This is crazy. Basically cables were pulling out for months and years and no one raised the alarm? In many industries that could be a criminal or career ending malpractice. Are the "contracted engineers" liable?
It seems unlikely that UCF had adequate time and resources to review and understand the Arecibo Telescope's original 1963 design, the 1974 upgrade, the structural inspection and maintenance records produced for nearly 50 years, [...] and the key factors, such as the wire breaks and cable pullout of the sockets and their significance on the strength and integrity of the structure.
The measured cable pullout may have appeared "normal" to [the UCF staff] and was not on their radar as signs of structural distress. The lack of concern may be because a small cable pullout was present from the beginning, and no one in authority had previously raised an alarm
But yeah, seems weird no-one of the contractors tried to raise an alarm.
Discontinuity could explain problems like this readily.
At least for mechanical, it's 4 years' working experience, documentation of sufficiently advanced projects, and sign-off from 3 other registered professional engineers who are familiar with your work.
A guy I worked with took the mechanical design variant. I don't know how the HVAC variant is. The test is over the most advanced stuff you learn in your degree; the "specialist" portion of the test (what your concentration is in, e.g., HVAC, thermal/fluids, or machine design and materials) is ~25 questions and you have 4 hours to complete it, in addition to the other 4 hour comprehensive portion that's the same for all takers.
On top of that, to keep your license, you need to complete some amount of classroom education every year.
As far as coursework goes, the coursework for some of my upper-level mech E classes was usually identical to a graduate-level course, the only difference being graduate students do a research paper+experiment for a final exam and undergrads do a traditional written exam since they had access to funding and we did not.
imo this comment is dismissive and glosses way too heavily over the rigor that goes into even the "lowliest" of engineering programs.
In Florida, the title of "software engineer" requires a license. To obtain the license, you only need to pass the national engineering (I forgot the exact name of the organization) exam for software engineering. The national exam was withdrawn some years ago. I wrote the Florida Engineering Board about it, suggesting that they needed to update the requirements.
Their response? Florida doesn't distinguish between PE specialties; prospective software engineers should just get a PE license in another field. They suggested electrical engineering.
So in Florida, the PE signing off on your buildings's wiring might be a chemist, or the PE supervising a bridge construction might be only trained in electrical engineering.
Also, if (in Texas) you stamp something outside of your area of expertise and it comes up in a review, it's viewed as if you never had the stamp in the first place[1]
[0]: https://ncees.org/exams/pe-exam/
[1]: https://pels.texas.gov/downloads/lawrules.pdf - rules 133.97(b) and 137.59(b)
My _literal_ engineering 101 case studies on "engineering failure":
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tacoma_Narrows_Bridge_(1940)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyatt_Regency_walkway_collapse
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I-35W_Mississippi_River_bridge
Are all failures traced down to the underlying design and engineering. Granted, they are famous because they are rare. I almost linked the Columbia disaster but that is sufficiently murky between engineer and management.
Stop being elitist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_International_Universi...
Btw, the cult of the professional engineer is apparently much stronger in Canada, to the point I've actually impressed women by calling myself a software engineer despite the lack of iron ring. I wonder if this makes up for them being paid peanuts?
I realize that HN has many actual software engineers, but it seems like every frontend dev today calls himself an engineer. Even on the Laravel website, the default job title for new members is software engineer.
I remember seeing technician jobs for programmers (not "developers"). The difference was that engineers were expected to have a masters degree (5 years) while technicians were expected to have a associate degree (2 years). The contract also was different, usually with a fixed schedule and a lower pay excluding overtime, as any overtime was expected to be paid. But for the job itself, there was essentially no difference between a junior engineer and a technician. Now, listed technician jobs are becoming rare.
Note that it is in France, where degrees matter more than in the US and employment is more regulated, the distinction probably wouldn't be as meaningful in the US.
I honestly don't know if this is sarcastic or not...
It's pretty much how professional prestigious positions work. Beneath the gilding there's duct tape repaired with super glue.
*Edit: okay, I don't know exactly how many are officially PEs vs. junior engineers or something, but at least that many are "PE-track".
They are complaining that developers who can crank out garbage with no consequences and take home $200k+ aren't respected as much as civil engineers who have to get licences and suffer accountability and take home less.
