And no-one has been 'getting anything across to me', inferring that I'm 'not getting it'. They've been throwing incomplete or irrational arguments, like yours, or simply downvoting.
Sure there have been 'red lines' by Russia, and the US has continuously pushed across them.
But this one was also a US 'red line'. Consistent with keeping a proxy-war in-theater.
Why have they crossed it, now?
What do they hope it will achieve?
Most likely very little militarily.
But maybe quite a lot in shaping or constraining future US policy.
For the same reason they crossed all the others - continued Russian aggression.
Each expansion of US aid or reduction in restrictions on how that aid is utilized has followed logically from Russian actions. Obama started with non-lethal aid; we've initially balked at every single step since that before eventually going "ok, now it's warranted".
It's very clear the US is keeping responses small and incremental to take the wind out of Russian bluster about nuclear holocaust if they do this one more little thing to piss Putin off. It's also very clear the Russian "no don't send Javelins/HIMARS/Patriots/Abrams/MiGs/F-16s/ATACMS, we'll be very mad" has lost a lot of its potency.
And, backtracking, how aware have you been about the situation in Ukraine, or baltic sea infrastructure, in the past few months (even year), compared to the last week? Just a marginal increment, no doubt.
I'd first reject the use of the term "red line" entirely for the ATACMS situation.
"No, not ever" is a red line. The Russians love issuing these for other people, but it's embarassing when they're crossed without significant consequence.
"No, not now" is not a red line. The US tends to shy away from issuing them - one of Obama's biggest mistakes was proclaiming one in Syria and then looking a bit feckless when they violated it. (https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-president-bli...)
Letting Ukraine hit Russian territory with ATACMS is like the fourth or fifth expansion of how they're permitted to use that weapons system so far, as was giving them ATACMS in the first place after HIMARS (which saw a similar set of gradually reduced limitations; https://www.defensenews.com/land/2022/07/08/us-to-send-more-...).
> And, backtracking, how aware have you been about the situation in Ukraine, or baltic sea infrastructure, in the past few months (even year), compared to the last week? Just a marginal increment, no doubt.
I've closely followed the situation in Ukraine since Euromaidan.
No doubt, but the fact is the US told Ukraine they couldn't use ATACMS to target Russia, and now, they can.
And it really is not just another incremental change. Previous red-lines involved what weapons could be deployed within Ukraine, consistent with a 'proxy theater of war'.
This concerns attacks on Russia itself, by Ukraine, but if we're honest, proxy the US, and is qualitatively different.
"I've closely followed the situation in Ukraine since Euromaidan." Then you must recognize that this is not just routine. Unless you're a boiling frog, who also don't pay attention to the news cycle, which is currently full of fearmongering.
It would be silly to claim, that evening, that I violated my own red line by letting them have phone time after dinner.
You continue to mix up “not now” and “not ever”.
> Russia has set out “red lines” before. Some, including providing modern battle tanks and fighter jets to Ukraine, have since been crossed without triggering a direct war between Russia and Nato.
This is the latest of a long list of small, slow, racheting-up responses to unilateral Russian aggression. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_lines_in_the_Russo-Ukraini...