The problem here is having an attacker control a security sensitive timer in the first place.
Maybe not contrived but definitely insecure by definition. Allowing user control of rates is definitely useful & a power devs will need to grant but it should never be direct control.
No matter how many layers of abstraction you put in between, you're still eventually going to be passing a value to the setTimeout function that was computed based on something the user inputted, right?
If you're not aware of these caveats about extremely high timeout values, how do any layers of abstraction in between help you prevent this? As far as I can see, the only prevention is knowing about the caveats and specifically adding validation for them.
Or comes from a set of known values. This stuff isn't that difficult.
This doesn't require prescient knowledge of high timeout edge cases. It's generally accepted good security practice to limit business logic execution based on user input parameters. This goes beyond input validation & bounds on user input (both also good practice but most likely to just involve a !NaN check here), but more broadly user input is data & timeout values are code. Data should be treated differently by your app than code.
To generalise the case more, another common case of a user submitting a config value that would be used in logic would be string labels for categories. You could validate against a known list of categories (good but potentially expensive) but whether you do or not it's still good hygiene to key the user submitted string against a category hashmap or enum - this cleanly avoids using user input directly in your executing business logic.
although not the OP this is what I would mean by indirect control.
pseudo if userAccountType === "free" then rate = longRate
if userAccountType === "base" then rate = infrequentRate
if userAccountType === "important" then rate = frequentRate
obviously rate determination would probably be more complicated than just userAccountType
Rate limits are implemented with e.g., token buckets which fill to a limit at a fixed rate. Timed tasks would then on run try to take a token, and if none is present wait for one. This would then be dutifully enforced regardless of the current state of scheduled tasks.
Only consideration for the timer itself would be to always add random jitter to avoid having peak loads coalesce.
It’s definitely suboptimal though, even if it is documented.
If your code would misbehave outside a certain range of values and you're input might span a larger range, you should be checking your input against the range that's valid. Your sample code simply doesn't do that, and that's why there's a bug.
That the bug happens to involve a timer is irrelevant.
Except for the fact that this behaviour is surprising.
> you should be checking your input against the range that's valid. Your sample code simply doesn't do that, and that's why there's a bug.
Indeed, so why doesn't setTimeout internally do that?
Given that `setTimeout` is a part of JavaScript's ancient reptilian brain, I wouldn't be surprised it doesn't do those checks just because there's some silly compatibility requirement still lingering and no one in the committees is brave enough to make a breaking change.
(And then, what should setTimeout do if delay is NaN? Do nothing? Call immediately? Throw an exception? Personally I'd prefer it to throw, but I don't think there's any single undeniably correct answer.)
Given the trend to move away from the callbacks, I wonder why there is no `async function sleep(delay)` in the language, that would be free to sort this out nicely without having to be compatible with stuff from '90s. Or something like that.
The browser devs have decided it's acceptable to change the behaviour of setTimeout in some situations.
https://developer.chrome.com/blog/timer-throttling-in-chrome...
Feel free to make a proposal to ECMA.
What's funny is you think that about the caller of setTimeout but not setTimeout itself :)
Welcome to Node.js v22.7.0.
Type ".help" for more information.
> setTimeout(() => console.log('reached'), 3.456e9)
Timeout { <contents elided> }
> (node:64799) TimeoutOverflowWarning: 3456000000 does not fit into a 32-bit signed integer.
Timeout duration was set to 1.
(Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
reached
I'm surprised to see that setTimeout returns an object - I assume at one point it was an integer identifying the timer, the same way it is on the web. (I think I remember it being so at one point.)Sometimes the wait is over before I find the responsible code, and sometimes it does check server-side, but that's just part of the fun...