The poor baby.
In 2005 the US said it was in the same condition as 75,000 other bridges in the US: 'structurally deficient', which is also what the US called it in 1990. I'd guess that the same quality of decisions brought down Arecibo. Gotta pay the piper.
I wouldn’t jump to the conclusion that the consulting engineer was incompetent. Sometimes a bureaucrat tells you to sharpen your pencils and come back with the answer That fits the budget they have if you want to keep your professional services contract going.
And what if they did? Then what? My guess is the conversation went something like this:
"Okay, cables are pulling out. Raising this issue will not magically make money appear to fix it as nobody wants to fund this. Tell me, how much do you like your job? If you flag this, you may lose your job directly and if the project gets shut down you may lose your job indirectly. So, how about we bury this as much as possible, cross our fingers and bank as much money as possible in the meantime, eh?"
On Nov 19 2020, NPR was already reporting that "Sean Jones, Director for the Mathematical and Physical Sciences Directorate at the NSF, said the telescope will be dismantled. ... after receiving ... the engineering assessments, we have found no path forward that would allow us to do so safely..." https://www.npr.org/2020/11/19/936677582/world-renowned-arec...
In retrospect, it seems that, -at its age- the design got in the way of repairs. The scope made possible a lot of great finds in its day, but it'd become too weak to save.
The reliance by the consultants (before and after the first cable failure in 2020) on a perceived allowable pullout of one-sixth of the cable diameter, which should only be seen at loading at 80 percent of ultimate cable strength, does not align with the AASHTO M 277 standard guidance. The committee, therefore, disagrees with the suggestion made in the Thornton Tomasetti, Inc. (TT) 2022 report, Arecibo Telescope Collapse: Forensic Investigation,13 to use the D/6 limit as a threshold for slip monitoring.
They're relatively new, they're relatively expensive (which saves them from being used in the worst of the applications) and like most things inherent to steel cable and whatnot they tend to get employed in situations where safety factors are generous. Don't count your chickens before they hatch.
You have a mechanical failure that can’t be seen in the labs and isn’t reproducible at other sites. Suggests something environmental.
Like when natural fiber army gear starts dissolving in the jungles of Vietnam.
Could be direct action, or a side effect of a chemical in plant or animal detritus. Like pigeon poop on car paint.
Active galvanic action will ruin your day.
I have a feeling such measurement and modelling might have been wrong.
It's easy to miss some oscillation mode, particularly high frequency longitudinal wave's in the cables, which couldn't be picked up by a laser survey due to the kilometers per second these waves travel.
Everyone working in large corporations knows this.
And for most applications it was obsoleted by the larger new telescope in china, so there was no large push to turn that ship around from the wider scientific community.
Secondly, even if it had, the report mentions that written documentation of inspections and so on was spotty and inconsistent.
That said, if the failure mode had been published before, and inspections and maintenance was written down in a consistent and detailed manner, then perhaps an LLM-based tool could have linked the two. I'm thinking of a RAG-like search thing that compared inspection reports with published documents. Alternatively just assisting a human in finding relevant published reports.
All the reported experimental zinc electroplasticity (EP) data were developed at current densities orders of magnitude higher than those possibly present in the Arecibo Telescope but measured in laboratory experimental periods that were orders of magnitude shorter than the telescope's socket zinc service.
There are no reported experimental data concerning low-current, long-term EP, which the committee has lumped together under the term "LEP", affecting zinc's creep mechanisms over decades.
The timing and patterns of the Arecibo Telescope's socket failures make the LEP hypothesis the only one that the committee could find that could potentially explain the failure patterns observed.
Accelerated aging is, as far as I know, pretty much standard in the industry. Nobody can wait 20 years to find out if a certain material is good enough or not.
However, the real failure seems to be the lack of urgency when they signs started to show up:
Upon reflection, the unusually large and progressive cable pullouts of key structural cables that could be seen during visual inspection several months and years before the M4N failure should have raised the highest alarm level, requiring urgent action. The lack of documented concern from the contracted engineers about the inconsequentiality of the cable pullouts or the safety factors between Hurricane Maria in 2017 and the failure is alarming.