTP codes or approving push notifications. However, TOTP remains significantly better than the alternatives, as it prevents credential stuffing attacks and SMS-related compromises while potentially limiting any account breach to a single session.
I think you're missing the point I made -- that because of the way sites are currently set up, your password can be phished even if you have a passkey, and your password is good enough to get you in.
So given that that is the current state of things, isn't TOTP better because it prevents this? Because at least the TOTP won't let an adversary get in a second time.
Which service is it? Do they ever use that password?
If I were used to signing in with a passkey, I'd find a password prompt suspicious. While the average person might not, it's also possible they would have forgotten the password entirely. There are other services that force TOTP even with hardware keys enrolled. Technically they can be phished, but it would not be successful in all cases.
Unfortunately, varying behavior and support for multifactor protocols (along with risky reset flows) makes it hard to give blanket recommendations.
So ironically, your options would be your passkey, or your password+passkey/FIDO key (in 2FA mode).
Tokens that increase the trust level of an authentication come with additional controls (tamper resistant hardware, passcode, etc)
For normal people, a FIDO token delivers the highest level of security and integrity.
It's the same idea with using a password manager in the first place - if a password manager is going to be the thing that gets you to use secure passwords that vary across services, it's worth the tradeoff of having all of those passwords in one place, because you're much more likely to be compromised by a bad password than by a password manager leak.